Akhuwat Microfinance: Participation, Impact and Gender-Based Heterogeneity in Business Returns by Maazullah, M. (Maazullah)
 AKHUWAT MICROFINANCE: PARTICIPATION, 
IMPACT AND GENDER-BASED HETEROGENEITY 
IN BUSINESS RETURNS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Maazullah 
  
  
The research was funded by the Higher Education Commission of 
the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (HEC) 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Maazullah 2016 
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, 
stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any 
means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, 
without the prior permission of the author.  
 
 
 
ISBN 978-90-6490-065-5 
  
AKHUWAT MICROFINANCE: 
Participation, Impact and Gender-Based 
Heterogeneity in Business Returns 
 
MICROFINANCIERING DOOR AKHUWAT: 
PARTICIPATIE, IMPACT EN GENDERGERELATEERDE 
HETEROGENITEIT IN BEDRIJFSOPBRENGSTEN  
 
Thesis 
 
to obtain the degree of Doctor from the 
Erasmus University Rotterdam 
by command of the 
rector magnificus 
 
Professor dr H.A.P. Pols 
 
and in accordance with the decision of the Doctorate Board 
 
The public defence shall be held on 
 
Friday 11 November 2016 at 16.00 hrs 
 
By 
 
Maazullah  
born in Charsadda, Pakistan 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Doctoral Committee 
 
 
Promotor 
Prof.dr. A.S. Bedi 
 
Other members 
Prof.dr. C.L.M. Hermes, University of Groningen 
Prof.dr. I.P. van Staveren 
Prof.dr. S.M. Murshed 
  
 Dedication 
 
 
To my Family 
 
vi 
 
 Contents 
 
 
LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES IX 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS XII 
ABSTRACT XIV 
SAMENVATTING XVI 
1. INTRODUCTION 1 
2. MICROFINANCE SECTOR IN PAKISTAN 4 
2.1 Evolution of the Microfinance Sector in Pakistan 4 
2.2 Performance of the Microfinance Sector in Pakistan 6 
2.2.1 Tapping the Potential 7 
2.2.2 Outreach is Improving 8 
2.2.3 Industry Moving Towards Sustainability 13 
3. AKHUWAT MICROFINANCE 15 
3.1 Historical Background of Akhuwat 15 
3.2 Microfinance Model of Akhuwat 17 
3.3 Akhuwat vs. Conventional MFIs 18 
3.3.1 Mitigation of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection 19 
3.3.2 Interest vs. Zero-interest 20 
3.3.3 Funding Sources 21 
4. DETERMINANTS OF PARTICIPATION IN AKHUWAT MICROFINANCE: THE 
EFFECTS OF LEARNING, PERSONALITY AND PERCEPTIONS 24 
4.1 Introduction 24 
 Contents vii 
4.2 Literature Review 27 
4.3 Sample and Data Collection 31 
4.3.1 Sampling 31 
4.3.2 Data and Operationalization of Key Variables 33 
4.4 Theoretical Framework 41 
4.4.1 Management Science 41 
4.4.2 Economics and Psychology 43 
4.5 Empirical Specification 45 
4.6 Results 46 
4.7 Conclusions 51 
4.8 Appendices 56 
5. ESTIMATING RETURNS TO CAPITAL 71 
5.1 Introduction 71 
5.2 Literature Review 74 
5.3 Theoretical Framework 78 
5.3.1 Theory of Impact 79 
5.3.2 Theory of Randomization 79 
5.4 Context and Description of The Experiment 81 
5.4.1 The Product 81 
5.4.2 Sample 81 
5.4.3 Randomization 82 
5.5 Data 83 
5.6 Sample Attrition 86 
5.7 Estimation of Treatment Effects 87 
5.7.1 Impact of Treatment on Capital stock, Business Profits and 
Hours of Work 88 
5.7.2 Returns to Capital 89 
5.8 Results 89 
5.8.1 Impact of Treatment on Capital stock, Business Profits and 
Hours of Work 89 
5.8.2 Returns to Capital 92 
5.9 Conclusions 95 
5.10 Appendices 98 
viii  
6. GENDER-BASED DIFFERENCES IN BUSINESS RETURNS 115 
6.1 Introduction 115 
6.2 Literature Review 117 
6.2.1 Gender-based Differences in Access to Markets 118 
6.2.2 Differences in Human Capital and Personality Traits 119 
6.3 Data 120 
6.4 Sample Attrition 124 
6.5 Estimation Strategy 125 
6.5.1 Gender-based Heterogeneity in Monthly Profits-Baseline 126 
6.5.2 Gender-based Heterogeneity in Treatment Effects-Panel 
Dataset 128 
6.6 Results 129 
6.6.1 Gender-based Heterogeneity in Monthly Profits-Baseline 129 
6.6.2 Gender-based Heterogeneity in Treatment Effects-Panel 
Dataset 134 
6.7 Conclusions 137 
6.8 Appendices 139 
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS 144 
 
 
 ix 
 
 List of Tables and Figures 
 
List of Tables 
Table 2.2-1: Financial Penetration in Pakistan Rural vs. Urban 7 
Table 3.1-1: Progress Report up to Feb 28, 2015 16 
Table 3.2-1: Products of Akhuwat Microfinance 17 
Table 3.3-1: Akhuwat vs. Conventional MFIs 20 
Table 4.3-1: Comparison of Applicants and Eligible-Non-Applicants based on Akhuwat 
Eligibility Criteria 33 
Table 4.3-2: Comparison of Means-Applicants vs. Non-Applicants 33 
Table 4.3-3: Definition of Personality Domains 37 
Table 4.3-4: NEO-FFI Reliability Test (Full Sample N=687) 38 
Table 4.6-1: Determinants of Probability of Participation in Akhuwat—Probit Marginal 
Effects 50 
Table 4.8-1: Determinants of Participation-Probit 56 
Table 4.8-2: Determinants of Probability of Participation in Akhuwat—Sensitivity 
Analysis 58 
Table 4.8-3: Sensitivity Analysis-Marginal Effects 60 
Table 4.8-4: NEO-FFI Reliability Test (Applicants vs. Non-Applicants) 62 
Table 4.8-5: NEO-FFI Reliability Test (Male vs. Female) 62 
Table 4.8-6: NEO-FFI Reliability Test (Full Sample N=687) 63 
Table 4.8-7: Inter-Scale Correlation Matrix 63 
Table 4.8-8: Scoring Method of NEO-FFI 64 
Table 4.8-9: Operationalization of Learning 65 
Table 4.8-10: Operationalization of Perception of Institutional Barriers 65 
Table 4.8-11: Description of Questionnaire 66 
Table 5.5-1: Descriptive Statistics and Verification of Randomization 85 
Table 5.6-1: Comparison of Means of Attrited and Unattrited Microenterprises 86 
Table 5.6-2: Determinants of Attrition 87 
Table 5.8-1: Impact of Treatment on Business Outcomes 91 
x  
 
Table 5.8-2: Returns to Capital 94 
Table 5.10-1: Sample Size for Different Level of Standardized Effects and Power 100 
Table 6.3-1: Gender-based Distribution of Treatment and Control Groups 120 
Table 6.3-2: Gender-based Distribution by Sectors 121 
Table 6.3-3: Gender-based Differences in Household and Business Characteristics 123 
Table 6.3-4: Baseline Differences in Personality 124 
Table 6.4-1: Comparison of Means of Attrited and Unattrited Microenterprises-Female
 125 
Table 6.4-2: Comparison of Means of Attrited and Unattrited Microenterprises - Male
 125 
Table 6.6-1: Baseline differences in Business Characteristics 129 
Table 6.6-2: Baseline - Gender-based Differences in Monthly Profits 132 
Table 6.6-3: Decomposition of Gender-based Differences in Monthly Profits 133 
Table 6.6-4: Single Difference Estimates 134 
Table 6.6-5: Treatment Effects - Gender-based Heterogeneity in Various Outcomes 136 
Table 6.8-1: Verification of Randomization-Male Microentrepreneurs 139 
Table 6.8-2: Verification of randomization-Female Microentrepreneurs 140 
Table 6.8-3: Treatment Effects – Difference in Difference Estimates for Male and 
Female 142 
Table 6.8-4: Treatment Effects - Returns to Capital 143 
  
List of Figures 
Figure 2.2-1: Evolution of Microfinance Sector in Pakistan 6 
Figure 2.2-2: Growth in number of Microfinance Borrowers and Savers 9 
Figure 2.2-3: Market Share in the number of Microfinance Borrowers 9 
Figure 2.2-4: Distribution of Microcredit by lending methodology 10 
Figure 2.2-5: Gender Distribution of Microcredit Borrowers 11 
Figure 2.2-6: Gender Distribution of Microsavings 11 
Figure 2.2-7: Geographic Distribution of Microcredit Borrowers 12 
Figure 2.2-8: Average Loan Size 12 
Figure 2.2-9: Yield on Gross Loan Portfolio 13 
Figure 4.4-1: Mediated Model of the Determinants of Risky Decision-Making 
Behaviour 43 
Figure 4.8-1: Flowchart of Sampling Strategy 67 
Figure 4.8-2: Comparison of Personality of Applicants and Non-Applicants 68 
Figure 4.8-3: Comparison of Personality of Female and Male 68 
  xi 
Figure 4.8-4: Simulated Marginal Effects of Positive and Negative Learning-Internal 69 
Figure 4.8-5: Simulated Marginal Effects of Positive and Negative Learning-External 69 
Figure 4.8-6: Simulated Marginal Effects of Positive and Negative Learning-External 70 
Figure 5.10-1: Randomization and Data Collection Flowchart 101 
Figure 5.10-2: Timeline of Experiment and Data Collection 102 
Figure 6.3-1: Comparison of Personality: Male vs. Female 124 
 
 
 xii 
 
 Acknowledgements 
 
First and foremost, I would like to thank you Prof. Arjun S. Bedi for 
your support and guidance throughout my PhD which was indeed a very 
intellectually stimulating experience. You have been an outstanding men-
tor to me and many others. Over the years, you have inspired and pro-
duced an excellent cadre of young researchers. I am confident that your 
research will go a long way in making this world a better place to live. 
Arjun I deeply appreciate your patience and faith in my abilities. Thank 
you very much for not giving up on me. I thank Dr. Robert Sparrow, Dr. 
Karin Siegmann, Dr. Luuk van Kempen and Dr. Pedro Goulart for mak-
ing critical comments and helping refine my research design.  
I also wish to acknowledge Akhuwat and its management for being 
open to this research. I thank them for their support. Dr. Amjad Saqib, 
the founding Chief Executive of Akhuwat, Dr. Kamran Shams and Mr. 
Saleem Ahmad Ranjha are some of the most inspiring individuals I have 
ever met in my life. I thank them for facilitating my fieldwork and wish 
them well for their exceptional development endeavour. 
I am grateful to Higher Education Commission of Pakistan for fund-
ing my studies. Economics of Development and Emerging Markets Re-
search Cluster of ISS provided substantial funds for my fieldwork. I am 
also thankful to State Bank of Pakistan for granting me study leave. The 
Netherlands Organization for International Cooperation in Higher Edu-
cation (NUFFIC) made my stay in The Netherlands very comfortable. I 
must say that I am in love with The Netherlands and its people.  
I was extremely lucky to have Kai, Karem, Rafaela and Sathya as my 
PhD batch mates. Thank you very much for your friendship and uncon-
ditional support. ISS was a special place where I met my lifelong friends 
Aamer, Husnulamin, Saleem, Anwar, Shuchi, Moushira, Pedro, Reko, 
Akimi, Arriane, Atsushi, Zelalem and countless others. At the end, I 
would like to thank International Institute of Social Studies and all its 
 Acknowledgements xiii 
staff members for providing me an outstanding enabling research envi-
ronment and excellent learning facilities. Thank you ISS and thank you 
Netherlands; I will surely miss you both. 
At the end, I would like to express my special gratitude and thanks to 
my parents. Thank you Baba and Bebe for being amazing parents. Bebe 
has always been on my side no matter what. Laying head in her lap is still 
my best antidepressant. I wish her a very long and healthy life. I would 
also like to express my gratitude to Niaz, Gulnaz, Farid, Zafar, Zakir and 
all of my nephews and nieces for their prayers and love. Niaz, as an elder 
brother, thank you very much for holding us together. My wife Robeena 
has been an amazing life partner. Thank you Robeena for taking care of 
my wonderful boys Fahad, Abdullah and Mashaal. I could not find a 
suitable word in oxford dictionary to adequately describe the awesome-
ness of my family. While writing these lines, I miss you Baba like a child. 
You were indeed a wonderful father. Today, I am sure you would have 
been very proud of my effort. I was in a race with your life expectancy. I 
knew that the competition was tough and I lost. After your demise, I lost 
my motivation but your memories and love have given me immense 
strength to stand up and recreate myself. I could not gift you the well 
deserved happiness before your last breath for which I am sorry Baba. 
 
. 
 
 
 xiv 
 
 Abstract 
 
AKHUWAT MICROFINANCE: PARTICIPATION, IMPACT AND GENDER-
BASED HETEROGENEITY IN BUSINESS RETURNS - Maazullah 
We conducted this research in collaboration with Akhuwat – a microfi-
nance organization in Pakistan which provides interest free loans to the 
poor. The research findings are reported in three core essays.  
The first essay explores reasons of non-participation in Akhuwat mi-
crofinance. Overall, microfinance has played an important role in provid-
ing basic financial services to the poor. Nonetheless, despite being a 
popular and well funded innovation, a large number of marginalized 
poor still do not participate in microfinance programs. It is still not clear 
whether this failure is because of institutional barriers or self-exclusion 
by the poor. While supply side barriers to participation are well re-
searched in literature, the demand side is still a puzzle.  This essay inves-
tigates this puzzle by exploring reasons of non-participation in Akhu-
wat’s microcredit program by comparing group of Applicants and 
Eligible-non-Applicants.  We find that besides personality, both exoge-
nous and endogenous learning significantly affect participation. Our 
analysis also reveals that when individuals perceive microfinance institu-
tions’ loan recovery methods to be coercive or high handed, it signifi-
cantly reduces the probability of participation. 
The second essay examines the effectiveness of Akhuwat microcredit. 
Lately, in the wake of mixed research findings and media reports about 
suicide of microfinance borrowers in India, there has been an immense 
debate on the usefulness of microfinance.  In this essay, we estimate re-
turn to marginal capital which is a good measure for poor’s affordability 
of microfinance loans. In order to remove selection bias, we use an ex-
perimental design in which we randomly assign microentrepreneurs to 
treatment and control groups. The treatment group receives an interest 
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free loan from Akhuwat. We find that Akhuwat’s microfinance really 
helps. Both monthly profits and capital stock of treatment group signifi-
cantly increase. Using randomized treatment as an instrument for capital 
stock, the estimated returns to capital are in the range of 103.2% to 
142.8% which are very high compared to market interest rates in Paki-
stan.  
The third essay investigates gender-based heterogeneity in treatment 
effects.  It is generally believed that, compared to men, women entrepre-
neurs are more credit constrained and hence are able to generate rela-
tively higher returns to capital. Recent randomized studies though do not 
support this theory. Women entrepreneurs in our sample earn 20% less 
in monthly profits than men. We find that purdah (veil), an institution 
which potentially limits women’s access to labor markets, is associated 
with lower monthly profits. We also find that the labor market price per-
sonality traits differently across genders. Though exhibiting large and 
significant heterogeneity, both male and female entrepreneurs benefit 
from access to additional capital.  
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 Samenvatting 
 
MICROFINANCIERING DOOR AKHUWAT: PARTICIPATIE, IMPACT EN 
GENDERGERELATEERDE HETEROGENITEIT IN BEDRIJFSOPBRENGSTEN 
Dit onderzoek is uitgevoerd in samenwerking met Akhuwat – een 
microfinancieringsinstelling in Pakistan die rentevrije leningen vertrekt 
aan de armen. De onderzoeksresultaten worden beschreven in drie 
essays. ` 
 Het eerste essay gaat over redenen om geen gebruik te maken van 
microfinanciering door Akhuwat. Microfinanciering speelt over het 
algemeen een belangrijke rol bij het verlenen van elementaire financiële 
diensten aan de armen. Maar hoewel microfinancieringsprogramma’s 
populair zijn en er veel geld naartoe gaat, maken grote aantallen 
gemarginaliseerde armen er toch nog steeds geen gebruik van. Het is nog 
niet duidelijk of dit ligt aan institutionele belemmeringen of dat de armen 
zelf afzien van deelname. In de literatuur over microfinanciering is veel 
te vinden over belemmeringen aan de aanbodzijde, maar over de 
vraagkant is nog weinig bekend. Dit essay gaat daarom in op redenen om 
niet deel te nemen aan het microkredietprogramma van Akhuwat. 
Hiertoe is een groep aanvragers vergeleken met een groep die wel in 
aanmerking komt, maar geen microkrediet aanvraagt. Uit de resultaten 
blijkt dat behalve persoonlijkheidskenmerken, zowel exogene als 
endogene vormen van leren een significant effect op deelname hebben. 
Verder blijkt dat de kans op deelname significant daalt wanneer 
individuen invorderingsmethoden van de microfinancieringsinstelling 
dwingend of onsympathiek vinden. 
Het tweede essay behandelt de effectiviteit van microkrediet van 
Akhuwat. Naar aanleiding van tegenstrijdige onderzoeksresultaten en 
verhalen in de media over zelfmoord onder ontvangers van 
microkredieten in India, staat het nut van microfinanciering de laatste tijd 
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behoorlijk ter discussie. In dit onderzoek wordt een schatting gemaakt 
van de opbrengst van het marginaal kapitaal, wat een goede maat is voor 
de betaalbaarheid van microkredieten voor de armen. Om selectie-
effecten te vermijden is een onderzoeksopzet gekozen waarin micro-
ondernemers aselect worden toegewezen aan experimentele en 
controlegroepen. De experimentele groep ontvangt een renteloze lening 
van Akhuwat. Uit het onderzoek blijkt dat microfinanciering door 
Akhuwat echt helpt. Zowel de maandelijkse winst als de kapitaalvoorraad 
van de experimentele groep neemt significant toe. Met aselecte 
toewijzing als instrument voor kapitaalvoorraad ligt de geschatte 
kapitaalopbrengst tussen de 103,2% en 142,8%, wat erg hoog is in 
vergelijking met marktrentes in Pakistan.  
Het derde essay betreft gendergerelateerde heterogeniteit in de effecten 
van de interventie. In het algemeen wordt aangenomen dat vrouwelijke 
ondernemers moeilijker aan krediet kunnen komen dan mannen en 
daarom een relatief hogere kapitaalopbrengst kunnen realiseren. In 
recent gerandomiseerd onderzoek is echter geen steun gevonden voor 
deze theorie. De maandelijkse winst van vrouwelijke ondernemers in 
onze steekproef is 20% lager dan die van mannen. Uit het onderzoek 
blijkt dat purdah (sluier), een gedragscode waardoor vrouwen potentieel 
beperktere toegang tot de arbeidsmarkt hebben, samenhangt met een 
lagere maandelijkse winst. Ook blijkt gender van invloed te zijn op hoe 
persoonlijkheidskenmerken op de arbeidsmarkt worden gewaardeerd. 
Ondanks een grote en significante heterogeniteit profiteren zowel 
mannelijke als vrouwelijke ondernemers van toegang tot extra kapitaal. 
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1  Introduction 
 
A well-developed financial system is essential for inclusive growth– that 
is, growth which benefits all sections of society. Some commentators 
(e.g. Peachy and Roe, 2004) have argued that access to financial services 
should be viewed as a ‘public good’ - just like access to safe drinking water, 
education and basic health facilities. The reality, however, is different as 
around the world low-income households are systematically excluded 
from the financial system. In imperfect markets, financial institutions 
require collateral to secure lending, which low-income households tend 
to lack. As a result, such households are systematically rationed out of 
credit markets and despite having skills and opportunities, lack of capital 
may lock poor families into a poverty trap.  
To bring the unbanked poor into the net of financial services, Prof. 
Muhammad Yunus established the Grameen bank in Bangladesh in 
1976. The Grameen Bank pioneered the idea of group lending in which 
loans were given to low-income individuals under joint liability contracts. 
Grameen, through its innovative group lending technology, successfully 
established that low-income individuals are bankable and that social col-
lateral can be as effective as physical collateral in mitigating problems of 
moral hazard and adverse selection in imperfect credit markets. Microfi-
nance has changed the philosophy of banking and in recognition of his 
exemplary services to humanity, Prof. Yunus and the Grameen bank 
were jointly awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2006.  
The success story of Grameen Bank has shaped the global discourse 
on poverty alleviation and now microfinance is regarded as an important 
development tool. Consequently, microfinance has attracted considerable 
funds from governments and donor agencies. As the industry has ma-
tured, microfinance has been moulded into a more market led interven-
tion where commercial viability and self-sustainability have gained more 
importance. With this paradigm shift, the microfinance industry has at-
2 CHAPTER 1 
 
tracted profit seeking investors. This development has had two contrast-
ing implications for the industry - on the one hand microfinance has at-
tracted much needed capital required for its growth and on the other 
hand the industry has evolved from a development to a commercial 
paradigm. As a result, the idea of services to the poor has gradually been 
replaced by profit driven motives resulting in mission drift (Mitra 2009).  
Notwithstanding the excitement generated by microfinance, evidence 
on its effectiveness is mixed (Armendariz and Morduch 2010). There are 
numerous academic studies and innumerable anecdotes which have es-
tablished a positive impact of microfinance on various socio-economic 
outcomes. For instance, recent randomized control studies in Sri Lanka 
and Mexico have reported large impact of microfinance loans on busi-
ness returns (De Mel et al. 2008, McKenzie and Woodruff 2008). In con-
trast, there are also randomized control studies which have not found 
any impact in India and Morocco. Based on available body of empirical 
research, scholars are clearly divided on the effectiveness of microfi-
nance. David Roodman1 is of the opinion that “microcredit rarely trans-
forms lives”. In support of his claim, in addition to research studies, he 
cites tragic reports on suicide of microfinance borrowers which occurred 
in 2010. As per reports, 80 poor borrowers of microfinance institutions 
committed suicides in the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh after default-
ing on their mounting debt. While reporting on this tragedy, BBC2 
termed microcredit as a ‘big curse’ for these borrowers. Guardian, in its 
March 9, 2011 editorial, posed microfinance as a ‘neoliberal fairytale’. 
BBC reported that in order to control the situation, besides introducing 
tough legislation for microfinance industry, politicians in Andhra 
Pradesh encouraged borrowers to stop repayment of their loans. In the 
wake of these legislations and incitement, the microfinance industry in 
the state of Andhra Pradesh faced imminent collapse.  
Despite being a staunch critic of microfinance and its ‘vaunted repu-
tation’, David Roodman termed Andhra Pradesh state government’s re-
sponse to the crisis as a step towards ‘quashing’ rather than ‘reforming’ 
the microfinance industry. Nine distinguished professors responded and 
wrote an article in the Financial Times criticizing the state government 
for enacting a law which encouraged microfinance borrowers to ‘default 
en masse’. In this article, the scholars opined that lending to the poor 
alone is not the main novelty of microfinance; the main contribution is 
rather lending to the poor at ‘lower interest rates’ than informal money 
 Introduction 3 
lenders. Some researchers and practitioners (e.g. Dehejia et al. 2005 and, 
Fernando 2006) believe that poor households need credit but not neces-
sarily ‘cheap credit’.  While these are valid points, the debate should not 
end here. A more relevant question is whether the ‘lower interest rate’ is 
low enough or cheap credit is cheap enough compared to the repayment 
capacity of the microfinance borrowers? 
The ‘success’ narrative of microfinance is based on a fundamental 
premise – a premise that once poor entrepreneurs have access to capital, 
they will be able to generate steep returns (De Mel et al. 2008, Rodrik 
and Rosenzweig 2009). There are, however, few studies which have in-
vestigated this claim in a credible manner. The purpose of this thesis is to 
fill this gap and to generate evidence on returns to capital from a ran-
domized experiment in Pakistan. The experiment was conducted in co-
operation with Akhuwat Microfinance which has been providing interest 
free microcredit to the poor since 2001. Before establishing the effec-
tiveness of microcredit, we take a step back and examine the reasons of 
non-participation in Akhuwat’s interest free microcredit program. In this 
thesis we also investigate gender-based heterogeneity in business returns 
and treatment effects. 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides 
background information on the evolution of microfinance industry in 
Pakistan, its outreach and performance. Chapter 3 introduces Akhuwat 
Microfinance and its lending model. The next three chapters comprise 
the core of the thesis and investigate three different issues. Chapter 4 
explores the factors which drive (non-) participation in microcredit pro-
grams. Chapter 5 estimates returns to capital. Chapter 6 investigates gen-
der-based heterogeneity in business returns and Chapter 7 provides con-
cluding remarks.  
 
Notes
 
1Source: https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/microcredit-doesnt-end-
poverty-despite-all-the-hype/2012/01/20/gIQAtrfqzR_story.html 
2 Source:  http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-11997571 
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2  Microfinance Sector in Pakistan 
 
This chapter briefly introduces the microfinance industry in Pakistan. 
The first section traces the evolution of the microfinance industry in 
Pakistan in a chronological fashion. The second section analyzes the per-
formance of the microfinance industry in Pakistan in terms of its out-
reach and sustainability. This second section is based on reports pub-
lished by Pakistan Microfinance Network from time to time.   
2.1 Evolution of the Microfinance Sector in Pakistan 
While microfinance as a tool for poverty reduction in developing coun-
tries was introduced as early as 1976, the spread of microcredit has a 
more recent history in Pakistan. Prior to 1980, the focal point of micro-
finance activities was agricultural loans. One of the reasons for this focus 
was that historically, the agriculture sector has employed bulk of the la-
bor force in Pakistan (45% of the total employment for year 2010-11). 
Therefore, the government’s development policies were mainly agricul-
ture specific.  Agriculture Development Bank of Pakistan and other 
state-owned banks were the primary conduits for channelling fiscal allo-
cations to the agriculture sector.  These banks were given annual targets 
for lending to small farmers. In the 1980s, the Aga Khan Rural Support 
Program (AKRSP), in partnership with local community based organiza-
tions in the northern areas of Pakistan, initiated various projects in 
health, education and infrastructure development for the welfare of local 
residents. Later on, AKRSP introduced projects for improving access to 
financial services. AKRSP’s success greatly influenced the government of 
Pakistan’s poverty alleviation policies.  To replicate AKRSP’s model, the 
government of Pakistan established regional RSPs in all four provinces 
(i.e. Sarhad Rural Support Program, Punjab Rural Support Program, 
Thardeep Rural Development Program) and one National Rural Support 
Program.  
 Microfinance Sector in Pakistan 5 
In the 1980s, microfinance services were mainly delivered by the 
aforementioned government-funded rural support programs. At the start 
of the 1990s, Pakistan initiated structural reforms especially in the finan-
cial sector and formulated a comprehensive strategy for poverty reduc-
tion. These reforms were marked by greater openness and liberalization 
of financial markets. State-owned banks were privatized which further 
helped in creation of healthy competition. In 1999, the government of 
Pakistan, in its poverty reduction strategy paper, recognized microfinance 
as a key to poverty alleviation policies. In another step in that direction, 
in February 2007, the government formulated a National Microfinance 
Strategy in consultation with the State Bank of Pakistan (central bank of 
the country), Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP), Pakistan 
Microfinance Network (PMN) and other international agencies. One of 
the targets under this initiative was to increase the number of microfi-
nance borrowers to three million by 2010. To achieve this target, the Na-
tional Microfinance Strategy identified three prerequisites.  
The first prerequisite related to sustainability of microfinance indus-
try. The National Microfinance Strategy emphasized the importance of 
transition from a grant based model to a more market led approach. The 
desire for this transition pushed the industry towards commercialization 
of microfinance activities. Although credit delivery costs are globally 
competitive, Pakistan’s microfinance industry has not yet achieved finan-
cial self-sufficiency3 though it is slowly moving in that direction. The av-
erage microfinance lending rate is 26.1% per annum with financial self-
sufficiency of 74% (Source: Pakistan Microfinance Review 2007).  The 
microfinance strategy proposed that Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund, 
as an apex institution and wholesale provider of concessional funds to 
the microfinance industry, should lend to those microfinance institutions 
that are willing to graduate to a sustainable model4. The strategy also en-
visioned transformation of National Rural Support Program, the largest 
government-funded microfinance provider, into a nationwide microfi-
nance bank.  
The second prerequisite identified the infusion of private capital as a 
critical component for development of microfinance sector. It was esti-
mated that in order to reach three million poor borrowers by 2010, the 
microfinance industry would need an additional US $ 700 million. The 
National Microfinance Strategy proposed the creation of a vibrant bond 
market for attracting capital and emphasized the need for innovative sav-
6 CHAPTER 2 
 
ing products. The strategy also encouraged microfinance industry to en-
hance leverage by raising debt from bond markets and commercial 
banks. 
The third prerequisite dealt with the importance of qualified human 
resources. To support the stated growth targets, the microfinance indus-
try would need 20,000 trained workers comprising 1% senior manage-
ment, 15% middle management and 84% field staff. The strategy empha-
sized microfinance industry to devise transparent recruitment, training 
and retention policies.  
2.2  Performance of the Microfinance Sector in Pakistan 
The deregulation of financial markets, at the start of 1990s, greatly bene-
fited the microfinance industry in Pakistan. Entry barriers into financial 
markets were gradually removed. As a result, the microfinance sector 
started attracting private capital which contributed to microfinance in-
dustry growth. The chronological evolution of microfinance institutions 
in Pakistan can be seen in Figure 2.2-1. In the 1990s, the microfinance 
sector was dominated by multi-dimensional institutions which, besides 
microfinance products, focused on health, education and infrastructure 
development. The start of new millennium though saw emergence of 
specialized institutions. These institutions are primarily responsible for 
microfinance activities.  
Figure 2.2-1: Evolution of Microfinance Sector in Pakistan 
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List of Acronyms   
SAFWCO: Sindh Agricultural and Forestry 
Workers Coordinating Organization 
OPP: Orangi Pilot Project 
SRSP: Sarhad Rural Support Program 
SUNGI: Sungi Development Foundation 
NRSP: National Rural Support Program 
Damen: Development Action for Mobiliza-
tion and Emancipation 
 TF: Taraqee Foundation 
PRSP: Punjab Rural Support Program 
TRDP: Thardeep Rural Development 
Program 
FMFB: First Microfinance Bank 
KB: Khushhali Bank 
MFB: Microfinance Bank 
 
Though access to financial services has improved in the 1990s, finan-
cial exclusion is still high. The private sector credit to GDP ratio is 
26.2% which is one of the lowest in the region5. Table 2.2-1 shows that 
rural areas do not get its fair share in the financial system. 67.0 % of 
Pakistan’s population live in rural areas but their shares in total bank de-
posits and loans are only 25% and 17% respectively. Formal financial 
institutions have reached only 5.9% of 3.176 million small and medium 
enterprises7. Key statistics on some outreach indicators are summarized 
in Table 2.2-1. 
Table 2.2-1: Financial Penetration in Pakistan Rural vs. Urban 
Statistics  Rural  Urban  Total 
% of Population  67.0  33.0  100.0 
% Poverty Incidence  28.1  14.9  23.9 
% of Bank Branches  33.0  67.0  100.0 
% of Population with bank accounts  6.0  37.0  17.0 
% of adult population (+19 years) having account  14.0  75.0  100.0 
% of deposits holders  25.0  75.0  100.0 
% of deposits amount  9.9  91.9  100.0 
% of borrowers  17.0  83.0  100.0 
% of advances  7.1  92.9  100.0 
Source: SBP’s Governor speech delivered at Financial Inclusion Conference, London on June 
19, 2007 
2.2.1 Tapping the Potential 
According to Economic Census of Pakistan Report of May 2005, almost 
94% of 3.17 million small and medium enterprises have no access to 
formal financial institutions. Microfinance industry is gradually moving 
towards tapping this huge potential. The microfinance providers in Paki-
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stan are divided into three different types. The first type is called Micro-
finance Institutions (MFIs). MFIs are non-bank institutions which oper-
ate under Societies Act, Trust Act and Companies Ordinance. These in-
stitutions are not allowed to mobilize deposits and their main sources of 
funding are local and foreign loans and grants. The second type of mi-
crofinance providers fall under a broader category of rural support pro-
grams (RSP). Similar to MFIs, RSPs operate under Societies Act, Trust 
Act and Companies Ordinance. Their main source of funding is fiscal 
allocations and loans from the government and loans and grants from 
local and foreign donors to some extent. The third category is called Mi-
crofinance Banks. These are specialized banks which are allowed to mo-
bilize deposits from the general public. In recent years microfinance 
banks have contributed considerably to the growth of the microfinance 
industry in Pakistan. The following sections summarize key performance 
statistics of the microfinance industry.  
2.2.2 Outreach is Improving 
Over the years, the microfinance industry in Pakistan has witnessed tre-
mendous growth both in size and outreach. Figure 2.2-2 shows that dur-
ing the period from 2008 to 2013 the number of active borrowers in-
creased from 1.7 million to 2.4 million. During this period, the number 
of savings accounts has shown an even more impressive growth re-
cording an increase from less than a quarter million to approximately 3 
million. This growth has been driven mainly by the geographical expan-
sion of microfinance institutions’ branch network.  According to the 
Pakistan Microfinance Network, during the period from June 2005 to 
December 2014, the number of microfinance institutions’ retail branches 
increased from 488 to 2,538.  
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Figure 2.2-2: Growth in number of Microfinance Borrowers and Savers 
 
Source: Pakistan Microfinance Review 2013 
 
Figure 2.2-3 shows that the over the 6 years period from 2008 to 2013 
the share of Microfinance banks in the number of active borrowers rose 
to around 40% while the share of the rural support programs declined. 
Figure 2.2-3: Market Share in the number of Microfinance Borrowers  
 
Source: Pakistan Microfinance Review 2013 
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Microfinance is known for Grameen style group lending. Consistent 
with global trends, group lending also prevails in Pakistan. The trend in 
Figure 2.2-4, however, shows that the industry is gradually moving to-
wards individual lending. Figure 2.2-5 show that women account for a 
larger share of microcredit beneficiaries, however, they account of a mi-
nority of saving accounts. Female clients own only 28% of micro-saving 
accounts (see Figure 2.2-6). 67% of Pakistan population lives in rural 
area. Although the incidence of poverty in rural areas is high, only 58% 
of total microfinance lending goes to rural areas (see Figure 2.2-7). The 
nominal average loan size is on consistent rise. For the period from 2008 
to 2013, the average loan size increased8 from PKR 14,487 to PKR 
26,838 (see Figure 2.2-8). The lending rates in Pakistan, though globally 
competitive, are still on the higher side. The nominal yield on gross port-
folio is a good proxy for microfinance lending rates. The data suggests 
that microfinance industry in Pakistan charges on average 33.5% on mi-
crocredit (see Figure 2.2-9).  
Figure 2.2-4: Distribution of Microcredit by lending methodology  
 
Source: Pakistan Microfinance Review 2013 
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Figure 2.2-5: Gender Distribution of Microcredit Borrowers 
 
Source: Pakistan Microfinance Review 2013 
Figure 2.2-6: Gender Distribution of Microsavings 
 
Source: Pakistan Microfinance Review 2013 
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Figure 2.2-7: Geographic Distribution of Microcredit Borrowers 
 
Source: Pakistan Microfinance Review 2013 
 
Figure 2.2-8: Average Loan Size 
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2.2.3 Industry Moving Towards Sustainability 
Since 2009, the yield on gross revenues of the microfinance industry are 
on consistent rise (See Figure 2.2-9). The industry earns 78% of its in-
come from its core activity which is micro-lending. The productivity in 
terms of loans and deposit per staff member during 2009-2013 showed a 
rising trend. Operating expenses slightly declined. With increased out-
reach overtime, the portfolio at risk (PAR)9 improved. PAR>30 measure 
dropped from 3.4% in 2009 to 1.5% in 2013.  The operational self sus-
tainability measures are positive which shows that the industry is gradu-
ally moving towards sustainability.  
With deregulation of financial markets in Pakistan, the microfinance 
industry has shown promising growth. As a result the industry is gradu-
ally moving towards a more market led approach. According to The 
Economist Intelligence Unit10, Pakistan has the third most enabling envi-
ronment for microfinance sector in the world based on regulatory and 
institutional frameworks. 
Figure 2.2-9: Yield on Gross Loan Portfolio 
 
Source: Pakistan Microfinance Review 2013 
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Notes 
 
3 Microfinance Information Exchange (MIX) defines financial self-sufficiency as 
organization’s ability to fully cover its operational costs 
4 Sustainability refers to an  organization’s ability to survive on its own without 
subsidies and financial assistance  
5 Private sector credit to GDP ratio is 40% in India, 50% in Indonesia and 75% 
in Thailand 
6 Economic Census of Pakistan Report of May 2005 
7 Small and medium enterprises accounts for approximately 99% of total enter-
prises in Pakistan (Source: Economic Census of Pakistan Report of May, 2005). 
State Bank of Pakistan defines Small and Medium Enterprise an entity, ideally not 
a public limited company, which does not employ more than 250 persons (if it is 
manufacturing / service concern) and 50 persons (if it is trading concern) and 
also fulfills the following criteria of either ‘a’ and ‘c’ or ‘b’ and ‘c’ as relevant: 
(a) A trading / service concern with total assets at cost excluding land and 
building up to Rs 50 million. 
(b) A manufacturing concern with total assets at cost excluding land and 
building up to Rs 100 million. 
(c) Any concern (trading, service or manufacturing) with net sales not ex-
ceeding Rs 300 million as per latest financial statements. 
8 This trend alludes to a phenomenon which suggests that with passage of time, 
the microfinance industry is leaning towards lending to relatively less poor (see 
Figure 7).  
9 PAR>30 shows the percentage of gross loan portfolio which are past due (no 
installment paid) for more than 30 days. Higher ratio shows higher non-
performing loans. 
10 
http://www.citigroup.com/citi/citizen/community/data/EIU_Microfinance_20
13_Proof_08.pdf 
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3  Akhuwat Microfinance 
 
3.1 Historical Background of Akhuwat 
Akhuwat Microfinance was established in 2001 by a group of volunteers, 
spear headed by Dr. Amjad Saqib, with a view to extending interest free 
loans11 to poor households. The word Akhuwat is derived from ‘mua-
khaat’ which means fraternity in Arabic. Mua-khaat refers to an event in 
Islamic history in which citizens of Madina shared their wealth with 
needy immigrants from Makkah. According to the founding chief execu-
tive, Akhuwat was established to revitalize the same spirit in society. 
With a motto of “microfinance with a difference” Akhuwat bases its mi-
crofinance model on mobilizing communities for self-reliance, mutual 
support and sharing financial and intellectual resources with the needy. 
In an interview with Berkley Center for Religion, Peace & World Affairs 
on November 1, 201012 Dr. Saqib stated that Akhuwat is gradually be-
coming a cooperative movement. In this interview Dr. Saqib spelled out 
the following four guiding principles for Akhuwat.  
The first principle forbids charging of interest on loans. This principle 
is derived from Islamic teachings on interest. There are injunctions13 in 
Quran, the holy book of Islam, which strictly prohibits charging of inter-
est14. Besides prohibition of interest, Quran encourages those who have 
money to give interest free loans15 to the needy. Apart from ideological 
reasons, the founders of Akhuwat are of the opinion that charging high 
interest rates, as is done by most conventional MFIs for various reasons, 
is not judicious as it adds to the predicament of the poor.  
The second principle recognizes the role of religious centres in devel-
opment. Each branch of Akhuwat is linked with a religious centre i.e. 
Mosque or Church. Besides reducing delivery cost, the involvement of 
these religious centres addresses issues of adverse selection and moral 
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hazard in the credit process. It presumably ensures high repayment rates 
and thus adds to the sustainability of Akhuwat’s model.  
The third guiding principle capitalizes on volunteerism which encour-
ages flow of capital from rich to the poor and sharing of knowledge, 
skills and time for social emancipation in general and poverty alleviation 
in particular. Akhuwat’s reliance on volunteerism ensures community 
participation and thus benefits from local knowledge to poverty allevia-
tion.  
The fourth principle is based on self-reliance. Although Akhuwat 
does not charge any interest, it encourages its borrowers to donate to-
wards Akhuwat’s cause. These donations are voluntary. Dr. Saqib is of 
the view that voluntary contributions instil a value of helping others in its 
borrowers.  
In 2001, Akhuwat started its business with an initial donation of 
Rs.10,000 (approx: $ 96)16 and the first loan was given to a widow. Since 
then it has registered remarkable growth. As of Feb 28, 2015, Akhuwat 
now has 343 branches in 210 cities and towns. To recover its administra-
tive expenditures, Akhuwat initially started levying a membership fee of 
5% of the loan amount; however, this practice was abolished in 2009. As 
of February 28, 2015, Akhuwat had disbursed more than Rs. 13.6 billion 
in revolving credit to more than 0.8 million families. The progress of 
Akhuwat as on February 28, 2015 is summarized in Table 3.1-1. 
Table 3.1-1: Progress Report up to Feb 28, 2015 
PROGRESS INDICATOR TOTAL 
Total Benefiting Families 797,148 
Male 61% 
Female 39% 
Amount Disbursed PKR 13,613,206,842 
Percentage Recovery 99.89% 
Active Loans 345,690 
Outstanding Loan Portfolio PKR 4,226,267,871 
Number of Branches 343 
Number of Cities and Towns 210 
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3.2 Microfinance Model of Akhuwat 
Akhuwat has a wide range of products tailored to the different needs of 
the low-income households. Table 3.2-1 summarizes the products of-
fered by Akhuwat. A common feature of all these products is that they 
are all interest free. Family enterprise Loan is the flagship program of 
Akhuwat in which they target poor microentrepreneurs. Akhuwat fol-
lows a poverty based eligibility criteria
17
. One of the criteria is that the 
monthly percapita income of the household should not be more than 
Rs.1,000. A distinguishing feature of Akhuwat is that it uses mosques 
and churches for marketing and implementation of its program. 
Mosques play a key role in Pakistani society where people congregate 
five times in a day for 15-20 minutes to offer collective prayers. In es-
sence a mosque is a community centre and provides a focal point for 
community outreach.  
Table 3.2-1: Products of Akhuwat Microfinance 
Loan Product Purpose Amount in Rupees 
Family Enterprise Loan For starting or expanding business 10,000 - 30,000 
Liberation Loan To help repay loans taken from 
money lenders 
Normally up to 50,000 
but higher amounts also 
possible with approval of 
executive director. 
Education Loan Financing of education related 
expenses 
Up to 25,000 
Health Loan Health related expenses 10,000 - 20,000 
Emergency Loan For meeting various emergencies 5,000 - 10,000 
Housing Loan Construction or renovation of 
house 
30,000 - 70,000 
Marriage Loan Marriage related expenses Up to 20,000 
Silver Loan Medium size loan for mature busi-
nesses who have completed 3 or 
more of Akhuwat’s loan cycles. 
Up to 50,000 
Source: Adapted from http://www.akhuwat.org.pk/loan_products.asp [Last accessed: June 
22, 2016] 
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Each branch of Akhuwat is attached with at least one mosque in its 
area of operations and most of the times the branch is physically located 
inside or just outside the mosque. In the first stage of the application 
process, the microentrepreneurs fill out a two page application form. 
This application contains basic personal and business information, refer-
ences and the intended utilization of a loan. In addition to the borrower, 
at least one family member, spouse in case of married applicants, signs 
the application form and that is why it is called a family enterprise loan. 
If a borrower meets the initial criteria, the applications enter the second 
stage. In this stage, the branch managers conduct a rigorous economic 
and social appraisal. In the appraisal phase, personal and family informa-
tion, income and expenditure of the household, viability of the business 
plan, assessment of credit needs and the credentials of the guarantors are 
verified. The appraisal process may also include in-depth interviews with 
the applicants and guarantors. For first-time applicants, the normal loan 
amount is Rs. 10,000. After passing through the second stage, successful 
applications are submitted to a credit committee for final approval.  
The whole appraisal process takes approximately three weeks. Once a 
loan is approved, the actual disbursement takes place in a mosque in 
front of at least one guarantor, Imam18 and community members. This 
creates community pressure on the borrower for effective utilization and 
timely repayment of loans. In each mosque, loan disbursements take 
place twice a month and normally 100-150 loans are given out. Borrow-
ers are required to pay their loans in 10 equal monthly installments. As 
per their operational manual, Akhuwat staff regularly visits resi-
dences/work places of the borrowers.  If an installment is not paid in 
time, borrowers are reminded of their duty to pay on time. If this effort 
does not result in successful recovery, then Akhuwat’s management con-
tact guarantors for collection.  
3.3 Akhuwat vs. Conventional MFIs 
Since its inception in 2001, Akhuwat Microfinance has substantially de-
parted from conventional MFIs19 in many ways. First, Akhuwat does not 
charge any interest on loans, second it uses an individual instead of a 
group lending20 approach, third it involves religious institutions in the 
lending process, and fourth, it raises financial resources from the com-
munity and its own borrowers through voluntary contributions. The fol-
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lowing sections provide a brief exposition of the areas where Akhuwat 
differs from conventional MFIs.  
3.3.1 Mitigation of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection 
The conventional microfinance model is based on group lending. There 
is ample evidence in the literature21 that group lending is superior to in-
dividual lending in terms of repayment rates. Akhuwat’s model though 
has challenged this conventional wisdom. Despite individual lending, 
Akhuwat has consistently maintained higher repayment rates than con-
ventional MFIs. Akhuwat has a very low default rate of 0.15% compared 
to 2.29% for other MFIs22 in Pakistan. The success of microfinance in-
stitutions is attributed mainly to their innovative group lending technol-
ogy in which credit discipline is enforced through a joint liability contract 
(Morduch 1999). The incentive structure under group liability mitigates 
the problem of adverse selection and moral hazard in credit markets. In 
joint liability contracts, the group members share the burden of adverse 
selection and moral hazard.  
In the absence of collateral, adverse selection is one of the main prob-
lems faced by lenders. Adverse selection arises from MFIs’ lack of in-
formation on repayment capacity of the borrowers. Group lending, 
which creates joint liability for group members, provides a good low-cost 
solution. Instead of gathering information directly on borrowers, MFIs 
leave this aspect to group members who are expected to utilize their local 
information networks to separate good risks from bad ones. In group 
lending, potential borrowers form groups and jointly assume the respon-
sibility of repaying loans. Using an adverse selection framework, Varian 
(1991) argues that group members know each other’s characteristics 
more than the MFI. To lower the expected joint liability, each member 
likes to have safe partners in the group. In equilibrium, the same type of 
members will partner to form a group and in this process the bad risks 
are screened out. The second benefit of joint liability contract is its ability 
to address the issue of moral hazard. The problem of moral hazard mainly 
refers to borrowers’ unwillingness to repay, underutilization of loan and 
excessive risk taking. In joint liability contracts, group members equally 
share the cost of others’ failures and thus group members have an incen-
tive to exert peer pressure on each other for observing credit discipline.   
Akhuwat tackles the issue of adverse selection and moral hazard in a 
different way. Akhuwat has apparently overcome the problem of adverse 
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selection and moral hazard with the help of embedded incentives in its 
unique microfinance model.  Akhuwat has made the involvement of reli-
gious centers as an integral part of their lending model. Involvement of 
religious centers discourages willful defaults because borrowers suppos-
edly attach religious sanctity to the loans which are disbursed in the 
places of worship. In essence, Akhuwat uses religious sanctity as collat-
eral. Besides religious sanctity, there is also pressure from the family 
member (who signs the application) and the guarantor(s). Involvement 
of religious centers and guarantors may explain rather high repayment 
rates of Akhuwat.  
The main differences in lending technology, credit discipline en-
forcement, incentive mechanisms and outreach philosophy between Ak-
huwat and conventional MFIs are summarized in Table 3.3-1. 
Table 3.3-1: Akhuwat vs. Conventional MFIs 
 
3.3.2 Interest vs. Zero-interest 
Conventional MFIs follow a standard market based approach to sustain-
ability. To achieve this end, MFIs normally charge high interest rates. 
There are two main reasons for this. First, due to small loan sizes, the 
transaction costs of MFIs is generally high.  In order to cover these 
costs, MFIs charge high interest rates. Second, in the absence of physical 
collateral, lending to the poor is considered more risky.  MFIs price their 
Akhuwat Conventional MFIs 
Individual Lending23 Group Lending 
Interest free lending Normally charges more than 30% interest 
Charity from community and voluntary donations 
from borrowers as a main source of funding 
Deposits, loans and grants as a main source of 
funding 
Marketing and implementation of program 
through mosques and churches 
Program implementation through their own 
branch networks 
Community, family pressure, religious sanctity Mainly peer pressure 
Depth of outreach Breadth of outreach 
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microfinance loans commensurate with the risk and therefore charge 
high interest rates. In contrast to conventional MFIs, Akhuwat ap-
proaches sustainability in a different way. It uses the physical network of 
mosques and churches as a cost reduction strategy and spirituality or re-
ligiosity as collateral. For sustainability, Akhuwat’s model of microfi-
nance relies on volunteerism and religious traditions, which encourages 
flow of capital from rich to the poor and sharing of knowledge, skills and 
time for social emancipation. Although, Akhuwat was mainly founded on 
ideological grounds, its operations are secular. It partners with mosques 
and other places of worship such as churches. Akhuwat uses the infra-
structure of these centres which helps it to reduce delivery cost. Further, 
virtues and rewards of munificence and volunteerism are preached at the 
loan distribution ceremonies held in these places of worship which helps 
Akhuwat mobilize donation from the local communities. 
 
3.3.3 Funding Sources 
Conventional MFIs generally rely on savings/deposits, equity, loans and 
grants to finance their operations. Akhuwat has two main sources of 
funding, one is charity from community members and the other one is 
voluntary donations from borrowers. Despite troubled economic situa-
tion, in 2010, people in Pakistan contributed approximately Rs. 140 bil-
lion24 to charity of which 58% was contributed by individuals. A major 
chunk of financial resources for Akhuwat comes from these avenues. As 
per Audited Accounts for the period ending June 2015, Akhuwat re-
ceived Rs. 405 million in donations25. In addition to donations, initially 
Akhuwat used to charge a one-time administration fee of 5% of the loan 
amount. In an interview with the author of this thesis, the CEO of Ak-
huwat revealed that the management of Akhuwat did not consider charg-
ing a fee to be in accordance with its vision. The fee was abolished in 
2009 and instead Akhuwat asked its borrowers to make voluntary contri-
butions to Akhuwat. As per practice, at the time of credit disbursal, each 
borrower is given a donation box in which they are asked to deposit their 
voluntary contributions and deposit it along with payment of instalment. 
This practice turned borrowers into donors. Therefore, apart from 
lender-borrower relationship, this step has defined a new relationship of 
donee-donor between Akhuwat and its borrowers. In the same interview, 
the CEO of Akhuwat stated that besides interest-free lending, through 
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the practice of voluntary donations Akhuwat intended to create institu-
tional ownership and feel-good-factor because it relieved borrowers from 
obligatory service fees and also gave them an institutionalized way of 
helping others. 
 
Notes 
 
11Besides microfinance products, Akhuwat has recently announced establishment 
of Akhuwat University. Akhuwat telemedicine clinics 
12http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/interviews/a-discussion-with-dr-amjad-
saqib-executive-director-akhuwat [Last accessed: June 22, 2016] 
13In Quran Surah Al Baqarah verse 2:278-9 says "O those who believe; fear Allah 
and give up what still remains of the Riba if you are believers. But if you do not 
do so, then be warned of war from Allah and His Messenger. If you repent even 
now, you have the right of the return of your principal; neither will you do wrong 
nor will you be wronged." Further in the same chapter, verse 2:275 says 
“[…]Allah has permitted trade and has forbidden interest[…]. 
14Besides interest free loans, there are numerous permissible market based asset 
and liability products for profit seeking investors. Obaidullah (2005) is a good 
reference for understanding system of Islamic financial services and its implica-
tions for poverty alleviation strategies. 
15In Quran, interest free loans are referred to as Qarz-e-Hasana literally meaning 
the beautiful loan. Surah Al-Baqarah (2:245) says “Who is it that would loan Allah 
a goodly loan so Him (Allah) may multiply it for him many times over? And it is 
Allah who withholds and grants abundance, and to Him (Allah) you will be re-
turned.” Surah At-Taghābun (64:17) says “If you loan Allah a goodly loan, He 
(Allah) will multiply it for you and forgive you. And Allah is most appreciative 
and forbearing.” 
16 Source: 
http://www.xe.com/currencyconverter/convert/?Amount=1&From=PKR&To
=USD [Last accessed: June 22, 2016] 
17Akhuwat’s average loan size of Rs. 11,300 (approximately 120 US$) is very small 
compared to Rs. 20,238 for all other MFIs in Pakistan (Pakistan Microfinance 
Network Jul-Sep 2011). Coleman (2006) argues that by setting smaller loan sizes, 
apparently the cost of participation for wealthy individuals is high and as a result 
only lower-income households participate.  
18A person/cleric who leads the prayer 
19Conventional MFIs refer to those institutions which follow standard group 
lending approach like Grameen Bank. 
 
 Akhuwat Microfinance 23 
 
20 Besides Akhuwat, there are many MFI around the world who are engaged in 
individual lending. This shift from group to individual lending is intended partly 
to make rapid expansion and partly to get rid of some of the disadvantages asso-
ciated with group lending e.g. exertion of excessive peer pressure resulting in vio-
lence, soical isolation and incentive for free-riding. 
21For detail review please refer to Morduch (1999) and Armendariz de Aghion 
and Morduch (2005) 
22http://www.sbp.org.pk/SME/pdf/DFG-Mar.pdf: [Last accessed on Septem-
ber 26, 2009]  
23 In addition to individual lending, Akhuwat has recently started group lending in 
some of their branches again, however, their focus still remains on individual 
lending. Group lending was mainly started to reduce transaction cost and facili-
tate effective loan supervision and recovery.  
24Source: http://tribune.com.pk/story/18318/philanthropy-doubles-to-rs140b  
published on June 3, 2010 [Last accessed on January 18, 2012] 
25 Source: 
http://www.akhuwat.org.pk/pdf/AuditReportfortheyearendedJune302015.pdf 
[Last accessed: June 22, 2016] 
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4  
Determinants of Participation in 
Akhuwat Microfinance: The Effects of 
Learning, Personality and Perceptions 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Microfinance institutions (MFIs) have played an important role in ex-
panding financial services to poor households. By the end of 2009, mi-
crofinance had reached more than 190 million clients (Daley-Harris 
2009). Despite being a popular and well-funded innovation, this figure 
represents only a small proportion of the 2.5 billion26 unbanked adults 
(Armendáriz and Labie 2011). One study reports that, globally, the poor-
est 20% are systematically excluded from formal financial services 
(Hulme and Mosley 1996)27. In Bangladesh alone, 76% of households are 
eligible but only 27% took part in microfinance programs (Evans et al. 
1999). Similarly, in Thailand, MFIs serve relatively less poor households 
(Coleman 2006). All these studies show that a large number of the poor 
do not participate in microfinance programs. It is not, however, clear 
whether such high non-participation rates are due to institutional barriers 
or self-exclusion. 
Most microcredit programs aim to target credit-constrained poor mi-
croentrepreneurs. In order to do so, MFIs generally use income-based 
criteria for ascertaining eligibility of applicants. Although many microen-
trepreneurs potentially meet these criteria, only some decide to apply, 
while others, although eligible, do not apply for microcredit. An intrigu-
ing question is, what factors drive participation or to be more precise, why don’t 
eligible credit-constrained microentrepreneurs apply for microcredit? 
Reasons for non-participation cited in the literature may be broadly 
categorized into supply and demand side barriers. Supply side barriers 
emanate from institutional policies or the regulatory environment which 
may lead to exclusion of the poor. These barriers include inappropriate-
ness of the product design,  MFIs’ mind-set of considering extreme poor 
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as risky clients, insufficient supply of microcredit, formalities required for 
group formation, forced savings, mandatory participation in some activi-
ties, group exclusions and institutional incentives encouraging lending to 
relatively less poor (Evans et al. 1999, Wright 2000, Rutherford 2000, 
Rahman 2000). On the demand side, barriers may include, among others, 
insufficient resources (time and resources for group membership), 
household vulnerability to different shocks, female as a household head 
and lack of education (Evans et al. 1999, Hashemi and Rosenberg 2006, 
Webb et al. 2002). In addition to the aforementioned household and 
business characteristics, there may be a range of other important reasons 
which may explain participation in microcredit programs. This paper 
brings new insights from literature in social networking and psychology 
to examine the demand-side drivers of participation in a microfinance 
program in Pakistan.  
Specifically, the paper examines the role of learning effects on participa-
tion. Learning is conceptualized at two levels, that is, learning from ex-
perimentation and learning as a result of peer effects. In experimentation, an 
endogenous process, individuals learn from their own past actions. The 
gap between actual and expected outcome feeds back into the decision 
making process. As a result, past decisions associated with positive out-
comes are more likely to be repeated than those culminating into nega-
tive outcomes (Sagi and Friedland 2007). In response to failures, human 
beings learn from the past and make adjustments to their future decisions 
(Hayek 1976, p.124-25)28. Folk wisdom says it all, once bitten twice shy. Indi-
viduals who did not benefit from previous loans are expected to shy 
away from applying for microcredit. In addition to experimentation, in-
dividuals also learn by observing payoff related information of their 
peers in a social network (Gale 1996). Peer effects may sometimes lead 
to herd behaviour29. The decision of microentrepreneurs whether or not 
to apply for microcredit may potentially be influenced by others in their 
social network. Taking microcredit entails various risks. Of these risks 
the most obvious one is the uncertainty whether a loan will translate into 
a profitable proposition. In order to reduce uncertainties, individuals may 
seek information from their peers. Based on their own experience or ob-
servational learning, the consulted peers may present microcredit as an 
opportunity or as a threat. Such exposé results in framing effects – a cognitive 
bias in which microentrepreneurs may react differently to microcredit 
depending on whether it is presented as an opportunity or a threat. While 
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there are a few papers that have focused on the effects of learning on 
participation in welfare schemes and investment in retirement plans, the 
effects of learning on participation decisions in microcredit programs has 
not been analyzed30. In this paper we study whether the decision to take 
microcredit is affected by the credit histories of microentrepreneurs and 
their peers.  
Besides differences in learning, individuals have different personality 
traits in terms of the way they think, feel and act (Borghans et al. 2008). 
These traits shape the way individuals perceive and process information and 
as a result variation in traits may induce idiosyncratic responses when 
they face the decision whether or not to apply for microcredit. There is a 
rich strand of literature which establishes strong links between different 
personality traits and time allocation and risk-taking behavior (Borghans 
et al. 2008, Almlund et al. 2011, Heckman 2011). We expect that, 
through preference parameters, personality traits may also be one of the 
determinants of participation in microcredit programs, therefore, in addi-
tion to learning we also control for differences in personality traits.  
This study has been conducted in collaboration with Akhuwat micro-
finance in Pakistan. The study explores non-participation in Akhuwat’s 
family enterprise loans31–a product which accounts for 91% of its total loan 
portfolio. For this study, we gathered data from 488 Applicants of Akhu-
wat and 199 Eligible-non-Applicants. The data was collected from these two 
groups through a survey questionnaire consisting of detailed sections on 
household and business level information, questions to measure person-
ality traits of microentrepreneurs, their credit histories and perceptions 
about loan and credit enforcement mechanisms.  For personality traits, 
we used the Urdu-language32 version of the Big Five personality inven-
tory.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 provides a 
brief literature review. Section 4.3 relates to sampling and delineates op-
erationalization of personality, learning and perceptions. Section 4.4 pro-
vides theoretical grounding to this study from literature in management, 
economics and psychology. Section 4.5 outlines the empirical specifica-
tion. Section 4.6 estimates the model and discusses results and section 
4.7 concludes. 
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4.2 Literature Review 
Despite the commendable success of MFIs in terms of outreach, a num-
ber of studies have reported high rate of exclusion of the poor. An inter-
esting dimension of this problem is that despite being eligible for micro-
credit, some individuals still do not participate. The limited evidence on 
the reasons for non-participation may be broadly mapped into supply 
side and demand side barriers33. Supply side barriers normally stem from 
institutional dynamics in which microfinance institutions purposively 
screen out some applicants as they are considered high-risk clients. De-
mand side barriers, on the other hand, refer to self-exclusion where eligi-
ble individuals decide not to participate. 
In this paper we are interested in the demand side of non-
participation. The evidence on reasons for non-participation mainly 
comes from studies done on the microfinance sector in Bangladesh. 
Hashemi (1997) cites lack of confidence, group exclusion and the fear of 
violating social norms34 as the main reasons for non-participation. 
Hashemi and Rosenberg (2006) state that the non-participating poor are 
generally risk-averse and lack confidence in their own entrepreneurial 
abilities. Because of their uncertain and vulnerable income, poor entre-
preneurs may be reluctant to enter into a binding contract which in-
volves regular payment of instalments. Webb et al. (2002) are of the 
opinion that reasons for non-participation include poor’s low aspirations 
shown by their high discount rate; lack of confidence and lack of entre-
preneurship because of their risk averse nature.  
In addition to the aforementioned reasons, the literature on social 
networking and psychology provides useful theoretical grounding for 
exploring reasons for non-participation in microfinance programs. The 
differences between participants and eligible-non-participants may ema-
nate from two sources. First, the differences may emanate from within 
the social networks in which individuals are exposed to learning from 
their peers. Second, the differences may also arise from personality traits 
which capture the way individuals think, feel and act (Borghans et al. 
2008). Differences in learning from social networks and personality traits 
may be a key driver of participation decisions in microcredit programs.  
Peer effects operate through channels of information and norms  (Lutt-
mer et al. 1998). Whenever individuals seek information about micro-
credit programs, their search normally starts within their social networks 
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in an effort to minimize their search costs. Thereafter, the decision 
whether to participate or not depends on norms which gives social sanc-
tion to microcredit. For example, if some microentrepreneurs raise their 
needed capital through microcredit, it signals a social approval for such 
forms of raising capital to his/her peers. Peer effects sometimes result in 
herding. By analyzing sequential decision model, Banerjee (1992), in his 
seminal work, showed that individuals exhibit ‘herd behavior’ in their deci-
sion making. The push for joining the herd comes from ‘informational ex-
ternalities’ where individuals join the herd by assuming that others, who 
are already in the herd, have superior information (Gale 1996). Accord-
ing to Gale, by observing others’ payoff related information in the net-
work, individuals engage in social learning. 
Individuals have the ability to learn from their peers35. Various studies 
have examined peer effects on different socio-economic outcomes. 
Zimmerman (2003) used a quasi-experimental design and measured peer 
effects in academic outcomes. The peers were identified as roommates. 
The paper argues that upon arrival of new students the allocation of stu-
dent housing is random and hence the process of peer formation is or-
thogonal to individual’s characteristics. The paper found that students in 
the middle of the SAT score distribution earn relatively lower grades if 
they share rooms with students in the lower 15% of the SAT verbal 
score distribution. The effects were small but statistically significant. 
Similarly, Bayer et al. (2009) examine peer effects on criminal behavior. 
Based on data of 169 juvenile correction facilities, the paper found that 
the crimes committed after the release of inmates exhibited strong evi-
dence of peer effects. Some studies have estimated peer effects on par-
ticipation in social programs. For example, Dahl et al. (2012) studied the 
influence of peers on participation in paternity leave program in Norway. 
The study used regression discontinuity design to address problems of 
reflection, correlated observables and endogenous group formation. The 
Norwegian government introduced a government paid paternity one-
month leave policy for fathers who had their children born after April 1, 
1993. The policy was intended to bring a gender balance. The paper 
found that the co-workers and brothers of the beneficiaries of this policy 
were also more likely to avail paternity leave. The paper claimed that the 
increased participation of co-workers and brothers was mainly induced 
by peer effects. Similarly, Duflo and Saez (2002) studied the role of peer 
effects on participation in a retirement plan and the choice of a particular 
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investment scheme. The study was conducted in a large university in the 
United States. The paper finds that ‘peer effects’ may be an important 
factor in saving and investment decisions. Luttmer et al. (1998) also find 
a strong influence of social network on participation in state welfare 
schemes.  
The literature on peer effects in the microfinance sector is scarce. A 
study on women’s participation in microfinance programs in India con-
cluded that the presence of other microcredit programs or self-help 
groups in the same or nearby villages had a significant positive impact on 
the participation of women in the microfinance programs through what 
the paper calls “demonstration effect” (Anjugam and Ramasamy 2007). Breza 
(2011) investigated peer effects on microfinance loan repayments. A 
massive default occurred when a government official in Krishna District 
of Andhra Pradesh, India asked microfinance borrowers to stop repay-
ment of their loans. After some time, the situation gradually improved as 
the borrowers started repaying their loans. The paper finds that borrow-
ers are indeed influenced by repayment behavior of their peers. Borrow-
ers were more likely to repay if their peers shift from full default to full 
repayment. 
Banerjee et al. (2011) study the process of information diffusion in 
social networks and its effects on participation in Bharatha Swamukti 
Samsthe (BSS) microfinance program in India. Besides other contribu-
tions, this study systematically examines peer effects on participation de-
cisions in a microfinance program.  The paper identifies two types of 
information diffusion models. In pure information models, the primary 
driver of diffusion is ‘mechanical information’, for example information 
about the existence of microcredit opportunities. In peer effects models, in-
dividuals interact and learn from each other. Banerjee et al. (2011) col-
lected social networks data from 75 villages. BSS introduced their micro-
finance program to a set of individuals in the community what the paper 
calls ‘injection points’ in 43 villages. The injection points were the first 
ones to receive this information. After getting information, some indi-
viduals in the injection points participated and others did not.   The in-
formation about BSS then diffuses in the villages through these injection 
points. The papers finds that participation rates in BSS are high in those 
villages where information injection points have higher importance 
measured in terms of eigenvector centrality. The paper also finds that 
participants are more likely to share information than informed non-
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participants; however, the paper did not find peer effects on participa-
tion decisions, that is, peers’ participation does not influence the partici-
pation decision of other peers in the network. Banerjee et al. (2011) 
mainly examine the diffusion of information and its effect on participa-
tion decisions. In this paper we go one step further. In addition to in-
formation about loans, we also capture outcomes associated with these 
loans (i.e. whether the loans taken by relatives and friends are associated 
with positive or negative outcomes). Sharing such information leads to 
learning which may potentially influence the participation decision of 
other peers in the network. While doing so, we follow Duflo and Saez 
(2002) and make no distinction whether variation in participation deci-
sions come from effects of learning or conformity with norms.  
In addition to learning, behavioural economists acknowledge the role 
of individual’s personality in affecting different socio-economic out-
comes. Heckman (2011) views personality as a response function which 
generates individual-specific enduring patterns of actions in response to 
set of constraints, endowments and incentives. Broadly speaking, indi-
viduals differ from each other in the way they think, feel, and act (Bor-
ghans et al. 2008). These differences have the ability to influence per-
sonal choices (Benartzi and Thaler 2002). Muller and Plug (2006) 
conceptualize personality as a bundle of productive traits which are 
traded in the labor market. Tett et al. (1991) find that people choose pro-
fessions which pay highest rewards on their possessed traits and as a re-
sult, in equilibrium state, labor market observes occupational sorting 
based on personality traits. Other studies try to explain non-participation 
from a different angle. For example, De Mel et al. (2008) mention that 
one possible reason of not applying for a loan might be that individu-
als/firms overestimate the probability of rejection of their loan applica-
tion. The probability of rejection is based on individual’s perception. 
The literature review in the preceding paragraphs has important im-
plications for our work. In this paper we bring new insights from the 
fields of social networking and psychology to explain reasons of non-
participation. As far as we know, this is the first study which controls for 
learning, personality traits and individuals’ perception about institutional 
barriers.   
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4.3 Sample and Data Collection 
The main research question is, what factors drive individuals to apply for 
Akhuwat’s microcredit? Or in other words, why do some microentrepre-
neurs, although eligible, not apply for credit? To empirically examine rea-
sons for non-participation, we compare Applicants and Eligible-Non-
Applicants. We selected a group of Applicants from a pool of Akhuwat’s 
applications. Group of Eligible-Non-Applicants consists of those eligible 
microentrepreneurs who did not apply for Akhuwat loan. Due to lack of 
information, finding eligible-non-applicants was a challenge. To over-
come this problem, the fieldwork was conducted in two stages. In the 
first stage, a shorter version of survey was administered to those micro-
entrepreneurs who were eligible based on Akhuwat eligibility criteria but 
did not apply for microcredit; and in the second stage, we conducted a 
detailed survey. We used the following sampling strategy. 
 
4.3.1 Sampling 
In the first stage, we are interested in those microentrepreneurs who 
could meet the eligibility criteria of Akhuwat but did not apply for a loan. 
To identify them, we used the application form of Akhuwat as screening 
instrument. The application form is simple and mainly contains house-
hold and business related information and planned utilization of loan. 
Application forms were distributed among potentially eligible microen-
trepreneurs in the neighbourhood of mosques (through which Akhuwat 
operates) and branches of Akhuwat. The search was purposive and busi-
nesses similar to that of applicants were targeted. The target group was 
approached at either home or business addresses. A total of 317 applica-
tions were filled out. These applications (from non-participants) were 
then mixed with those actual loan applications which Akhuwat received. 
Akhuwat officers were asked to evaluate all applications and decide 
about their eligibility based on Akhuwat’s existing criteria. To avoid any 
possible bias in favour or against the actual applicants, the identity of 
those applied and those who did not apply were kept confidential from the of-
ficers. Furthermore, the applications received in one branch were evalu-
ated by officers of other branches. Among 317 non-applicants, 207 were 
eligible based on information provided in the application. Most of the 
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rejected 110 applications were deemed ineligible based on income crite-
ria.  
In the second stage, a detailed survey was conducted. The survey in-
strument consisted of eight sections including a dedicated section on 
personality. Mueller and Plug (2006) argue that announcement of bene-
fits may change expectations of the respondents and as a result it may 
create a bias on personality domains. To address this concern and re-
move any possible contamination, the detailed survey was conducted 
before announcement of eligible applicants. The target group of the de-
tailed survey comprised of 488 participants (selected from Akhuwat’s 
pool of applications) and 207 non-applicants. Among 207 non-
applicants, 8 refused to cooperate and did not fill the detailed question-
naire. The flowchart of sampling strategy is summarized in Figure 4.8-1 
in the appendix. 
The fact that one group applied for Akhuwat’s loan and the other did 
not, implies that both groups are inherently different. We only claim that 
both Applicants and Eligible-Non-Applicants meet Akhuwat’s loan eligibility 
criteria. To test if our sampling strategy has created a valid group of Eli-
gible-Non-Applicants, we compared both groups based on following three 
core eligibility criteria of Akhuwat. Although Akhuwat implements their 
program through mosques, they claim that their program is secular. Since 
individuals with higher mosque attendance may have better networks 
and access to information regarding Akhuwat program, nevertheless we 
hypothesize that the number of prayers in a day may have an effect on 
probability of participation. Due to its importance, in addition to the 
three core eligibility criteria of Akhuwat, we add the fourth one for com-
parison purposes.   
1. Whether households in both groups have same percapita income level. 
2. Whether both groups are able to provide personal guarantees. 
3. Whether both groups are willing to go to mosque. We captured their willingness 
by asking them a direct question and also gathered data on the number of pray-
ers that they attend in a day. 
4. The number of prayers attended by respondents in a day 
As it is evident in Table 4.3-1, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of 
equal means. It implies that our sampling strategy created a valid group 
of non-Applicants who are eligible but did not apply. 
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Table 4.3-1: Comparison of Applicants and Eligible-Non-Applicants based on 
Akhuwat Eligibility Criteria 
Variable Applicants Eligible- 
Non-Applicants 
t-test 
t-statistic 
Percapita income 2,716 2,610 0.643 
Can provide guarantees 83.4% 82.9% 0.155 
Have problem visiting mosque 3.9% 4.0% 0.077 
Number of prayers in a day 2.45 2.3 1.030 
Significance levels (*=10%,**=5%, ***=1%) 
4.3.2 Data and Operationalization of Key Variables 
This study uses a cross-sectional survey data gathered from 687 respon-
dents (488 applicants and 199 eligible-non-applicants). The survey was 
conducted in June 2010 in four branches of Akhuwat microfinance 
headquartered in Lahore, Pakistan. The data on household and business 
characteristics, NEO-FFI personality traits, learning and perceptions 
were gathered through a survey questionnaire. Table 4.8-11 in the ap-
pendix provides a short description on the different sections of the sur-
vey instrument. Table 4.3-2 provides descriptive statistics and compari-
son of selected variables for Applicants and Non-Applicants. 
Table 4.3-2: Comparison of Means-Applicants vs. Non-Applicants 
: Both Groups have Equal Means 
  Applicants (N=488)  Non-Applicants (N=199)  t-test 
t-
statistic Variables  Mean Std. 
Dev. 
 Mean Std. 
Dev. 
 
Household percapita monthly 
income 
 2,716 2,031  2,610 1,774  0.643 
Sex of the entrepreneur  0.76 0.43  0.79 0.41  0.840 
0H
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Education of the entrepreneur  4.89 4.12  5.21 4.70  0.883*** 
Age of the Entrepreneur  38.60 10.30  35.00 10.20  4.220** 
HH with at least one chronic 
patient (Yes=1, No=0) 
 0.17 0.38  0.10 0.30  2.440 
Number of prayers in a day  2.45 1.69  2.30 1.65  1.030 
Family business  0.10 0.30  0.10 0.30  0.168 
Doing business for survival  0.13 0.33  0.07 0.25  1.110 
Profit and growth opportuni-
ties 
 0.34 0.48  0.39 0.49  2.290** 
Direct monthly business in-
come 
 8,170 1,365  8,244 1,354  0.647 
Credit requirement  23,557 17,193  21,025 14,900  1.820* 
Neuroticism  2.48 0.65  2.54 0.71  1.050 
Extraversion  3.51 0.65  3.50 0.64  0.083 
Openness  3.27 0.78  3.26 0.76  0.205 
Agreeableness  3.61 0.66  3.58 0.71  0.455 
Conscientiousness  3.86 0.68  3.71 0.71  2.480** 
Positive Internal Learning-
Internal 
 0.26 0.44  0.15 0.35  3.270*** 
Neutral Internal Learning-
Internal 
 0.13 0.33  0.15 0.36  0.902 
Negative Internal Learning-
Internal 
 0.09 0.29  0.19 0.39  3.460*** 
Positive External Learning-
Relatives 
 0.32 0.47  0.21 0.41  2.860*** 
Neutral External Learning-
Relatives 
 0.09 0.29  0.11 0.31  0.537 
Negative External Learning-
Relatives 
 0.09 0.29  0.18 0.38  3.210*** 
Positive External Learning-
Friends 
 0.26 0.44  0.18 0.39  2.220** 
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Neutral External Learning- 
Friends 
 0.08 0.28  0.10 0.30  0.482 
Negative External Learning- 
Friends 
 0.06 0.24  0.13 0.33  2.710*** 
Think that MFI takes 
bribe(Yes=1, No=0) 
 0.46 0.50  0.50 0.50  0.986 
Consider loan bad (Yes=1, 
No=0) 
 0.55 0.50  0.61 0.49  1.460 
Perception that loan en-
forcement is non-institutional 
 0.52 0.50  0.57 0.50  1.080 
Significance levels (*=10%,**=5%, ***=1%) 
 
4.3.2.1 Household 
The household section relates to detailed information on household 
characteristics. In this section we collected basic demographic data (age, 
sex, marriage, education etc), health status, income and its sources, 
household assets, access to different amenities and prevalence of dowry 
in the household etc. 86% of the households in our sample are male-
headed families. The microentrepreneurs in our sample have an average 
education of 4.98 years. 
Based on bivariate analysis of subsamples, both Applicants and Non-
Applicants are significantly different from each other on some house-
hold characteristics. Applicants have larger family with 5.64 members 
compared to 5.50 members in family of Non-Applicants. Entrepreneurs 
in group of Applicants are 39 years old compared to 35 years in non-
applicants. Similarly, Applicants reported significantly higher rates of 
chronic illness than Non-Applicants.  
4.3.2.2 Business 
The business section of the questionnaire comprises of detailed informa-
tion on microenterprises and its owner’s characteristics. In our sample, 
most microenterprises work in retail (34%) and services (35%). Microen-
trepreneurs in our sample reported limited access to formal financial ser-
vices. 8% of microentrepreneurs have a bank account in their name and 
only 2% has business account. Applicants reported a slightly lower  
monthly business income (Rs. 8,170) compared to non-applicants (Rs. 
8,243). For evaluation of business assets, we recorded value of tools and 
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equipments, vehicles, immovable property, inventories and unfinished 
goods etc at market price and net of depreciation. The average assets 
owned by a microenterprise were Rs. 29,309 and both groups did not 
show any significant differences on this variable. 
In the business part of our survey instrument, profitability of micro-
enterprise is the key variable of interest. Like other developing countries, 
the activities of microenterprises in Pakistan are not well documented. In 
our sample 45% of the businesses did not maintain any record and 15% 
relied on personal notes/chits. Remaining 40% used informal registers 
for record-keeping and none of the microenterprises in our sample pre-
pared formal financial statements. Mckenzie and Woodruff (2008) state 
that due to lack of proper record keeping, responses on business profit-
ability are based on recall and personal notes which may result in report-
ing errors.  
De Mel et al. (2009b) find that data on profits obtained by asking a di-
rect question provides more reliable measure than using revenue minus 
expenses approach. The study reveals that firms tend to underreport 
their revenues by 31% and similarly they overestimate their expenses 
which results in discrepancy between both approaches. We measure 
profitability of microenterprises in two different ways. First, we employ 
revenues minus expenses approach and second we ask a direct question 
on business profitability. In our sample, data on income obtained 
through both methods were significantly correlated with coefficient of 
0.86 which is higher than the surveys done in other countries. Correla-
tion between direct profits and profits derived from revenue minus ex-
penses approach was 0.26 in Côte d’Ivoire, negative and close to zero in 
Ghana (Vijverberg and Mead 2000) and 0.24 in Zimbabwe (Daniels 
2001). 
4.3.2.3 Personality Traits 
Literature in psychology shows that personality traits are partly heritable 
and partly shaped by environment through social roles and cultural mi-
lieu (Loehlin et al. 1998, McGue et al. 1993, Helson et al. 2002). To ad-
dress the cultural malleability of personality traits, we use the Urdu ver-
sion of NEO-FFI test developed by National Institute of Psychology, 
Islamabad, Pakistan36. Definitions of each domain and associated charac-
teristics are given Table 4.3-3. 
 Determinants of Participation 37 
Table 4.3-3: Definition of Personality Domains 
Domain Definition Characteristics   
Neuroticism 
The degree to which a 
person experiences the 
world as threatening and 
beyond his/her control. 
High 
Fear, sadness, embarrassment, an-
ger, guilt and disgust.  
Low 
Emotional stability, generally calm-
ness, feeling relaxed, even-
temperament, feeling secure, self-
satisfied, able to face stressful situa-
tions 
Extroversion 
The degree to which a 
person needs attention 
and social interaction. 
High 
Assertive, active, talkative, enjoy ex-
citement and stimulation, cheerful in 
disposition, sociable, gregarious 
Low 
Reserved, quiet, independent rather 
than follower, even paced 
Openness 
The degree to which a 
person needs intellectual 
stimulation, change, and 
variety. 
High 
Imaginative, creative, complex, intel-
lectual curiosity, daring, independent, 
analytical, untraditional, artistic, liberal 
and independence of judgment 
Low 
Uncreative, simple, not curious , non-
adventurous, conforming, non-
analytical, inartistic, traditional, con-
servative and narrow interests 
Agreeableness 
The degree to which a 
person needs pleasant 
and harmonious relations 
with others. 
High 
Sympathetic, altruistic, warm 
Low 
Egocentric, skeptical, cold, competi-
tive and non-cooperative 
Conscientiousness 
The degree to which a 
person is willing to com-
ply with conventional 
rules, norms, and stand-
ards. 
High 
Scrupulous, punctual, consistent, 
persevering, organized and reliable 
Low 
Careless, low assertiveness, unor-
ganized,  impulsive, irresponsive, 
undependable and lazy 
Source: Characteristics taken from NEO-FFI (2002) booklet of National Institute of Psychology 
and definitions taken as verbatim from Borghans et al. (2008) 
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Urdu version of NEO-FFI is a multiple construct Big Five personality 
inventory and is fully adapted to local environment. The test is com-
prised of 60 questions with 33 positive and 27 negative scoring items. 
We choose to use NEO-FFI37 because it adequately describes personality 
at the broadest level (Goldberg 1971). Urdu version of NEO-FFI has 
been tested on large number of participants for its reliability. Langdridge 
and Hagger-Johnson (2009) are of the view that tested scales can be im-
plemented directly in the field without pretesting. Borghans et al. (2008) 
argue that anticipation of future benefits may increase present self-
esteem; therefore, we expected that announcement of beneficiaries or 
eligibility of applicants might contaminate responses on the personality 
measures. To tackle this issue, we conducted survey prior to announce-
ment of eligibility. The enumerators asked questions on NEO-FFI test 
from the respondents and recorded their responses. We are aware that 
the responses may have been contaminated by the way the questions 
were put to the respondents. 
For each domain, the NEO-FFI test resulted in alpha reliability38 
ranging from 0.76 to 0.84. Table 4.3-4 provides reliability coefficients 
and average inter-item covariance. Usually, reliability of 0.70 or higher 
are considered adequate (Nunnally and Bernstein , p. 265)39. Since psy-
chological scales require more introspection than cognitive tests, 
Youngman (1979) considers reliability of as low as 0.60 acceptable.  
Table 4.3-4: NEO-FFI Reliability Test (Full Sample N=687) 
Domain 
No. of items in 
scale 
Average inter-
item covariance 
Scale reliability 
coefficients 
Neuroticism 12 0.351 0.78 
Extroversion 12 0.320 0.77 
Openness 12 0.500 0.84 
Agreeableness 12 0.348 0.76 
Conscientiousness 12 0.379 0.80 
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Each personality domain was measured with 12 questions on a scale 
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) 40. Table 4.8-7 in the ap-
pendix shows that Neuroticism is negatively correlated to Extraversion, 
Openness, Agreeableness and Conscientiousness.  Besides Neuroticism, 
remaining four domains are positively correlated to each other. Respon-
dents scored an average of 2.50 on Neuroticism, 3.51 on Extraversion, 
3.27 on Openness, 3.60 on Agreeableness and 3.82 on Conscientious-
ness. Using a two-tailed t-test, bivariate analysis reveals that on Conscien-
tiousness scale Applicants scored significantly higher than Non-
Applicants. For Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness and Agreeableness 
variables, we cannot reject null hypothesis of equal means. Table 4.8-4 in 
the appendix provides comparison of NEO-FFI for applicants and non-
applicants (see Figure 4.8-2 for boxplots); and Table 4.8-5 in the appendix 
provides comparison of NEO-FFI for male and female entrepreneurs 
(see Figure 4.8-3 for boxplots).  
4.3.2.4 Learning 
Individuals take loans for easing different credit requirements and attach 
various expectations to it. Any gap in the expected and actual outcome 
of the loan sends a positive or negative feedback. We conceptualize 
learning relating to credit histories and recognize it to be emanating from 
two different sources. The first one is endogenous (i.e. experimentation) 
which we call internal learning and the other one is exogenous (i.e. learn-
ing from others) which we call external learning. In the context of social 
network, we capture exogenous learning from two types of bonds i.e. 
relatives and friends. With such conceptualization, we divide learning in 
three categories i.e. learning through experimentation, learning from rela-
tives and learning from friends. Intuitively individuals value each type of 
learning differently depending on the strength of interdependence of 
each bond. Each category of learning is then measured at four levels. For 
example, we asked following question from the respondents to measure 
internal learning.  
Q: If you ever took a loan, what was the impact of the loan on your socio-economic 
conditions? 
(1) Never took a loan [No Learning] (2). Took a loan and condition 
improved [Positive Learning] (3). Took a loan and condition did not 
change [Neutral Learning] (4). Took a loan and condition deteriorated 
[Negative Learning] 
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Compared to No Learning, Neutral Learning has additional informa-
tional content. Individuals with Neutral Learning had gone through the 
loaning process in the past whereas individuals with No Learning did not 
have such experience. Neutral learning might negatively affect the par-
ticipation decision especially in those situations where the respondents 
consider loans as a social stigma. External learning from relatives and 
friends were also operationalized in the same manner.  For detail (see Ta-
ble 4.8-9 in the appendix). 
In full sample, internal learning, external learning from relatives and 
external learning from friends were reported by 48%, 50% and 41% of 
the respondents respectively. Compared to Non-Applicants, group of 
Applicants has significantly higher proportion of individuals with posi-
tive learning and significantly lower proportion of individuals with nega-
tive learning.  
 
4.3.2.5 Perception 
Institutional barriers are supply side phenomena; however, perception of 
these barriers makes them a demand side problem. In our research de-
sign, both Applicants and Eligible-Non-Applicants face same institu-
tional barriers because eligibility of both groups was decided on same 
selection criteria. This implies that we treat institutional barriers as given 
but at the same time acknowledge that individuals might have different 
perceptions of these barriers. For example, one of the criticisms on mi-
crofinance is that MFIs sometimes resort to non-institutional mecha-
nisms for enforcing credit discipline (e.g. use of threats and violence). 
Similarly, MFIs consider extreme poor as risky clients and hence poor 
are excluded (Rahman 2000). We capture individual variations in percep-
tions by asking different questions. For example; 
 
Q: Do you think that MFIs lend to the poor? [Yes]    [No] 
 
The above question was intended to capture individual’s perception 
about MFI’s mindset. In our sample, both groups perceive institutional 
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barriers differently. Significant differences include perception about em-
ployees’ behaviour, MFIs’ credit policy/mind-set towards the poor and 
microentrepreneurs’ confidence in their own entrepreneurship skills. 
36% of the Non-Applicants and 29% of the Applicants perceive that 
employees of MFIs are unfriendly. 39% of the Applicants and only 32% 
of the Non-Applicants think that MFIs lend to the poor. 87% of the 
Applicants were confident that they could payback their loan compared 
to only 81% of Non-Applicants. 
4.4 Theoretical Framework 
Various studies have found that the marginal returns to capital for mi-
croenterprises are well above the market interest rate.  While investigat-
ing heterogeneity of treatment effects, De Mel et al.(2008) raise an inter-
esting question as to why firms are not taking advantage of these high 
returns. Is it because of the imperfect markets; or is it because of self-
exclusion driven by different risk propensity of entrepreneurs or is it be-
cause of both? 
There is no simple answer. Although, numerous research studies have 
established positive impact of microcredit, at the same time, microcredit 
does not always provide panacea of all problems for the poor41. The 
benefits accrued to microcredit are not visible in short run and similarly 
they are subtle and not clear to everyone alike. In other words, micro-
credit also carries a degree of risk. For example, Montgomery (1996) ar-
gues that some poor consider credit as a potential burden; Webb et al. 
(2002) mention that poor avoids credit when economic conditions are 
volatile and Hashemi and Rosenberg(2006) report that large number of 
new startups fail and hence investment in new startups is a risky proposi-
tion. So the pertinent question is that how do entrepreneurs make deci-
sions which involves risk?  
For providing theoretical grounding to our research, we benefit from 
two strands of literature. The first one is motivated by literature in man-
agement science and the second one builds on cross disciplinary research 
in the field of economics and psychology.  
4.4.1 Management Science 
According to social networking theory, individuals make a rational 
choice of developing an interdependent bond with other individuals in 
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the network. The nature of bond is defined by type of interdependence 
(e.g. kinship, friendship, common belief or interest etc.). Individuals pur-
sue their own goals and informally participate in information and risk 
sharing. In this process, individuals learn both from their own past ac-
tions and actions of other individuals in the network.  
Hayek(1976, p.124-25)42  argues that individuals set different goals 
and attach various expectations to them. Some of the expectations are 
not met and in the process of striving, individuals learn by trial and error. 
In response to failure, like any other self-organizing system, individuals 
learn and make adjustments. As a result, past decisions resulting in posi-
tive outcomes are more likely to be repeated than those resulting in nega-
tive outcomes (Sagi and Friedland 2007). Besides repetition of decisions, 
successful outcome history increases risk seeking propensity (Thaler and 
Johnson 1990). With a positive outcome history, decision makers are 
more likely to make similar decisions when confronted with a similar 
situation. 
In addition to experimentation (learning from own actions), feedback 
also comes from exogenous arrival of information by observing actions 
of others. Sitkin and Weingart(1995) provide a conceptual framework 
showing the effect of feedback on decision making behavior. The core 
proposition of Sitkin and Weingart is that variation in exogenous vari-
ables - outcome history and problem framing - affects decision making behav-
ior. The effects of outcome history and problem framing on decision 
making behavior are mediated by risk propensity and risk perceptions. Ac-
cording to this model, the sources of variations in decision making come 
from two different levels. The first source of variation relates to individ-
ual differences in risk preferences in terms of seeking or avoiding risks. 
The second source of variation in decision making behavior is caused by 
idiosyncrasies in risk perception, that is, decision makers have different 
assessment of situational uncertainty. According to this model, outcome 
history alters risk propensity of the decision maker; however, risk per-
ceptions of the decision maker is shaped both by risk propensity and 
problem framing (see Figure 4.4-1).  
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Figure 4.4-1: Mediated Model of the Determinants of Risky Decision-Making 
Behaviour 
 
Source: Sitkin and Weingart (1995) 
 
The above model shows that exogenous information resulting from 
interaction within social network are factored in the decision making 
process through problem framing. Individuals confront various uncer-
tainties which they try to resolve by getting feedback from other indi-
viduals in the network. For example, before applying for a loan, an en-
trepreneur may discuss its pros and cons with her family and friends. 
The process of consultation involves framing. The consulted members in 
the network frame the problem the way they see or perceive it resulting 
in a feedback contagion. Positive or negative framing of the problem in-
fluences the risk perception of the decision maker and as a result some 
individuals may consider loan-taking as an opportunity and others may see 
it as a threat. In this framework, we hypothesize that negative credit histo-
ries of individuals and their peers in the network will discourage them to 
apply for Akhuwat’s microcredit. Similarly, positive credit histories will 
encourage them to apply. 
 
4.4.2 Economics and Psychology 
The second strand of literature builds on the intuitive link between the 
field of psychology and economics. In their argument against external 
imposition of preferences, Mullainathan (2008) argues that economic 
decisions have more deep-rooted psychological underpinnings than what 
standard economic models suggest. Standard models rely on assumption 
 
Outcome History 
Problem Framing 
Risk Propensity 
Risk Perception 
Risky Decision 
Making Behavior 
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of unbounded rationality of economic agents; however, in reality agents 
have bounded rationality. In a more realistic setting, individuals differ 
from each other in the way they think, feel, and act (Borghans et al. 
2008) and hence due to these differences, they react differently to same 
situation.  
Personality may be viewed as a response function which generates in-
dividual-specific enduring patterns of actions in response to the con-
straints, endowments and incentives faced by the individuals (Heckman 
2011). Personality psychologists measure the individuality of these pat-
terns through personality traits which are “relatively” stable, person-
specific determinants of behaviour. Almlund et al. (2011) consider pref-
erences as natural counterpart of these traits in economics.  Muller and 
Plug (2006) conceptualize personality as a bundle of productive traits. 
They argue that individuals trade these traits against equilibrium price 
which is determined by market return on each component of the trait 
vector. Individuals choose professions which pay highest reward on their 
traits and as a result, in equilibrium, labor market observes occupational 
sorting based on personality traits (Tett et al. 1991). 
Besides affecting behavior, personality traits influence the way indi-
viduals perceive and process information and thus personality affect personal 
choices (Benartzi and Thaler 2002). Individuals make certain choices 
based on their information sets which are generated by a production 
function in which traits enter as key input. Information sets are updated 
through a feedback mechanism in response to learning from experimen-
tation as well as arrival of exogenous information (Almlund et al. 2011). 
Knowing their own preferences, productivity rewards, prices, consump-
tion outcomes, traits and endowments of effort, individuals make per-
sonal choices (Almlund et al. 2011).  
In simple words, individuals will make choices which potentially 
maximizes their reward and that the choices, beside other factors, are 
influenced by personality traits. Among the big five personality traits 
higher score on Extroversion, Openness, Agreeableness and Conscien-
tiousness are socially desirable (Wichert and Pohlmeier 2010). Neuroti-
cism, on the other hand, has a negative connotation and higher score on 
this domain shows a neurotic personality. We frame our hypotheses on 
the assumption that socially desirable traits will encourage and Neuroti-
cism, on the other hand, will discourage individuals to apply for Akhu-
wat’s microcredit. 
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4.5 Empirical Specification 
There are certain costs and benefits associated with microcredit, there-
fore, a utility maximizer entrepreneur will apply for microcredit if the 
expected utility of applying for microcredit is more than expected utility 
of not applying. Let *
iA  represents the latent utility
43 associated with Ak-
huwat microcredit.  
 
iiIBiLiPiBiHi IBLPBHHA  
*
 4.5-1 
  
*
iA  is unobserved and we can only see whether or not an individual 
has applied for Akhuwat microcredit. Let iA  be a binary outcome vari-
able taking values 1 if individuals applied for the loan and 0 otherwise. 
iA  can be considered as a function capturing variations in the household 
characteristics iHH , business characteristics iB , personality of the en-
trepreneur iP , learning iL  and perception about institutional barriers 
iIB . The probability of participation in Akhuwat program may be esti-
mated using following model. 
 
)|0(Pr)|1(Pr * iiii XAobXAob    
 
Where iX  represent vector of covariates on the right side of Equa-
tion 4.5-1. 
)0(Pr  iiIBiLiPiBiH IBLPBHHob    
 
])[(Pr iIBiLiPiBiHi IBLPBHHob     
 
])[(1 iIBiLiPiBiH IBLPBHHG     
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)()|1(Pr iIBiLiPiBiHii IBLPBHHGXAob    4.5-2 
For any real number z , ]1,0[)( zG . iHH is a vector of household 
variables which included household size, sex of household head 
(dummy), household monthly income and expenditure, number of 
school going children in the household, number of unemployed and not 
school going HH members, presence of chronic patient in the house-
hold(dummy), value of dowry and presence of unmarried female mem-
ber in the household (dummy). iB  is a vector of business and entrepre-
neur related information which included variables like education, age, 
prayers in a day(dummy), reasons of choosing this particular busi-
ness(dummy), monthly net business income and credit requirement. iP  is 
a vector of personality traits comprising of NEO-FFI big five domains 
i.e. Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness, Agreeableness and Conscien-
tiousness. All forms of learning iL  and perception of institutional barri-
ers iIB  were entered as dummy variables. 
The error term i represents other unobserved factors which may af-
fect participation in Akhuwat. Assuming that error term is normally and 
randomly distributed i.e. ),,,,( iiiiii IBLPBHH , we use probit model 
to estimate vectors of parameter HH , B , P , L and IB  associated 
with household, business, personality, learning and perception of institu-
tional barriers respectively. To find out the differential effects of covari-
ates on probability of participation, we estimate probit marginal effects. 
We also run Logit and LPM to ascertain sensitivity of our estimates as-
suming different functional forms of G . 
 
4.6 Results 
We estimate four specifications in which we combine different exoge-
nous sets of covariates one by one. In specification1, we only control for 
household and business characteristics of microentrepreneurs. In specifi-
cation2, we include additional control for personality traits by adding 
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vector of five domains of NEO-FFI. In specification3, we add different 
learning episodes of microentrepreneur in our model. Finally in specifi-
cation4, we bring perception of the microentrepreneurs into the equa-
tion. Probit marginal effects of all four specifications are presented in 
Table 4.6-1. We also estimated our model in Equation 4.5-2 under dif-
ferent distributional assumptions of G . Sensitivity analysis in Table 4.8-2 
in the appendix shows that our estimates are stable.  
Using dummy variables approach, we start our analysis by investigat-
ing branch specific effects to see if pooling of data is reasonable. Branch 
dummies and its interaction with other covariates were introduced into 
the model. The joint significance test on equality of slopes and intercepts 
resulted in non-significant p-value (Prob>Chi2=0.1390). Based on the 
test statistic, we cannot reject null hypothesis of parameter stability 
across branches and, therefore, run pooled regressions.  
Our analysis shows that older microentrepreneurs have higher ten-
dency to apply for Akhuwat loan, however, the effect of age is non-
linear. Ucbasaran et al. (2008) find that entrepreneurs with higher human 
capital are more likely to identify opportunities and subsequently pursue 
them. We expected that more educated microentrepreneurs would be 
more likely to participate in Akhuwat microcredit program; however, our 
results did not show any impact of education on participation. In devel-
oping countries, women entrepreneurs are thought to be relatively more 
credit constrained than male entrepreneurs (Khandker 1998). We ex-
pected the same in Pakistan and posited that female entrepreneurs would 
be more likely to apply for Akhuwat microcredit. Based on our sample, 
however, we did not find such evidence. The presence of at least one 
chronic patient in the household increases the probability of applying by 
13-15 percentage points. Although, the presence of chronic patient in the 
household is not significantly correlated to health related expenditures, 
the increase in probability of participation may either mean that loan 
amount is intended to be spent on health or it may show a desire to meet 
health related expenditures in future as a result of improved profitability. 
Evans et al. (1999) reported similar evidence from Bangladesh. Evans et 
al. found that members of an MFI in Bangladesh reported higher rates of 
chronic illness than non-members.  
One of our main findings is that Akhuwat attracts survivalist enter-
prises. We asked a direct question from the respondents regarding their 
main motivation behind running this particular business. We divided 
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these responses into four categories. The first category consists of those 
entrepreneurs who inherited their business, the second category consists 
of those entrepreneurs who said to be doing business for survival of their 
family, the third category reported to be doing business for growth oppor-
tunities and the fourth category consisted of those entrepreneurs who 
cited other reasons. In all four specifications, our analysis shows that surviv-
alists are 11-13% more likely to apply for Akhuwat loan compared to 
those entrepreneurs who cited other reasons. Microentrepreneurs who in-
herited their business and those who are doing business for growth opportu-
nities have no effect on probability of participation.  
Our results show that Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness and 
Agreeableness do not significantly explain participation as hypothesized. 
Among five domains, only Conscientiousness has a significant positive 
effect on participation. In all specifications, a unit increase on Conscien-
tiousness scale increases the probability of applying by 5.8-5.9% (at 
%5 ). Conscientiousness accentuates goal oriented behaviour and it 
affects the participation decision through one or more of its facets i.e. 
scrupulousness, punctuality, consistency, perseverance, ability to organize 
and reliability.  
In the theoretical part, we argued that historical outcomes and prob-
lem framing affects risk propensity and risk perception of an individual 
and as a result they have the ability to influence decision making behav-
iour. We expected that positive learning will increase and negative learn-
ing will decrease probability of participation in Akhuwat. Our analysis 
shows that on internal learning part, both positive and negative learning 
have significant effect on probability of participation. Microentrepre-
neurs with positive internal learning are 8.6-8.7 percentage points more 
likely to apply for Akhuwat loan than microentrepreneurs with no learn-
ing. Similarly, negative learning decreases probability of participation by 
16.4-17.2 percentage points. This is an interesting finding. On average, 
the absolute effect of negative learning (i.e. decrease in probability of 
participation) is more than the effect of positive learning. In simple 
words, discouragement from negative learning is more than the encour-
agement from positive learning. In some ways, our finding concurs with 
Prospect Theory which fundamentally posits that “losses to loom larger 
than gains” (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). The paper explains that the 
fear of losing a sum of money is more that the pleasure of gaining the 
same amount of money.  
 Determinants of Participation 49 
In case of external learning from relatives, the positive learning has a 
small and less significant effect. Negative learning, on the other hand, 
had a larger effect. Compared to no learning, negative external learning 
from relatives decreases participation by 7.5-8.0 percentage points at sig-
nificance level of 10%. Overall learning from friends, on the other hand, 
has no effect on participation. These findings show that individuals at-
tach more weight to learning from relatives than to learning from 
friends.  
To ensure parameter stability of different learning episodes, we simu-
lated Specification4 one thousand times by randomly dropping 1% ob-
servations in each draw (see Figure 4.8-4, Figure 4.8-5 and Figure 4.8-6). 
The simulation shows persistent effects of positive and negative internal 
learning on participation. In other words, we do not see any unusual out-
liers. 
MFIs use different methods for enforcement of credit discipline. 
Contrary to the success narrative of microcredit, different studies have 
also documented negative impact of microcredit. Some of the adverse 
effects are related to the way credit discipline is enforced. For example, 
at times, in order to ensure loan repayments, borrowers are subjected to 
physical and emotional violence. In our sample, perception about en-
forcement of credit discipline significantly affects participation decision. 
We divided perceptions about loan enforcement into institutional and 
non-institutional mechanisms. Institutional mechanisms consisted of re-
covery through litigation, pressure of guarantors and pressure from 
within the family. Non-institutional mechanisms entail recovery through 
coercive methods e.g. actual or threats of physical and emotional vio-
lence, confiscation of assets and damaging reputation etc. We find that 
entrepreneurs fearing non-institutional enforcement of credit discipline 
are 6 percentage points less likely to apply for Akhuwat loan than those 
entrepreneurs who believe that MFIs use institutional enforcement 
mechanisms for loan recovery. 
 
 
 
 
50 CHAPTER 4 
 
Table 4.6-1: Determinants of Probability of Participation in Akhuwat—Probit 
Marginal Effects 
Variable Specifica-
tion1 
Specifica-
tion2 
Specifica-
tion3 
Specifica-
tion4 
Age of the Entrepreneur 0.026** 
(0.01) 
0.025** 
(0.01) 
0.027** 
(0.01) 
0.026** 
(0.01) 
Age square -0.000 
(0.00) 
-0.000 
(0.00) 
-0.000* 
(0.00) 
-0.000 
(0.00) 
HH with at least one chronic 
patient 
0.126*** 
(0.04) 
0.128*** 
(0.04) 
0.148*** 
(0.04) 
0.149*** 
(0.04) 
Choice of business 
(Ref: others reasons) 
    
Family business -0.037 
(0.06) 
-0.024 
(0.06) 
-0.043 
(0.07) 
-0.035 
(0.07) 
Profit and growth opportu-
nities 
-0.030 
(0.04) 
-0.026 
(0.04) 
-0.028 
(0.04) 
-0.027 
(0.04) 
Survival 0.110** 
(0.05) 
0.113** 
(0.05) 
0.130*** 
(0.05) 
0.126** 
(0.05) 
Personality     
Neuroticism  
 
-0.038 
(0.04) 
-0.039 
(0.04) 
-0.042 
(0.04) 
Extraversion  
 
-0.029 
(0.04) 
-0.022 
(0.04) 
-0.026 
(0.04) 
Openness  
 
0.007 
(0.03) 
0.007 
(0.03) 
0.011 
(0.03) 
Agreeableness  
 
-0.004 
(0.03) 
-0.019 
(0.03) 
-0.017 
(0.03) 
Conscientiousness  
 
0.058** 
(0.03) 
0.058** 
(0.03) 
0.059** 
(0.03) 
Internal Learning 
(Ref: No Learning) 
    
Positive Internal Learning  
 
 
 
0.087** 
(0.04) 
0.086** 
(0.04) 
Neutral Internal Learning  
 
 
 
-0.038 
(0.05) 
-0.041 
(0.06) 
Negative Internal Learning  
 
 
 
-0.164*** 
(0.06) 
-0.172*** 
(0.06) 
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External Learning-Relative 
(Ref: No Learning) 
    
Positive Internal Learning  
 
 
 
0.080** 
(0.04) 
0.075* 
(0.04) 
Neutral Internal Learning  
 
 
 
-0.029 
(0.06) 
-0.037 
(0.06) 
Negative Internal Learning  
 
 
 
-0.128** 
(0.06) 
-0.123* 
(0.06) 
External Learning-Friends 
(Ref: No Learning) 
    
Positive Internal Learning  
 
 
 
0.052 
(0.04) 
0.060 
(0.04) 
Neutral Internal Learning  
 
 
 
-0.048 
(0.06) 
-0.058 
(0.07) 
Negative Internal Learning  
 
 
 
-0.108 
(0.07) 
-0.105 
(0.07) 
Perception that loan enforce-
ment  is non-institutional 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.060* 
(0.04) 
N 687 687 687 687 
LL -396.729 -393.148 -373.218 -370.396 
(Pseudo) R-squared .041 .049 .097 .104 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
 
We also controlled for other household and business variables which resulted in insignificant 
coefficients. These variables included Household percapita monthly income, Sex of the entre-
preneur, education, monthly business profits, and their perceptions about whether MFIs take 
bribe for loan approvals and whether loan generally helps. 
 
4.7 Conclusions 
Various studies have tried to explain reasons of non-participation in mi-
crofinance programs; however, the term ‘non-participation’ brings to-
gether two important but opposing phenomena. Non-participation may 
stem from either demand or supply side barriers or both. This paper ex-
plores the demand side barriers to participation in Akhuwat Microfi-
nance in Pakistan. To do so, we use cross-sectional data of 488 Akhuwat 
applicants, and 199 non-applicants who did not apply for a loan, yet are 
eligible on Akhuwat lending criteria. We use unique research design to 
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unravel and focus only on the demand side barriers. The survey instru-
ment gathers detailed information on household and business level indi-
cators, personality traits of microentrepreneurs, different learning epi-
sodes relating to credit histories of microentrepreneurs, and their 
perceptions about institutional barriers. The paper estimates four specifi-
cations using probit model to see the effect of different sets of covariates 
on probability of applying for Akhuwat microcredit. We also conduct 
sensitivity analysis and find that our estimates are stable under different 
distributional assumptions. 
The paper finds that older microentrepreneurs and microentrepre-
neurs having at least one chronic patient in the household are more likely 
to apply. Similarly survivalist microentrepreneurs –those reported to be 
doing business for survival of their family–are more likely to apply for 
Akhuwat microcredit. In this study, we measured personality of microen-
trepreneurs with the Urdu version of NEO-FFI which is a multiple con-
struct Big Five personality inventory. Among five personality domains, 
only conscientiousness, which is a measure of scrupulousness, punctual-
ity, consistency, perseverance, ability to organize and reliability, comes 
out significant. We find that increase in conscientiousness increases the 
probability of applying for Akhuwat microcredit.  
The effect of learning on participation shows very interesting but in-
tuitive patterns. We focus on learning related to credit histories only, and 
capture it from three different sources. The first one, referred to as in-
ternal learning, comes from experimentation. The other two, relates to 
external learning both from relatives and friends which take place within 
the social network. Individuals take loans for meeting different credit 
needs and attach various expectations to it. They experience negative 
learning if their expectations are not met; conversely, they experience 
positive learning if their expectations are met. Our analysis show that 
probability of applying increases with positive learning and decreases 
with negative learning both in case of internal learning and learning from 
relatives. In case of internal learning, the effect sizes are large and highly 
significant compared to learning from relatives. None of learning epi-
sodes from friends was significant. There is strong evidence that micro-
entrepreneurs value negative learning more than positive learning which 
is consistent with Prospect Theory. Our analyses reveal that individuals 
attach more importance to relatives than friends in a social network. 
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There is evidence that microentrepreneurs who perceive enforcement of 
credit discipline to be non-institutional are less likely to participate. 
Overall we find that participation is mainly driven by non-business 
needs. Businesses with survivalist motives and with at least one chronic 
patient in the household are more likely to apply for Akhuwat’s micro-
credit. This may well mean that the loan amount is partially spent on 
meeting some non-business needs. Clients may benefit if microfinance 
institutions, along with microcredit, provide affordable insurance prod-
ucts to cover household risks and vulnerabilities. Based on our findings, 
we also believe that in order to encourage participation in microfinance 
programs, MFIs may benefit from improving their loan recovery meth-
ods or at least try to dispel their impression of coercive loan enforce-
ment.  
 
 
Notes 
26 Chaia, A., A. Dalal, T. Goland, M.J. Gonzalez, J. Morduch and R. Schiff 
(2009) 'Half the World is Unbanked', Financial Access Initiative Framing Note.  
27 Evans, T.G., A.M. Adams, R. Mohammed and A.H. Norris (1999) 
'Demystifying Nonparticipation in Microcredit: A Population-Based Analysis', 
World Development 27(2): 419-430. 
28 I could not access the original paper. This reference is taken from: DeCanio, 
S.J. (1979) 'Rational Expectations and Learning from Experience', The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 93(1): 47-57.  
29 Bikhchandani et al. (1998) narrates an interesting story about a book ‘The Disci-
pline of Market Leaders’ authored by Michael Treacy and Fred Wiersema. Despite 
ordinary reviews, the book hit the New York Times bestseller list after the au-
thors slyly purchased fifty thousand copies of their own book from those stores 
whose sales data are used for compilation of bestseller list. Bestseller list arguably 
signals quality which has the ability to influence the decision of customers. 
Bloomberg Businessweek termed this strategy as dirty trick. After creating an arti-
ficial demand for the book through the so called ‘dirty trick’, the book continued 
as a bestseller for some time.  
Source: http://www.businessweek.com/stories/1995-08-06/did-dirty-tricks-
create-a-best-seller Posted on August 06, 1995 [Last accessed: June 22, 2016] 
30 A few studies have examined the effects of learning on decision making behav-
ior. For example, Luttmer et al. (1998) find a strong influence of social networks 
on participation in state welfare schemes. Using language and geography as proxy 
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for social networks, the paper finds that people who speak the language of high 
welfare-using groups are more likely to participate in welfare schemes. Duflo and 
Saez (2002) study the role of ‘peer effects’ on participation and investment deci-
sions in a retirement plan offered to employees of a large university.  They finds 
that enrolment in the retirement plan and the choice of vendor may be influenced 
by their peers working in the same department. 
31 Other products include liberation loan (for repayment of loans taken from 
money lender), education loan, marriage loan, emergency loan (e.g. family contin-
gencies like hospitalization), silver loan (larger business loans for those who have 
previously taken three times or more family enterprise loan) and housing loan 
(only repairs and renovation) 
32 Urdu is the national language of Pakistan. 
33 Evans et al. (1999) provide a conceptual framework for barriers to participa-
tion in microfinance. Based on a large survey of more than 24 thousands 
households in Bangladesh, Evans et al. (1999) show that 76% of the house-
holds are eligible for microcredit, however, only 27% participates. Non-
participants were mostly landless, had smaller family, lower dependency ratios, 
less education, fewer assets, lower income and more reliance on wage labor.  
Based on 7% random sample of this population, the paper finds that non-
participation is characterized by low female education, smaller family size and 
lack of landholding. 
34 This is especially true for female borrowers in countries which have gender 
segregated labor markets. 
35 Manski (1993) discusses various issues around identification of peer effects. 
The potential bias in estimating peer effects in a group arise mainly from two 
sources. First, the peer groups are endogenously formed and, therefore, any 
estimate of peer effects will be biased due to self-selection. Second, the individ-
ual’s behavior may be influenced not only by peers but also partly by the com-
mon environment shared by all peers. To tackle the problem of self-selection, 
researchers, to-date, have relied on natural experiments in which the peer 
groups are formed as a result of random process. For isolating the effects of 
shared environment, researchers have used panel datasets and have treated 
common environment as time invariant fixed effects in their models. 
36 http://www.nip.edu.pk/ [Last accessed: June 22, 2016] 
37 Variables used in most personality assessment tests can be mapped into one 
or more dimensions of Big Five (Costa and McCrae  1992).  
38 Chronbach’s alpha is a measure of internal consistency. 
39 Source: Stata 11 Manual 
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40 One of the criticism of self-reported tests are that they might be contami-
nated by two sources of fake responses (Paulhus 1984). (i) fake responses aris-
ing from the intent of the respondent to signal positive image (ii) fake re-
sponses arising from self-deception. Ones and Viswesvaran (1998) find that 
these contaminations does not pose any problem because they have minimal 
effect on predictive validity of the tests. Mueller and Plug (2006) mentions that 
ex post self-reported assessment of personality used in different studies can be 
both cause and consequence of labor market outcomes. In other words the 
causal relationship is not clear.  
41 In the spate of Indian state of Andhra Pradesh suicides, microcredit, especial-
ly its market-led approach towards poverty alleviation, has been vigorously crit-
icized. In Andhra Pradesh, borrowers, who were unable to pay their mounting 
debt, are increasingly committing suicides. To address this problem, the state of 
Andhra Pradesh introduced tough legislation for the conduct of microfinance 
business especially recoveries of loan. Such stories have also been reported 
from other parts of the world.  
Sources:  
http://www.ssireview.org/blog/entry/akhuwat_making_microfinance_work 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/18/world/asia/18micro.html?pagewanted
=all [Last accessed: June 22, 2016] 
42 Reference taken from: DeCanio, S.J. (1979) 'Rational Expectations and Learn-
ing from Experience', The Quarterly Journal of Economics 93(1): 47-57.  
43 Our formulation of latent utility function is based on Wooldridge (2009). 
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4.8 Appendices 
Table 4.8-1: Determinants of Participation-Probit 
Variable Specifi-
cation1 
Speci-
fication2 
Specifi-
cation3 
Specifi-
cation4 
Age of the Entrepreneur 0.077** 
(0.04) 
0.073** 
(0.04) 
0.081** 
(0.04) 
0.079** 
(0.04) 
Age square -0.001 
(0.00) 
-0.001 
(0.00) 
-0.001 
(0.00) 
-0.001 
(0.00) 
HH with at least one chronic 
patient 
0.411*** 
(0.16) 
0.422*** 
(0.16) 
0.512*** 
(0.16) 
0.517*** 
(0.16) 
Choice of business 
(Ref: others reasons) 
    
Family business -0.107 
(0.18) 
-0.070 
(0.18) 
-0.126 
(0.19) 
-0.103 
(0.19) 
Profit and growth opportu-
nities 
-0.087 
(0.11) 
-0.078 
(0.12) 
-0.084 
(0.12) 
-0.080 
(0.12) 
Survival 0.357* 
(0.19) 
0.372* 
(0.19) 
0.450** 
(0.20) 
0.432** 
(0.20) 
Personality     
Neuroticism  
 
-0.113 
(0.12) 
-0.118 
(0.12) 
-0.128 
(0.12) 
Extraversion  
 
-0.086 
(0.12) 
-0.065 
(0.12) 
-0.078 
(0.12) 
Openness  
 
0.021 
(0.08) 
0.020 
(0.08) 
0.033 
(0.08) 
Agreeableness  
 
-0.013 
(0.09) 
-0.058 
(0.10) 
-0.052 
(0.10) 
Conscientiousness  
 
0.174** 
(0.08) 
0.177** 
(0.08) 
0.180** 
(0.08) 
Internal Learning 
(Ref: No Learning) 
    
Positive Internal Learning  
 
 
 
0.280* 
(0.14) 
0.275* 
(0.14) 
Neutral Internal Learning  
 
 
 
-0.114 
(0.16) 
-0.123 
(0.16) 
Negative Internal Learning  
 
 
 
-0.457*** 
(0.17) 
-0.478*** 
(0.17) 
External Learning-Relative 
(Ref: No Learning) 
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Positive Internal Learning  
 
 
 
0.252* 
(0.13) 
0.237* 
(0.13) 
Neutral Internal Learning  
 
 
 
-0.086 
(0.18) 
-0.109 
(0.18) 
Negative Internal Learning  
 
 
 
-0.361** 
(0.17) 
-0.349** 
(0.17) 
External Learning-Friends 
(Ref: No Learning) 
    
Positive Internal Learning  
 
 
 
0.162 
(0.14) 
0.188 
(0.14) 
Neutral Internal Learning  
 
 
 
-0.142 
(0.18) 
-0.168 
(0.19) 
Negative Internal Learning  
 
 
 
-0.306 
(0.20) 
-0.299 
(0.20) 
Perception that loan enforce-
ment  is non-institutional 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.183* 
(0.11) 
Constant -1.386* 
(0.79) 
-1.439 
(1.11) 
-1.468 
(1.12) 
-1.227 
(1.12) 
N 687 687 687 687 
LL -396.729 -
393.148 
-373.218 -370.396 
(Pseudo) R-squared .041 .049 .097 .104 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
 
We also controlled for other household and business variables which resulted in insignificant 
coefficients. These variables included Household percapita monthly income, Sex of the entre-
preneur, education, monthly business profits, and their perceptions about whether MFIs take 
bribe for loan approvals and whether loan generally helps. 
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Table 4.8-2: Determinants of Probability of Participation in Akhuwat—
Sensitivity Analysis 
Variable Probit Logit OLS 
Age of the Entrepreneur 0.079** 
(0.04) 
0.133** 
(0.06) 
0.027** 
(0.01) 
Age square -0.001 
(0.00) 
-0.001 
(0.00) 
-0.000* 
(0.00) 
HH with at least one chronic 
patient 
0.517*** 
(0.16) 
0.890*** 
(0.29) 
0.149*** 
(0.04) 
Choice of business 
(Ref: others reasons) 
   
Family business -0.103 
(0.19) 
-0.173 
(0.32) 
-0.031 
(0.06) 
Profit and growth opportu-
nities 
-0.080 
(0.12) 
-0.165 
(0.20) 
-0.030 
(0.04) 
Survival 0.432** 
(0.20) 
0.748** 
(0.36) 
0.110** 
(0.05) 
Personality    
Neuroticism -0.128 
(0.12) 
-0.220 
(0.20) 
-0.040 
(0.04) 
Extraversion -0.078 
(0.12) 
-0.141 
(0.21) 
-0.026 
(0.04) 
Openness 0.033 
(0.08) 
0.073 
(0.13) 
0.013 
(0.02) 
Agreeableness -0.052 
(0.10) 
-0.099 
(0.17) 
-0.016 
(0.03) 
Conscientiousness 0.180** 
(0.08) 
0.302** 
(0.14) 
0.054** 
(0.03) 
Internal Learning 
(Ref: No Learning) 
   
Positive Internal Learning 0.275* 
(0.14) 
0.489* 
(0.25) 
0.076* 
(0.04) 
Neutral Internal Learning -0.123 
(0.16) 
-0.201 
(0.27) 
-0.039 
(0.05) 
Negative Internal Learning -0.478*** 
(0.17) 
-0.784*** 
(0.28) 
-0.165*** 
(0.06) 
External Learning-Relative 
(Ref: No Learning) 
   
Positive Internal Learning 0.237* 
(0.13) 
0.408* 
(0.23) 
0.067* 
(0.04) 
Neutral Internal Learning -0.109 -0.202 -0.038 
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(0.18) (0.30) (0.06) 
Negative Internal Learning -0.349** 
(0.17) 
-0.593** 
(0.29) 
-0.123** 
(0.06) 
External Learning-Friends 
(Ref: No Learning) 
   
Positive Internal Learning 0.188 
(0.14) 
0.306 
(0.24) 
0.050 
(0.04) 
Neutral Internal Learning -0.168 
(0.19) 
-0.323 
(0.31) 
-0.053 
(0.06) 
Negative Internal Learning -0.299 
(0.20) 
-0.518 
(0.33) 
-0.104 
(0.07) 
Perception that loan enforce-
ment  is non-institutional 
-0.183* 
(0.11) 
-0.317* 
(0.19) 
-0.061* 
(0.03) 
Constant -1.227 
(1.12) 
-2.061 
(1.90) 
0.097 
(0.37) 
N 687.000 687.000 687.000 
LL -370.396 -370.327 -388.422 
(Pseudo) R-squared .104 .104 .435 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
 
We also controlled for other household and business variables which resulted in insignificant 
coefficients. These variables included Household percapita monthly income, Sex of the entre-
preneur, education, monthly business profits, and their perceptions about whether MFIs take 
bribe for loan approvals and whether loan generally helps. 
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Table 4.8-3: Sensitivity Analysis-Marginal Effects 
Variable Probit Logit OLS 
Age of the Entrepreneur 0.026** 
(0.01) 
0.026** 
(0.01) 
0.027** 
(0.01) 
Age square -0.000 
(0.00) 
-0.000 
(0.00) 
-0.000* 
(0.00) 
HH with at least one chronic 
patient 
0.149*** 
(0.04) 
0.146*** 
(0.04) 
0.149*** 
(0.04) 
Choice of business 
(Ref: others reasons) 
   
Family business -0.035 
(0.07) 
-0.034 
(0.07) 
-0.031 
(0.06) 
Profit and growth opportu-
nities 
-0.027 
(0.04) 
-0.032 
(0.04) 
-0.030 
(0.04) 
Survival 0.126** 
(0.05) 
0.124** 
(0.05) 
0.110** 
(0.05) 
Personality    
Neuroticism -0.042 
(0.04) 
-0.042 
(0.04) 
-0.040 
(0.04) 
Extraversion -0.026 
(0.04) 
-0.027 
(0.04) 
-0.026 
(0.04) 
Openness 0.011 
(0.03) 
0.014 
(0.02) 
0.013 
(0.02) 
Agreeableness -0.017 
(0.03) 
-0.019 
(0.03) 
-0.016 
(0.03) 
Conscientiousness 0.059** 
(0.03) 
0.058** 
(0.03) 
0.054** 
(0.03) 
Internal Learning 
(Ref: No Learning) 
   
Positive Internal Learning 0.086** 
(0.04) 
0.088** 
(0.04) 
0.076* 
(0.04) 
Neutral Internal Learning -0.041 
(0.06) 
-0.040 
(0.05) 
-0.039 
(0.05) 
Negative Internal Learning -0.172*** 
(0.06) 
-0.170*** 
(0.07) 
-0.165*** 
(0.06) 
External Learning-Relative 
(Ref: No Learning) 
   
Positive Internal Learning 0.075* 
(0.04) 
0.075* 
(0.04) 
0.067* 
(0.04) 
Neutral Internal Learning -0.037 
(0.06) 
-0.041 
(0.06) 
-0.038 
(0.06) 
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Negative Internal Learning -0.123* 
(0.06) 
-0.126* 
(0.07) 
-0.123** 
(0.06) 
External Learning-Friends 
(Ref: No Learning) 
   
Positive Internal Learning 0.060 
(0.04) 
0.057 
(0.04) 
0.050 
(0.04) 
Neutral Internal Learning -0.058 
(0.07) 
-0.066 
(0.07) 
-0.053 
(0.06) 
Negative Internal Learning -0.105 
(0.07) 
-0.110 
(0.07) 
-0.104 
(0.07) 
Perception that loan enforce-
ment  is non-institutional 
-0.060* 
(0.04) 
-0.061* 
(0.04) 
-0.061* 
(0.03) 
N 687 687 687 
LL -370.396 -370.327 -388.422 
(Pseudo) R-squared .104 .104 .435 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
 
We also controlled for other household and business variables which resulted in insignificant 
coefficients. These variables included Household percapita monthly income, Sex of the entre-
preneur, education, monthly business profits, and their perceptions about whether MFIs take 
bribe for loan approvals and whether loan generally helps. 
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Table 4.8-4: NEO-FFI Reliability Test (Applicants vs. Non-Applicants) 
Domain 
  Applicants(N=488)  Non-Applicants(N=199) 
No. 
of 
items 
in 
scale 
 Average 
inter-item 
covariance 
Scale relia-
bility coef-
ficients 
 Average 
inter-item 
covariance 
Scale relia-
bility coef-
ficients 
Neuroticism 12  0.330 0.78  0.403 0.80 
Extroversion 12  0.326 0.78  0.308 0.75 
Openness 12  0.510 0.85  0.479 0.83 
Agreeableness 12  0.330 0.75  0.395 0.78 
Conscientiousness 12  0.365 0.80  0.401 0.80 
 
Table 4.8-5: NEO-FFI Reliability Test (Male vs. Female) 
Domain 
  Male(N=531)  Female(N=156) 
No. 
of 
items 
in 
scale 
 Average 
inter-item 
covariance 
Scale relia-
bility coef-
ficients 
 Average 
inter-item 
covariance 
Scale relia-
bility coef-
ficients 
Neuroticism 12  0.347 0.78  0.376 0.79 
Extroversion 12  0.299 0.76  0.393 0.80 
Openness 12  0.493 0.84  0.523 0.85 
Agreeableness 12  0.360 0.77  0.311 0.74 
Conscientiousness 12  0.372 0.80  0.400 0.82 
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Table 4.8-6: NEO-FFI Reliability Test (Full Sample N=687) 
Domain 
No. of 
items in 
scale 
Average inter-
item covari-
ance 
Scale reliability 
coefficients 
Reliability co-
efficients of 
original test* 
Neuroticism 12 0.351 0.78 0.90 
Extroversion 12 0.320 0.77 0.82 
Openness 12 0.500 0.84 0.80 
Agreeableness 12 0.348 0.76 0.81 
Conscientiousness 12 0.379 0.80 0.91 
* Source: Urdu version of NEO-FFI by National Institute of Psychology, QAU, Islamabad 
Rest are author’s own calculations 
 
Table 4.8-7: Inter-Scale Correlation Matrix 
 N E O A C 
N 1 
    
E -0.72 1 
   
O -0.52 0.49 1 
  
A -0.50 0.53 0.34 1 
 
C -0.25 0.23 0.11 0.23 1 
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Table 4.8-8: Scoring Method of NEO-FFI 
Respondents reacted to each question on a five point scale. Some questions con-
tribute positively and some negatively to each personality domain. For example, 
for measuring Conscientiousness, following questions were asked; 
 
Positive Question25: My objectives are very clear and I try to achieve them in an 
organized way. 
 
Negative Question15: I am not a very organized person. 
 
Each item was scored in the following manner. Cumulative score for each domain 
was calculated which is the average score for all 12 questions in the domain.  
 
Item 
Scoring 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Agree 
Neither 
Agree Nor 
Disagree 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Positive 1 2 3 4 5 
Negative 5 4 3 2 1 
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Table 4.8-9: Operationalization of Learning 
 
This learning episode is measured mainly through following two questions. It captures learning 
from one’s own past experiences. 
 
Q8: Did you ever take a business loan? Yes/No 
 
Q24: (If yes to Q8) what was the impact of the loan on your socio-economic conditions? 
 
(1). Condition improved (2). Condition did not change (3). Condition deteriorated 
 
 
Learning Description 
  
No learning The respondent did not take any business loan. 
 
Positive internal 
learning 
The respondent took business loan and (s)he thinks that it has im-
proved his/her socio-economic condition 
 
Neutral internal 
learning 
The respondent took business loan and (s)he thinks that it has not 
changed his/her socio-economic condition 
 
Negative internal 
learning 
The respondent took business loan and (s)he thinks that it has deterio-
rated his/her socio-economic condition 
 
 
Table 4.8-10: Operationalization of Perception of Institutional Barriers 
Perception of Description 
Employees’ behavior  Perception about behavior  of MFIs’ employee  
1=friendly,2=unfriendly,3=do not know 
 1: The respondent thinks that the employees of the MFIs are friendly. 
 2: The respondent thinks that the employees of the MFIs are unfriendly. 
 3: The respondent does not know about the behavior of MFI employees. 
Bribe The respondent thinks that MFIs ask for bribe money for loan. (1=Yes, 0=No) 
MFI lend to the poor Respondent thinks that MFI can lend to the poor (1=Yes, 0=No) 
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Table 4.8-11: Description of Questionnaire 
Section Description 
Enumeration Details This section mainly contains information on personal data of 
the respondent and status of survey. 
Section A: Household Roster This section gathers personal information e.g age, marital 
status, schooling, employment and health history of the house-
hold.  
Section B: General HH In-
formation 
This section gathers information on use of mobile phones, type 
of housing, access to information sources and other basic 
amenities. 
Section C Shocks and risk 
mitigation strategies 
This section gathers information on different idiosyncratic and 
systemic shocks that a household has gone through. It also 
gathers information on how these household, if faced with any 
shock, coped with those shocks. 
Section D Credit History In this section, we gather information on respondent’s credit 
history. This section also operationalizes the concept of learn-
ing and perception about different institutional barriers.  
Section E Socio-economic 
profile 
This section mainly gathers information on HH income, HH ex-
penditure and HH assets. It also contains questions related to 
women empowerment.  
Section F: Business informa-
tion 
This section gathers information on nature of business, its as-
sets and performance. 
Section G: Akhuwat Satis-
faction 
This section gathers information on satisfaction of borrowers. 
This section was mainly included at the request of management 
of Akhuwat.  
Section H: Personality This section is related to personality. Copy rights of Urdu ver-
sion of NEO-FFI were purchased from National Institute of Psy-
chology, Pakistan. This test is fully adapted to local environ-
ment. It consists of 60 questions (12 questions for each domain) 
scored on scale of 1-5.  
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Figure 4.8-1: Flowchart of Sampling Strategy 
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68 CHAPTER 4 
 
Figure 4.8-2: Comparison of Personality of Applicants and Non-Applicants 
 
Figure 4.8-3: Comparison of Personality of Female and Male 
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Figure 4.8-4: Simulated Marginal Effects of Positive and Negative Learning-
Internal 
 
Figure 4.8-5: Simulated Marginal Effects of Positive and Negative Learning-
External 
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Figure 4.8-6: Simulated Marginal Effects of Positive and Negative Learning-
External 
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5  Estimating Returns to Capital 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In developing countries, a large share of the labor force is employed by 
microenterprises operating in informal sector (De Mel et al. 2008). Mi-
crofinance has played an important role in providing much needed capi-
tal to these microenterprises. It is axiomatically believed that small firms 
have enough potential in terms of returns to capital to repay loans with 
high interest rates –a fundamental claim which is at the core of global 
microfinance movement. But is there any credible evidence on returns to 
capital to substantiate this claim?  
Besides anecdotes and few rigorous empirical studies, the impact of 
microfinance on business returns has not been credibly and adequately 
established (Armendariz and Morduch 2010, Morduch 1999). At the start 
of the microfinance revolution, the emphasis of development policies 
was mainly on the timing and scale of intervention; however, as microfi-
nance matured and became a well-funded innovation, the emphasis 
gradually shifted from interventions to the impact of interventions. This 
shift was mainly motivated by a desire for evidence-based policy making 
(Gertler et al. 2011). For long, many scholars and policy makers consid-
ered microfinance a ‘development success’ – a narrative which became 
part of a widely accepted discourse. Three recent randomized studies
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have challenged the popular impact narrative and generated mixed reac-
tions among scholars (Bauchet et al. 2011). These papers did not find 
significant impact of microfinance on different outcome indicators. Be-
sides empirical evidence, news reports45 of suicides committed by poor 
microfinance borrowers in the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh has fur-
ther put a question mark on the effectiveness of microfinance46. Similar 
stories have also been reported from other parts of developing world. 
These incidents have brought microcredit under intense scrutiny. 
72 CHAPTER 5 
 
To address the aforementioned problem, the state of Andhra Pradesh 
introduced tough legislation seeking stringent regulation of microfinance 
activities. Political sloganeering further incited borrowers to stop repay-
ment of their loans. In their reaction to this crisis, nine distinguished 
professors criticized the state legislature for enacting a law which in es-
sence encouraged borrowers to ‘default en masse’47. In this article, these 
scholars maintained that lending to the poor itself is not the main inno-
vation of microfinance; rather its main innovation is lending to the poor 
at ‘lower interest rates’ than informal money lenders. 
It is patently true that MFIs charge lower interest rates than money 
lenders; however, a more relevant concern is whether these interest rates 
are affordable. Or in other words, is the so called ‘lower interest rate’ low 
enough compared to borrower’s repayment capacity? The debate about 
repayment capacity essentially boils down to returns on marginal capital 
– an estimate which can be used as a benchmark for pricing of microfi-
nance products. Returns to capital provides the upper bound of interest 
rates that microentrepreneurs might be able to pay without causing any 
harm to them.  
The global narrative on microfinance revolves around one fundamen-
tal claim. The claim is that once poor entrepreneurs are given access to 
capital, they will be able to generate steep returns to capital (De Mel et al. 
2008, Rodrik and Rosenzweig 2009). There are only few empirical stud-
ies in support of this claim. Results from field experiments in Mexico 
and Sri Lanka have shown large gains from access to capital on business 
returns; however, two recent studies in India and Morocco do not show 
any significant impact on business profitability.  
Among the studies showing positive impact, two studies stand out. 
Mckenzie and Woodruff (2008) and De Mel et al. (2008) randomly allo-
cated cash and in-kind grants to firms in Mexico and Sri Lanka respec-
tively. The estimated annual return to capital was 240-396 percent in 
Mexico and 55-63 percent in Sri Lanka. Apart from these two studies, in 
a non-experimental study in Mexico, Mckenzie and Woodruff (2006) 
found annual return of 180% for firms with capital stock of less than  
$200 and 40-60% for firms with more than $500 in capital stock. In 
Ghana, Udry and Anagol (2006) found annual return of 50% on tradi-
tional crops and 250% on non-traditional crops grown on medium sized 
plots. 
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In contrast, two recent randomized studies did not find any impact of 
microcredit on business profits. In these studies, researchers partnered 
with microfinance organizations, which were planning to open new vil-
lage branches in India and Morocco. Both studies randomly selected vil-
lages for opening of new branches and estimated intention to treat ef-
fects (ITT) on different outcomes. In India, Banerjee et al. (2009) finds 
that households in the treated areas are 1.7 percentage points more likely 
to start new businesses compared to households in control villages; how-
ever, the businesses in treated areas did not report any significant in-
creases in profits. Similarly in Morocco, Crépon et al. (2011) find that the 
household income from livestock and other non-agricultural businesses 
in the treated areas did not increase. In another study in Philippines, Kar-
lan and Zinman (2011) randomly assigned marginally rejected loan appli-
cations of First Macro Bank to treatment and control groups. The treat-
ment group was eligible to borrow 10,000 pesos which was equivalent to 
37% of their average monthly income. After 11 to 22 months, the paper 
estimated ITT effects and found that the net borrowings of the treat-
ment group increased; however, surprisingly their subjective wellbeing 
declined. 
Available evidence on returns to capital in small enterprises is both 
scant and mixed. The purpose of this paper is to provide further evi-
dence on returns to capital from a randomized experiment in Pakistan. 
We conducted this experiment in collaboration with Akhuwat Microfi-
nance. At the beginning of the experiment, we collected baseline data 
from 488 microenterprises that applied for Akhuwat’s interest free loans 
and were eligible based on Akhuwat’s lending criteria. Prior to randomi-
zation, we conducted baseline survey. Thereafter, we randomly assigned 
243 applicants to treatment group and the remaining 245 applicants to 
control group. Treatment was given in the form of interest free loans of 
Rs. 10,000. Borrowers were contractually restricted to spend the loan 
amount on business activities only and they were required to repay the 
loan in 10 equal monthly instalments. We followed the treatment and 
control group for two periods. In the first follow-up survey, which was 
conducted 5 months after the baseline, we only collected self-reported 
data on business profits, capital stock and the number of hours worked. 
Ten  months after the baseline, we conducted a second follow-up survey 
in which we collected detailed household and business level data.  
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We estimated treatment effects using both, a single and double differ-
ence approach. Depending on the method, the capital stock of treated 
microenterprises increased by Rs. 2,305 to Rs. 2,448. Profits also regis-
tered a significant increase ranging from Rs. 241 to 275 a month. The 
number of hours worked by the microentrepreneurs remained unaf-
fected. Using randomized treatment as an instrument for capital, we find 
an average monthly return to capital of 8.6 to 11.9%. 
This paper makes several contributions. Firstly, we use interest free 
loans as a treatment instead of grants or interest-bearing loans. Some 
studies (e.g. De Mel et al. 2008, McKenzie and Woodruff 2008) used 
grants and others (e.g. Banerjee et al. 2009, Crépon et al. 2011, Karlan 
and Zinman 2011) used interest-bearing loans/microfinance programs as 
treatment in their experiments. We are not aware of any study which 
uses interest free loans as treatment in a randomized experiment as done 
here. Secondly, instead of unrestricted cash grants, we use restricted cash 
loans. Finally, to our knowledge, it is the first study which estimates re-
turns to capital through a randomized experiment in Pakistan –a country 
where microfinance has made significant progress over the years. Our 
findings suggest that, if given access to capital, microenterprises in Paki-
stan can earn steep returns to capital which are considerably higher than 
market interest rates. With large returns to capital and a huge untapped 
market, microfinance in Pakistan has immense potential48. We expect 
that this paper will provide useful feedback to policy debates around 
pricing of microcredit products in Pakistan49.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 5.2 provides a 
brief literature review on returns to capital in microenterprises. Section 
5.3 describes the context of the experiment. Section 5.4 relates to data 
collection. Section 5.5 investigates sample attrition for systematic pat-
terns. Section 5.6 outlines the empirical strategy. Section 5.7 reports re-
sults and section 5.8 provides concluding remarks. 
 
5.2 Literature Review 
There is a growing body of empirical and theoretical literature which 
establishes the importance of access to capital in business creation and 
survival (Giné and Mansuri 2011). Entrepreneurs normally require 
minimum initial investment to meet startup costs. In imperfect credit 
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markets, these costs serve as an entry barrier and as a result different 
theoretical models predict a long term low-growth poverty trap (Banerjee 
and Newman 1993)50. Market imperfections have severe implications for 
the poor in particular because it systematically rations out the poor from 
credit markets. Due to lack of access to credit, poor households may not 
be able to put their skills into practice and as a result they remain in per-
petual poverty (Yunus and Weber 2007). To address the problem of sys-
tematic exclusion, microfinance institutions have played an important 
role in providing access to capital for the unbanked poor. But does mi-
crofinance make any difference?  
It is generally believed that once poor entrepreneurs, who are more 
likely to face binding credit constraints than relatively wealthy entrepre-
neurs, are given access to capital, they are able to generate high returns to 
capital (De Mel et al. 2008, Rodrik and Rosenzweig 2009). We, however, 
have little empirical evidence to support this claim.  
Few non-experimental studies so far have established large impact of 
access to capital on business returns. In Mexico, McKenzie and Wood-
ruff (2006) found an annual return of 180% for smaller firms and 40-
60% for larger firms. In Ghana, returns to capital were 50% on tradi-
tional crops and 250% on non-traditional crops (Udry and Anagol 2006). 
Although non-experimental studies show large impact of access to capi-
tal on business returns, nonetheless they are contaminated with potential 
biases which raise a question mark on the credibility of these estimates. 
McKenzie and Woodruff (2006) identify two sources of potential bias in 
non-randomized studies which try to estimate returns to marginal capital. 
First, the investment decision of entrepreneurs is influenced by market 
specific profitability. As a result, returns to capital are not only driven by 
marginal investment but also by market gains. Firms tend to invest more 
in profitable markets, and therefore, it is difficult to separate the effect of 
marginal investment from the initial market conditions.  The second 
source of bias arises from self-selection when relatively able entrepre-
neurs are more likely to participate in microcredit programs. Besides de-
termining participation, entrepreneurial ability is also a key determinant 
of business performance and hence it is difficult to isolate returns to 
capital from returns to entrepreneurial ability.  
In order to remove the aforementioned biases, few studies have used 
randomized designs to examine the impact of microcredit on business 
returns.  Theoretically randomization generates exogenous variation in 
76 CHAPTER 5 
 
capital stock and as a result the selection bias is removed. In other 
words, variation in capital is purely by chance and is not correlated with 
unobserved characteristics of the entrepreneur. 
McKenzie and Woodruff (2008) conducted a randomized experiment 
in Mexico. 198 small firms, having less than 10,000 pesos in capital stock 
were sampled for this experiment. Firms were assigned to treatment and 
control groups through a random draw at different rounds of study. Be-
sides deciding about beneficiaries, the draw also determined the timing 
of treatment, however, this was not revealed to the firms. One of the 
strengths of the paper is that it investigated spillover effects and sample 
attrition in order to overcome possible estimation biases. Firms in the 
treatment group received 1,500 pesos in grants in the form of either cash 
or in-kind ( i.e. capital in the form of equipment or inventories). Consid-
ering the size of the firms, 1,500 pesos was a substantial shock. It was 
approximately equivalent to 25% of average capital stock and 50% of 
median monthly profits. These grants were given as a compensation for 
participation in the survey. The monthly profits of the treated firms in-
creased by 608-685 pesos which was equivalent to 46% monthly returns 
on capital. The paper found that in-kind produced larger effects than 
cash treatment i.e. 600 pesos compared to 436 pesos. The paper finds 
higher returns for more credit constrained entrepreneurs. Although the 
study does not make any generalizations, nevertheless, it has some limita-
tions. It focuses only on male entrepreneurs aging 22-55 years and firms 
operating in the retail sector; therefore, conclusions for female entrepre-
neurs and firms operating in other sectors cannot be drawn from this 
study.  
In another study, De Mel et al.(2008) conducted an identical field ex-
periment in Sri Lanka in which 408 firms participated. At the end of first 
round of the survey, firms were selected for prize money through a ran-
dom draw. The selected entrepreneurs received one of the four treat-
ment types: 10,000 LKR worth of equipment/ inventories, 10,000 LKR 
in cash, 20,000 LKR worth of equipment/ inventories, or 20,000 LKR in 
cash. The treatment of 10,000 LKR was equivalent to approximately 
three months of median profits reported by the firms participating in the 
experiment. The cash treatments were unrestricted. Although cash re-
cipients were free to spend the treatment money for any purpose; on av-
erage, 58% of the amount was invested in business. The paper finds that 
10,000 LKR in-kind increases capital stock by 40% and the same amount 
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in cash increases capital stock only by 23%. Similarly, capital stock in-
creases by 71% with 20,000 LKR in-kind and 53% with same amount in 
cash.  In-kind vs. cash treatment created differential effects on business 
profits. 10,000 LKR in-kind did not significantly increase monthly prof-
its; however, the same amount in cash increased monthly profits by 15%. 
These results are opposite to what the researchers found in Mexico 
where in-kind treatment created larger effects than cash treatment. Both 
20,000 LKR in-kind and cash increased monthly profits by 21%. Using 
randomized treatment as an instrument for capital stock, the paper finds 
an average annual real return to capital of 55%-63%. In Mexico, the an-
nual returns were around 240%-396% which were extremely high com-
pared to estimates in Sri Lanka. 
In a rather recent experiment in Sri Lanka, De Mel et al. (2014) ran-
domized two types of treatment among two groups of 628 randomly 
sampled women in each group. The first group consisted of existing 
business owners. The second group was made of those potential owners 
who were out of labor market but interested in starting a business. 400 
women from each group were randomly treated with business training 
alone (N=200) and combination of business training and a cash grant of 
LKR 15,000 (N=200). The treatment and control groups were tracked 
for two years in four follow-up surveys. For existing business owners, 
the paper finds no impact of training alone on business profits, sales and 
capital stock. The combination of training and cash grant, on the other 
hand, significantly improved business profitability in the first eight 
months. The impact was, however, short lived as it disappeared in the 
second year. For potential owners, the training only treatment had a sig-
nificant impact on business profits, however, surprisingly; training plus 
cash grant had no impact on business profits. 
Banerjee et al. (2009) conducted a randomized experiment for esti-
mating the impact of Spandana microfinance program on different out-
come indicators. Spandana was a fast growing group-based microcredit 
program in India with more than 1.2 million active borrowers in March 
2008. Spandana gives unrestricted loans, that is, borrowers are free to 
spend the loan amount and are not restricted to expenditure on business. 
Spandana planned to expand its business into 120 new unbanked vil-
lages. After conducting a baseline survey, half of the 104 selected villages 
were randomly selected for opening Spandana branches. A follow-up 
survey was conducted 15-18 months after the baseline. After estimating 
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the intent to treat (ITT) effects, (Banerjee et al. 2009) find that house-
holds in the treated areas are 1.7 percentage points more likely to report 
opening of new business than non-treated areas. The paper, however, 
finds no evidence of significant increase in business profits in the treated 
areas51.  
A similar study was conducted in rural areas of Morocco (Crépon et 
al. 2011). For this study, researchers partnered with Al Amana microfi-
nance which was planning to expand their business to other villages in 
Morocco. Within one year starting from 2006, Al Amana, which mainly 
offers joint-liability loans, opened new branches in 60 villages randomly 
selected from 81 matched pairs – each pair composing of two or more 
villages. The paper estimates ITT effects and finds that treatment has 
significantly reduced credit constraints. Borrowers were able to upscale 
their activities involving non-livestock agriculture and livestock. Income 
earned from agriculture by a household in the treatment areas signifi-
cantly increased by 976 Moroccan Dirhams (MAD), however, income 
from livestock and other businesses did not show any significant in-
crease. 
Although experimental designs are considered as a gold standard in 
impact evaluations, in essence they establish causality for a particular 
context only. For example, findings in India may not be generalized to 
Sri Lanka. For this very reason, returns to capital in Sri Lanka, Mexico, 
India and Morocco show large variations. Similarly, study done on firms 
engaged in retail business may not be generalized to the manufacturing 
sector. Although very promising, these results show large differences in 
returns to capital and, therefore, further investigation is needed. In this 
research, we report results from a randomized study in Pakistan. This 
study is first of its kind which uses interest-free loans as a treatment.  
5.3 Theoretical Framework 
In the first part of this section, we briefly discuss the channels through 
which the effects of microfinance loans are translated into desirable out-
comes. In the second part, we provide the theoretical motivation for us-
ing a randomized design and its ability to remove selection bias.   
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5.3.1 Theory of Impact 
The impact of microcredit has intuitive theoretical underpinnings. In the 
presence of indivisible start-up or expansion costs, poor entrepreneurs, 
despite having skills, are unable to exploit their full entrepreneurial po-
tential. The critical problem is that credit markets ration out poor entre-
preneurs. Microcredit eases credit constraints of the poor and thus adds 
to market efficiency. According to Banerjee et al. (2009)
52
, in efficient 
markets the level of investment and its timing is determined by rates of 
return which is a direct consequence of the ‘separation theorem’ –that  
is, saving does not affect investment decisions and vice versa. In other 
words, households will not be forced to first save and then invest in dif-
ferent avenues like business, education, health and the like. If poor 
households have access to microcredit, they may efficiently allocate and 
time their investments consistent with the rate of return. This basically 
means that investment and saving decisions are taken separately. The 
other indirect effect of microcredit comes from resisting temptation ex-
penditures (tea, cigarettes, alcohol, leisure etc). Banerjee et al. (2009) ex-
emplify microcredit as ‘saving in reverse’. That is, households avail mi-
crocredit and then start saving to repay obligatory periodical instalments. 
This creates a commitment mechanism which makes their investment 
decisions more efficient. Theoretically, microfinance loans increase effi-
ciency in the investment decision and it is expected that these loans will 
increase the capital stock of microenterprises and as a result profitability 
is also likely to increase. 
5.3.2 Theory of Randomization 
How would a treated microenterprise fare in the absence of treatment? 
This is a central question in all impact evaluation studies. Estimating the 
causal effect of an intervention requires identification of an appropriate 
counterfactual. In reality, counterfactuals are unobserved and we are 
faced with a typical problem of missing data. A major source of bias in 
evaluation studies comes from program selection. In demand driven 
programs like Akhuwat, microenterprises who apply for Akhuwat loans 
may have inherently different unobserved characteristics than those who 
do not apply. These characteristics, among others, may include entrepre-
neurial ability, motivation and risk aversion. Besides driving participation, 
these latent characteristics are perhaps key determinants of business per-
formance. In other words, any improvement in the outcomes of treat-
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ment groups may not be caused by treatment alone. Therefore, if we 
compare those who applied for a loan with those who did not will result 
in biased estimates.  
Suppose T
iY is the outcome of treated microenterprise i  and 
C
iY is the 
outcome of true counterfactual. That is, C
iY is the outcome of the same 
microenterprise i  if it was not treated. The average treatment effect is
)( Ci
T
i YYE  . One approach to estimate the treatment effect is to calcu-
late the difference between average outcomes of treatment and control 
groups. Our difference estimator will be; 
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This counterfactual is unobserved. In reality, once treated, we cannot 
observe the untreated scenario of the treated. Assume that )( TYE
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)( TYYE Ci
T
i   is the treatment effect that we are interested in. The 
last term )()( CYETYE
C
i
C
i   represent selection bias which may arise if 
treatment and control group are inherently different. If we ignore the 
selection bias, the program impact may be under or overestimated. Since, 
)( TYE Ci  is unobserved, therefore, in general it is not possible to meas-
ure selection bias. One way to correct for selection bias is to assign mi-
croenterprises to treatment and control groups randomly i.e. 
., TYY Ci
T
i   Both groups have equal chance of receiving treatment, that 
is; 
)()( CYETYE Ci
C
i   
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This implies that randomization successfully removes selection bias. 
0)()(  CYETYE Ci
C
i  
Selection bias = 0 
5.4 Context and Description of The Experiment 
5.4.1 The Product  
For this experiment, we partnered with Akhuwat Microfinance which, 
besides other products, provides interest free loans to credit constrained 
microentrepreneurs in Pakistan. For treatment, we chose Family Enter-
prise Loan which is the flagship microcredit program of Akhuwat. It ac-
counts for approximately 91% of Akhuwat loan portfolio. Depending on 
the loan cycle, the normal loan amount ranges from Rs. 10,000 to 
30,000. The loan has to be repaid in 10 equal monthly instalments. This 
specific loan product is designed for starting or expanding businesses. 
These businesses are typically very small ranging from fruit and vegetable 
vending on the carts, grocery stores, food stalls, carpeting, welding, ma-
sonry, tailoring, embroidery and selling cloths etc. 
The product derives its name –Family enterprise loan –from its pecu-
liar design. Although the business is run by only one person, Akhuwat 
involves borrower’s family in the loan application process. Akhuwat is of 
the view that the design of the product aims to strengthen family cohe-
sion because the business as result of this loan becomes a family enter-
prise instead of being perceived as individual initiative. 
5.4.2 Sample 
Potential borrowers apply for Akhuwat’s Family enterprise loan after 
paying a non-refundable application fee of Rs. 100.  The loan application 
is co-signed by a spouse or any other family member. Since Akhuwat 
aims to target the poor, it follows a poverty based screening criteria. To 
do so, Akhuwat has instituted a two stage evaluation process. In the first 
stage, when individuals apply for an Akhuwat loan, their eligibility is de-
cided mainly on income criteria. In order to be eligible, applicants should 
have a monthly percapita household income of less than Rs. 1,00053. Af-
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ter meeting this criterion, the application enters into a second stage in 
which detailed economic and social appraisal is carried out. In this stage, 
personal and family information, income and expenditure of the house-
hold, business and its viability, credit needs of the business and planned 
utilization of the loan are ascertained.  
For this experiment, we selected four branches of Akhuwat. Appli-
cants submitted applications as usual to these branches. Akhuwat staff 
evaluated all applications on the prevailing eligibility criteria. At the end 
of evaluation process, we selected 488 eligible applicants for randomiza-
tion. The justification of our sample is given in Appendix 5.9.1  
5.4.3 Randomization 
The main purpose of this experiment is to give an exogenous shock to 
the capital stock of randomly selected microenterprises. As a policy, Ak-
huwat serves its customers on a first-come-first-served basis. To support 
our experimental design, Akhuwat agreed to make a one-time exception 
to this rule. This was decided in a meeting with the CEO of Akhuwat 
held on July 3, 2009 in Lahore, Pakistan. In this meeting, moral issues 
(i.e. refusing treatment to eligible applicants falling in control group) aris-
ing from the experiment were also discussed in detail. After careful de-
liberation, it was decided that, as compensation, the control group will be 
offered a larger loan at the end of the experiment i.e. after 10 months 
which is the usual repayment period of the loan. This arrangement, how-
ever, was kept confidential so that the firms in the control group did not 
act or change their behaviour in anticipation of getting larger loans in the 
future. At the time of application submission, all applicants were in-
formed about the random draw among the eligible applicants and the 
consequences of this random draw were explained to them. The process 
of randomization and data collection is shown in the flowchart in Figure 
5.10-1 in the appendix. 
Our sample for this experiment consists of 488 eligible applicants. Be-
fore randomization, we conducted a full-scale baseline survey. At the 
conclusion of the survey we made a draw through a random number 
generator in Microsoft Excel. As a result of this draw, 243 firms were 
randomly assigned to treatment group and remaining 245 were assigned 
to control. Each applicant in the treatment group was given an interest-
free loan of Rs. 10,000 for 10 months duration. The loan was repayable 
in 10 equal monthly instalments. Two follow-up surveys were conducted. 
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The first mini follow-up survey was conducted 5 months after the loan 
disbursement and the second full-scale follow-up survey was conducted 
10 months after the loan disbursement. In the first mini follow-up, we 
collected data only on business profits, capital stock and number of 
hours worked by microentrepreneurs.  
The treatment of Rs. 10,000 is equivalent to 123% of microenter-
prises’ median income and 41% of median capital stock in the baseline. 
As per the loan agreement, borrowers could only spend the loan amount 
on business activities and hence the utilization of the loan amount was 
restricted. Since the loan amount is disbursed in cash, ensuring compli-
ance of spending restrictions is technically difficult because of fungibility 
issues. Nonetheless Akhuwat staff tries to ensure compliance by regularly 
visiting business sites of the borrowers.  
5.5 Data 
This study relies on a three-period panel dataset. The data were collected 
through a survey questionnaire. The timeline of experiment and data col-
lection is provided in Figure 5.10-2 in the appendix. Since the gestation 
period of microenterprises is generally short, it is expected that the loans 
will show its impact, if any, at the end of 10 months54. Microentrepre-
neurs were visited on their home/business addresses for data collection. 
Of 488 applicants in the baseline, 453 completed three rounds of surveys 
representing an attrition rate of 6.97%. The response rate is comparable 
to other similar randomized studies. In our final analysis, we use a panel 
dataset comprising of 453 microenterprises i.e. 1359 firm-period obser-
vations.  
In the first wave, a baseline survey was conducted in June 2010 prior 
to randomization of treatment. For collection of the baseline data, the 
survey instrument contained detailed sections on key variables pertaining 
to microentrepreneur’s households and their businesses. Our baseline 
data reveals that an average household in our sample has 5.64 members 
of which 1.57 are school going children. An average household is ap-
proximately 26 years old and has little less than 5 years of education. 
85% of the households are male-headed. Adult female members of the 
household are mostly out of the labor market as 1.41 females compared 
to 0.51 males did not report any paid work. Average income of the 
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households is Rs. 12,640 of which approximately 66% is spent on food 
related expenditures. 
In this survey, we are mainly interested in two key variables i.e. profit-
ability and capital stock of the microenterprise. 45% of the respondents 
reported that they do not maintain any record of their business activities 
– be it formal or informal. We obtained data on business profits by ask-
ing a direct question –an approach which is also used by De Mel et al. 
(2008). De Mel et al.(2009) established that data on profits obtained in 
this manner provide a more reliable measure than using revenue minus 
expenses approach. We also, however, gathered detailed information on 
monthly revenues and expenses of the microenterprise. In our baseline 
survey, income data as a result of both methods – direct vs. indirect – 
were significantly correlated with a coefficient of 0.87 which is compara-
ble to 0.70 reported in De Mel et al. (2008). Studies conducted in other 
countries found lower or even no correlation. Correlation between prof-
its derived from direct and revenue minus expenses approach was 0.26 in 
Côte d’Ivoire, negative and close to zero in Ghana (Vijverberg and Mead 
2000) and 0.24 in Zimbabwe (Daniels 2001). 
In our analysis we use monthly profits. For inflation adjustment we 
use monthly consumer prices indices55. Microenterprises in our baseline 
have approximately Rs. 30,026 worth of business assets. After excluding 
the cost of land and building, operational or productive capital stock was 
around Rs. 24,048. 35% of the microenterprises in our sample work in 
retail and 35% in services sector. The startup capital in 60% of the cases 
was raised from internal resources i.e. either from household savings or 
internal borrowings from family members. All of the microenterprises in 
our sample were informal. The informality of these businesses is charac-
terized by their low levels of capital and their exclusion from formal 
banking services.  None of the businesses had national tax numbers and 
only 2% had bank accounts in the name of their businesses. On average, 
microentrepreneurs worked for 9.86 hours in a day.  
In the third round we asked the treatment group about the utilization 
of the loan. Since the question was asked 10 months after treatment, the 
responses were based on recall.  Since borrowers were contractually 
obliged to spend the whole amount on business transactions only, there-
fore all of them responded in a way which showed conformity. On aver-
age, 31.98% of the loan amount was spent on buying inventory, 54.16% 
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on tool, and 8.54% on furniture/carts/display cases and the remaining 
on renting locations and other activities.  
 After collecting baseline data, we investigated if the process of ran-
domization has created a valid control group. As shown in Table 5.5-1, 
we did not find any significant differences between the two groups in the 
baseline.  
Table 5.5-1: Descriptive Statistics and Verification of Randomization 
0H : Both Groups have Equal 
Means 
Treatment  Control  t-test 
t-
statistic 
Mean SD  Mean SD  
Total number of the HH members 5.59 2  5.69 2.1  0.546 
Household monthly income 12,855 5,148  12,427 4,485  0.978 
Household assets 765,696 777,594  732,726 873,910  0.440 
Household monthly expenditure 12,793 5,072  12,707 4,486  0.199 
Number of school going children 1.49 1.58  1.64 1.75  0.976 
Presence of Chronic ill in the 
Household 
0.239 0.583  0.188 0.441  
1.090 
Years of education of borrower 5.06 3.87  4.72 4.35  0.910 
Age 38.4 10.1  38.9 10.4  0.511 
Monthly Profits 8,153 1,407  8,186 1,324  0.260 
Revenues 9,834 3,149  9,861 2,581  0.105 
Monthly sales 24,939 32,641  27,098 32,481  0.733 
Business assets 30,121 49,589  29,932 43,030  0.045 
Hours of work in a day 9.87 2.18  9.84 1.98  0.146 
Capital Stock 24,125 3,999  23,973 4,330  0.404 
Credit requirement 23,798 17,892  23,318 16,503  0.308 
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Neuroticism 2.49 0.654  2.48 0.65  0.212 
Extraversion 3.49 0.655  3.52 0.642  0.528 
Openness 3.31 0.75  3.23 0.802  1.110 
Agreeableness 3.63 0.628  3.59 0.696  0.635 
Conscientiousness 3.86 0.678  3.86 0.673  0.042 
Notes: Significance levels (*=10%,**=5%, ***=1%). The baseline data was collected in June 2010. Variable 
Monthly Profits was measured by asking a direct question from the respondents on their monthly business 
profitability. Capital stock excludes value of land and buildings.  
5.6 Sample Attrition 
We investigated for any systematic patterns in attrition. Systematic attri-
tion may create substantial estimation biases. For example, if less profit-
able microenterprises from the control group systematically drop out of 
the survey, then our estimates would be downward biased. Based on 
bivariate comparisons of our key variables of attrited and unattrited mi-
croenterprises, we did not find any significant differences as shown Ta-
ble 5.6-1.  
Table 5.6-1: Comparison of Means of Attrited and Unattrited Microenter-
prises 
0H : Both Groups have 
Equal Means 
Attrited  Unattrited  
t-test 
t-statistic 
Mean S.D  Mean S.D  
Monthly Profits 8,131 1,388 
 
8,172 1,364 
 
0.172 
Capital Stock 23,991 3,941 
 
24,053 4,185 
 
0.084 
Number of Hours Worked 9.38 1.95 
 
9.89 2.09 
 
1.390 
Significance levels (*=10%,**=5%, ***=1%) 
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In multivariate analysis, we also run probit models on our key variables 
of interest to see if coefficients are jointly and simultaneously equal to 
zero Table 5.6-2 shows that none of the coefficients were significant. 
Overall the model is insignificant which implies that there is no system-
atic pattern in attrition.  
Table 5.6-2: Determinants of Attrition 
Attrition Coefficients 
(S.E) 
Direct Monthly Profits -0.000 
(0.00) 
Capital Stock 0.000 
(0.00) 
Number of Hours Worked -0.060 
(0.04) 
 Number of Attrited Microenterprises  34 
 Number of Unattrited Microenterprises 454 
 LR Chi2(3) 2.00 
 Prob>Chi2 0.5728 
(Standard errors are reported in parenthesis) 
 
5.7 Estimation of Treatment Effects 
In this section, we outline our estimation strategy for examining treat-
ment effects on different outcome variables. Our estimation strategy is 
guided by standard production technology in which capital, labor and 
latent entrepreneurial ability enters as major factors of production. Intui-
tively treatment has both direct and indirect effects. We expect that ran-
domization of treatment will directly increase capital stock of treated mi-
croenterprises. Technically the variation in capital will be exogenous due 
to randomization. In response to infusion of additional capital, business 
profits are likely to increase. As an indirect effect, treatment may also 
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incentivize entrepreneurs to put more effort into their businesses. For 
estimating treatment effects on different business outcomes, we proceed 
as follows. In the first step, we examine the impact of treatment on capi-
tal stock, profits and number of hours worked; and in the second step, 
we estimate returns to capital which is our main target. 
 
5.7.1 Impact of Treatment on Capital stock, Business Profits and 
Hours of Work 
In this experiment, microenterprises were randomly allocated or not al-
located interest free loans. It was mandatory for borrowers to spend the 
loan amount for business purposes. We expect that treatment will posi-
tively affect capital stock and business profitability of credit constrained 
entrepreneurs. We also expect that treatment may extract more effort 
from entrepreneurs; however, it is less obvious. We estimate the impact 
of treatment on different outcomes in the following regression. 
 
iti
t
titTit TreatmentY   

3
2
 5.7-1 
 
 
Where itY is the outcome of interest, itTreatment is a dummy which 
takes values of 1 for treatment and 0 for control; t  captures fixed wave 
effects; T represents overall effect on the treated; and i  are  time in-
variant fixed effects of microenterprises. The error term it in this model 
represents other unobserved factors affecting our outcome variables. 
The randomization of treatment implies that it  is random and uncorre-
lated with other covariates in our model. Since the treatment was ran-
domized at the microenterprise level, we cluster the standard errors at 
microenterprise level as well.  
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5.7.2 Returns to Capital 
In this section, we estimate returns to capital which has important policy 
implications. It provides an indication of repayment capacity of the bor-
rowers. We use following equation to estimate returns to capital. 
 
iti
t
tιtcit Capitalβαprofits   

3
2
, t=1,2,3 5.7-2 
 
 
In the above equation itprofits represents the monthly profits of mi-
croenterprise i at time t. ιtCapital represents the capital stock of the mi-
croenterprise i at time t. Capital does not include the value of land and 
building. i  captures the microenterprise fixed effects. We estimate our 
model in equation 5.7-2 both in levels and logs. 
 
5.8 Results  
5.8.1 Impact of Treatment on Capital stock, Business Profits and 
Hours of Work 
We use single difference and difference-in-difference (DID) approach to 
estimate the treatment effects. Since randomization has created a valid 
control group as shown in Table 5.5-1, we estimate post-treatment ef-
fects through a single-difference estimator in which the treatment effect 
is simply the difference between the mean outcomes for treatment and 
control groups at t=3. For the DID estimator, we take advantage of the 
panel data and estimate equation 5.7-1 using fixed effects and random 
effects model. The fixed effects estimation will remove the effects of 
time invariant unobserved factors. To see if the unobserved effects are 
correlated with our outcome variables, we estimate both fixed and ran-
dom effects model and conduct a Hausman test in which random effects 
is the preferred model under the null hypothesis. Based on the test statis-
tic, we cannot reject the null hypothesis (see Appendix 5.10-1). In our 
analyses, we, however, report both random and fixed effects estimates 
for comparison purposes. 
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The first two columns (1-2) of Table 5.8-1, report single difference es-
timators. Column (1) shows that the monthly profits of the treated mi-
croenterprises significantly increased by Rs. 241. Monthly profits, meas-
ured through the revenue minus expenses approach, also increased by 
Rs. 220. As expected, the capital stock of treated microenterprises also 
increased by Rs. 2,448. This is the increase in capital stock after the re-
payment of the interest free loans which were to be repaid in 10 equal 
monthly instalments.  We find no evidence of treatment effects on num-
ber of hours worked. Column (2) shows the treatment effects on vari-
ables of interest after log transformation. The coefficients as result of 
this transformation can be interpreted as percentage changes. As re-
ported in column (2), for the treated microenterprises, the monthly prof-
its increased by 2.73%; indirect profits increased by 2.58%;  capital stock 
increased by 10% and the number of hours worked did not change. The 
coefficients reported in column (2) show differential increases. For ex-
ample, if the average direct profits of the control group increases by 
4.6% between the first and the third wave then in the same period, the 
profits of treatment group increased by 7.7% i.e. 4.6%+3.1%. In other 
words, the differential increase of 3.1 percentage points may be attrib-
uted to treatment. 
The last four columns (3-6) in Table 5.8-1, report the difference in 
difference estimators both for levels and logs. Column (3) shows fixed 
effects estimates. The direct monthly profit of treatment group increased 
by Rs. 275 which is equivalent to 2.75% of the treatment amount and the 
indirect profits increased by Rs. 193. Working capital increased by Rs. 
2,305. As can be seen in column (3) and column (5), coefficients and 
standard errors estimated through fixed and random effects model are 
quite similar. The random effects model shows that the monthly direct 
and indirect profits significantly increased by Rs. 274 and Rs. 201, re-
spectively. Working capital of treated microenterprises increased by Rs. 
2,319. Under both fixed and random effects model, treatment did not 
show any impact on the number of hours worked.  
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Table 5.8-1: Impact of Treatment on Business Outcomes 
Impact of Treatment on: 
 
Single Difference 
(one tail t-test at t=3) 
 Double Difference 
  Fixed Effects  Random Effects 
 
Levels 
(1) 
Logs 
(2) 
 
Levels 
(3) 
Logs 
(4) 
 
Levels 
(5) 
Logs 
(6) 
Direct Monthly Profits  241* 
(124) 
0.0273* 
(0.0148) 
 275*** 
(39) 
0.033*** 
(0.005) 
 274*** 
(38) 
0.033*** 
(0.005) 
Indirect Monthly Profits †  220* 
(139) 
0.0258* 
(0.0171) 
 193* 
(108) 
0.025* 
(0.014) 
 201** 
(98) 
0.026** 
(0.012) 
Working Capital  2,448*** 
(394) 
0.10*** 
(0.0159) 
 2,305*** 
(163) 
0.091*** 
(0.007) 
 2,319*** 
(160) 
0.092*** 
(0.006) 
Number of Hours worked in a Day  0.027 
(0.216) 
-0.0002 
(0.0231) 
 0.027 
(0.122) 
0.005 
(0.014) 
 0.032 
(0.128) 
0.004 
(0.015) 
Number of microenterprises  454 454  454 454  454 454 
Number of observations  454 454  1361 1361  1361 1361 
Notes: Significance level (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).  Robust standard errors are clustered at the microenterprise level and reported in parentheses. The data 
was collected in three waves (t=1,2,3). The baseline data (t=1) was gathered in June 2010 and a detailed follow up survey was conducted after 10 months (t=3). In 
between the two rounds, at t=2, we also collected a self-reported data on three core variables of interest i.e. business profits, working capital and hours of daily 
work. Variable Direct Monthly Profits was measured by asking a direct question from the respondents on their monthly business profitability. Working Capital 
excludes value of land and buildings. 
† Variable Indirect Monthly Profits was measured through revenues minus expenses approach. We have data for this variable for only two periods i.e. t=1 and t=3. For 
analysis involving this variable, we use 908 microenterprise-period observations instead of 1361 observations. 
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5.8.2 Returns to Capital 
Capital, in a more realistic setting, complements entrepreneurial ability. 
As a result, able entrepreneurs are likely to invest higher percentages of 
the loan amount in their businesses than less able entrepreneurs. Besides 
driving capital, entrepreneurial ability is also a key determinant of profit-
ability. When both investment and profitability are correlated with latent 
abilities, it is difficult to separate returns to ability from returns to capital. 
Conflation between returns to capital and returns to ability renders 
ιtCapital  in equation 5.7-2 endogenous. Although, as a result of ran-
domization, theoretically both treatment and control groups would have 
same unobserved entrepreneurial abilities; however, once loans are given 
to the treatment group, we expect idiosyncratic responses of the entre-
preneurs due to differences in their latent abilities within the group. 
Standard panel data analysis techniques do not fix this particular endoge-
neity problem because changes in capital stock between rounds of a 
panel are endogenously determined by unmeasured shocks (De Mel et al. 
2008).  
We estimated equation 5.7-2 using both fixed effects and random ef-
fects models56. To obtain an unbiased estimate of returns to capital, we 
follow De Mel et al. (2008) and use random treatment as an instrument 
for ιtCapital  in our two-stage regression model. De Mel et al. argue that 
an instrument is only valid if it only affects capital and no other factors 
of production, for example, entrepreneurial effort. As shown in the pre-
vious section, treatment significantly increased capital stock, however, 
number of hours worked did not change. Table 5.8-2 shows that in the 
first-stage regressions, treatment significantly increases levels of capital 
stock. Using fixed effects model, we find 11.9% return to capital on 
monthly basis which is very high. Random effects model yielded similar 
results i.e. 11.8%. The indirect monthly profits, however, show smaller 
and less significant returns to capital. Based on indirect profits, monthly 
returns to capital is 8.6% under fixed effects model and 8.8% under ran-
dom effects model. 
The coefficients of log profits on log capital stock can be interpreted 
as elasticities (De Mel et al. 2008). In our baseline, with an average capital 
of Rs. 24,053, a microenterprise earns an average monthly profit of Rs. 
8,172. With elasticity of 0.361, the implied average monthly return is 
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12.27% 





 361.0
053,24
172,8
..ei  which is close to linear estimate of 11%. If 
we take median values of capital and profitability, then returns to capital 
increases to 12.5%.  
Table 5.8-1 and Table 5.8-2 provide a basis for an ancillary yet impor-
tant conclusion. Our analyses show that profits measured directly pro-
vides more precise estimates because it has smaller standard errors com-
pared to that of indirect profits. De Mel et al.(2008) also prefer using a 
direct measure of profits over profits calculated through the revenue mi-
nus expenses approach. 
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Table 5.8-2: Returns to Capital 
 
Two Stage Instrumental Variable Regression 
 Direct Monthly Profits  Indirect Monthly Profits † 
 Level 
FE 
(1) 
Log 
FE 
(2) 
 Level 
RE 
(3) 
Log 
RE 
(4) 
 Level 
FE 
(5) 
Log 
FE 
(6) 
 Level 
RE 
(7) 
Log 
RE 
(8) 
Working Capital/Log of Working 
Capital 
 0.119*** 
(0.014) 
0.361*** 
(0.044) 
 0.118*** 
(0.013) 
0.355*** 
(0.041) 
 0.086* 
(0.049) 
0.284* 
(0.156) 
 0.088** 
(0.042) 
0.273** 
(0.132) 
             
First-Stage Regression             
 Coefficient on 
 Treatment Dummy 
 2,305*** 
(131) 
0.091*** 
(0.005) 
 2,318*** 
(127) 
0.092*** 
(0.005) 
 2,249*** 
(151) 
0.090*** 
(0.006) 
 2,333*** 
(268) 
0.094*** 
(0.011) 
 F statistic  39.46 41.87  - -  25.96 27.33  - - 
             
Number of microenterprises  454 454  454 454  454 454  454 454 
Number of observations  1361 1361  1361 1361  908 908  908 908 
Notes: Significance level (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).  Robust standard errors are clustered at the microenterprise level and reported in parentheses. The data was collected 
in three waves (t=1,2,3). The baseline data (t=1) was gathered in June 2010 and a detailed follow up survey was conducted after 10 months (t=3). In between the two rounds, at 
t=2, we also collected a self-reported data on three core variables of interest i.e. business profits, working capital and hours of daily work. Variable Direct Monthly Profits was 
measured by asking a direct question from the respondents on their monthly business profitability. Working Capital excludes value of land and buildings. 
† Variable Indirect Monthly Profits was measured through revenues minus expenses approach. We have data for this variable for only two periods i.e. t=1 and t=3. For analysis 
involving this variable, we use 908 microenterprise-period observations instead of 1361 observations. 
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5.9 Conclusions 
Because of high risk lending and transaction costs, microfinance institu-
tions normally charge high interest rates from the poor with a belief that 
the poor’s return on marginal capital is very high. This is, however, not 
always true. A large number of reported suicides of poor microfinance 
borrowers have generated intense debate about the pricing of microfi-
nance loans vis-à-vis repayment capacity of the poor. The repayment ca-
pacity of microenterprises depends on their returns on marginal capital. 
A credible estimate of returns to capital in microenterprises is, therefore, 
of great interest to policy makers for developing a sustainable microfi-
nance sector. 
We conducted a randomized experiment in collaboration with Akhu-
wat microfinance to generate evidence on returns to capital in microen-
terprises. For this experiment, we collected detailed baseline data from 
488 microenterprises who applied for Akhuwat’s interest free loans. Af-
ter the baseline, we randomized treatment among the 488 microenter-
prises. Randomization created a valid control group based on baseline 
characteristics. Each microenterprise in the treatment group was given an 
interest loan of Rs. 10,000. We followed these enterprises for 10 months. 
For estimating various treatment effects we used both fixed and random 
effects model. The standard errors were clustered at the enterprise level. 
Using single difference and difference in difference estimators we found 
that treatment significantly increased the capital stock of treated micro-
enterprises - estimates ranged between Rs. 2,305 to Rs. 2,448. Compared 
to the control group, the monthly profits of treatment group also in-
creased. The effects were between Rs. 241 to Rs. 275. The number of 
hours worked by microentrepreneurs did not respond to treatment. For 
estimating returns to capital, we used randomized treatment as an in-
strument. The estimated monthly returns to capital were 8.6% – 11.9% 
(annual interest rate of 103.2% – 142.8%) for microenterprises in our 
sample which are very high compared to both market interest rates57  of 
12.5% and microfinance annual lending rate of 33.5% in Pakistan. 
Our results suggest large gains from access to capital; however, these 
results are only valid for those microenterprises who apply for Akhu-
wat’s microcredit. Due to lack of data, we did not control for possible 
spillover effects. Mckenzie and Woodruff (2008) found insignificant but 
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positive spillovers in their study in Mexico. In case of positive spillovers, 
our estimates may be viewed as a lower bound.  
 
 
 
Notes 
44 Banerjee et al. (2009); Karlan and Zinman (2011); and Crépon et al. (2011) 
45 On 16 December 2010, BBC reported that microcredit had turned out to be a 
‘big curse’ for many poor borrowers in the State of Andhra Pradesh. According 
to the State government, more than 80 people committed suicide after defaulting 
on their mounting debt. The media reports blamed multiple lending, over-
indebtedness, coercive recovery methods, exorbitant interest rates and MFI’s 
grow-at-any-cost strategy as reasons for this crisis. In Andhra Pradesh, house-
holds spend more than 60% of their annual income on debt repayments. More 
than one third of total microcredit borrowers live in Andhra Pradesh with an ex-
posure of more than $4 billion. The problem was dubbed to be of comparable 
magnitude to the subprime debacle. 
 Sources:  http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-11997571 [Last ac-
cessed: June 22, 2016] 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/18/world/asia/18micro.html?_r=1&pagewa
nted=all [Last accessed: June 22, 2016]. 
46 Source: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-11997571 [Last ac-
cessed: June 22, 2016] 
47 Source: Microcredit is not the enemy –published on December 13, 2010 in Fi-
nancial Times http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/53e4724c-06f3-11e0-8c29-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz20z2pMDKl] [Last accessed: April 22, 2012] 
48 Despite this growth, microfinance sector in Pakistan has reached only 7% of 
the potential market Source: State Bank of Pakistan second quarterly report for 
year 2006 
http://www.sbp.org.pk/reports/quarterly/FY06/second/microfinance.pdf [Last 
accessed on January 8, 2010].  
49 Pricing of microcredit is a contentious issue. One school of thought –the 
institutionists– favors charging high interest rates with a view to make micro-
finance institutions self-sustainable. The other school of the thought –welfarists– 
considers charging high interest rates tantamount to ‘mission drift’. In support of 
high interest rates, the usual argument is that the poor primarily look for access to 
credit and not necessarily ‘cheap credit’. The hidden assumption in this argument 
is that small firms have enough potential in terms of returns on capital to repay 
loans with high interest rates. 
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50 Banerjee (2003) provides a good survey of these models 
51 For impact of Spandana microcredit on other outcome indicators please refer 
to Banerjee et al.  (2009) 
52 The effect of microcredit also comes from its ability to enhance bargaining 
power of the women in a household. Most microcredit programs target women. 
After productively investing the loan amount, women are able to contribute to 
the household income which increases their self-esteem. It gives gradual financial 
emancipation to the women. Research shows that compared to men money un-
der women control are more likely to be spent on children welfare.  
53 Our sample shows that this criterion is not strictly followed. The percapita 
monthly household income in our sample is Rs. 2,341.  
54 In Sri Lanka, out of 385 firms, 124 were treated after the first wave and 104 
were treated after the third wave (De Mel et al. 2008). Quarterly data were col-
lected for 9 waves in total. In Mexico, out of 198 firms, different firms were ran-
domly treated at the end of each wave (5 waves in total). 71 firms were treated in 
the 5th round which means that their reported profit in the last wave showed the 
treatment effect of only three months (D. Mckenzie and Woodruff 2008). In 
both these experiments, grants were given in cash and in kind (e.g. inventory and 
equipment).  
55 Source: Monthly Bulletin of Statistics published by Pakistan Federal Bureau of 
Statistics 
http://www.pbs.gov.pk/sites/default/files/other/monthly_bulletin/report.pdf 
[Last accessed: June 22, 2016] 
56 Before proceeding to model estimation, we conducted some diagnostic tests. 
We conducted a post estimation joint test to see if time fixed effects are jointly 
equal to zero. We strongly reject the null hypothesis of no time fixed effects 
(F=99.08). We, therefore, introduce time dummies to capture wave effects in 
our estimation strategy.  We estimated equation 5.7-2 using both random 
effects and fixed effects model. A Hausman test supports the use of random 
effects.  
57 Source: 
http://www.sbp.org.pk/reports/annual/arFY11/Urdu/Stats/eng/Chapter-
1.pdf [Last accessed: June 22, 2016] 
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5.10 Appendices 
Appendix 5.9.1 
The choice of appropriate sample size is critical to any evaluation study. 
The sample size should be large enough to detect treatment effects if 
they truly exist. Large sample sizes are preferred but gathering quality 
data is often expensive and time consuming. If treatment effect is not 
detected, then there can be two possible explanations of it. First, there is 
no effect at all. Second, the sample size was not large enough to detect 
this effect. In practice, researchers choose power of 0.8 and significance 
level of 0.05. Sample power is the probability of rejecting null hypothesis 
of no treatment effects and alternatively accepting treatment effects. 
Lenth (2001) sheds light on the importance of optimal sample size and 
argues that undersized studies are not capable of producing useful results 
while oversized studies use more resources than are necessary.  
First of all we have to determine if a sample size of 454 (after attri-
tion) is adequate. Suppose T  and C denote the mean outcome for 
treated and control group respectively. Our task is to choose a sample 
size which maintains a power of   say 0.8. CT    is the treatment 
effect that we are interested in detecting.  We test 0:0 H , and alter-
natively 0:1 H . We use a one-sided test because we expect positive 
treatment effects. However, the tricky part is determining effect size be-
fore the experiment? 
Statisticians have developed various techniques to tackle this problem. 
For sample size calculation, the key inputs are standardized effect, de-
sired power and significance level. Intuitively larger effects with small 
variations are easy to observe and therefore these effects can be detected 
with smaller sample sizes. On the contrary, smaller effect sizes with lar-
ger variations need larger samples for detection. Effect sizes are obtained 
from secondary sources/previous similar studies. In the context of this 
research design, we face three challenges.  
First, the impact of microcredit on business returns is not adequately 
studied and therefore, secondary sources are limited. Second, some of 
the estimates from secondary sources are based on non-experimental 
designs. The literature on impact evaluation suggests that non-
experimental designs may under/overestimate the impact. The direction 
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of the bias is not clear which further aggravates the problem. We know 
of only two experimental studies i.e. McKenzie and Woodruff (2008) in 
Mexico and De Mel et al. (2008)in Sri Lanka, which have evaluated the 
impact of exogenous capital shock on business returns. Both studies es-
tablished very large treatment effects on business returns ranging from 
240-396 percent in Mexico and from 55-63 percent in Sri Lanka. 
Banerjee et al. (2009) and Crépon et al. (2011) studies did not find any 
impact of microcredit on business returns. Our sample size of 454 is 
large compared to some experimental studies. For example, papers 
which calculated returns to capital in Mexico and Sri Lanka used a sam-
ple size of 198 and 385 firms respectively. Other studies, such as van 
Kempen et al. (2009) conducted an experiment with 218 individuals to 
investigate household revealed preferences for (legal) firewood in rural 
Guatemala. In another experiment van Kempen (2009) use a sample size 
of 156 individuals to test the role of expectations in women’s empower-
ment in India.  
Apart from anecdotal support, we rely on Cohen (1988) to determine 
adequacy of our sample size of 454. Cohen considers a standardized ef-
fect of 0.2 “small”, 0.5 “medium” and 0.8 “large”. The treatment effects 
found in Sri Lanka and Mexico were very large, however, we are cogni-
zant of the fact that it might be quite different in Pakistan. With this 
sample size and 0.8 power, we should be able to detect standardized ef-
fect of 0.22 which is close to small. Standardized treatment effects are 
likely to be larger than 0.22 and hence can be detected with sample size 
of 454. Table 5.10-1 provides sensitivity analysis of sample size to differ-
ent levels of standardized effect sizes and power. 
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Table 5.10-1: Sample Size for Different Level of Standardized Effects and 
Power 
   Significance Level=0.05 
   Sample Size for Treatment, Control 
 
Standardized Ef-
fect Size 
 Power=0.8  Power=0.9 
Small 0.2  310, 310  429, 429 
Medium 0.5  50, 50  69, 69 
Large 0.8  20, 20  27, 27 
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Figure 5.10-1: Randomization and Data Collection Flowchart 
 
 
 
 
Applications Akhuwat 
Pool of Eligible 
Applicants (488) 
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Control 
Group 
Treatment 
Group 
1st Follow-up 
Survey 
 
2nd Follow 
up Survey 
 
Eligibility Drops out from 
Survey 
1st Follow-up 
Survey 
2nd Follow up 
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No 
Treatment (243) 
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Control (245) 
Coding and 
Data Entry 
 
Coding and 
Data Entry 
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10 months after 
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5 months after 
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t=1 t=2 t=3 
Full scale survey 
Mini survey 
Data only on monthly 
profits, working capital 
and number of hours 
worked 
Full scale survey 
Randomization 
 5 months 
 10 months 
Figure 5.10-2: Timeline of Experiment and Data Collection 
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Appendix 5.10-1: Hausman Test 
Hausman Test: Monthly Profits 
 
                 ---- Coefficients ---- 
             |      (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
             |      fe1          re1         Difference          S.E. 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    2bn.time |    397.8265     398.2733       -.4468205        2.796461 
      3.time |      382.68     383.1641       -.4841048        2.794772 
   treatment |    275.1932      274.212        .9811768         5.51431 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
 
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
 
                  chi2(3) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                          =        0.04 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.9982 
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Hausman Test: Log(Monthly Profits) 
 
                 ---- Coefficients ---- 
             |      (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
             |      fe2          re2         Difference          S.E. 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    2bn.time |    .0492098     .0493064       -.0000966        .0003563 
      3.time |    .0479316     .0480333       -.0001017        .0003561 
   treatment |    .0329727     .0327666         .000206        .0007045 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
 
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
 
                  chi2(3) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                          =        0.09 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.9929 
 
.   
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Hausman Test: Indirect Monthly Profits 
 
                 ---- Coefficients ---- 
             |      (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
             |      fe9          re9         Difference          S.E. 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      3.time |    402.4783     398.6416        3.836705        20.39839 
   treatment |     193.236     201.0122        -7.77618        41.18941 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
 
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
 
                  chi2(2) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                          =        0.04 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.9823 
 
.  
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Hausman Test: Log(Indirect Monthly Profits) 
 
                 ---- Coefficients ---- 
             |      (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
             |      fe10         re10        Difference          S.E. 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      3.time |    .0535549     .0534957        .0000593        .0025555 
   treatment |    .0254199       .02554       -.0001201        .0051588 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
 
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
 
                  chi2(2) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                          =        0.00 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.9997 
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Hausman Test: Working Capital 
 
                 ---- Coefficients ---- 
             |      (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
             |      fe3          re3         Difference          S.E. 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    2bn.time |    215.4505     208.3623        7.088289        14.59985 
      3.time |   -75.39339    -82.46907         7.07568        14.59108 
   treatment |    2304.637     2318.977       -14.34089        29.06083 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
 
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
 
                  chi2(3) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                          =        0.24 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.9703 
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Hausman Test: Log(Working Capital) 
 
                 ---- Coefficients ---- 
             |      (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
             |      fe4          re4         Difference          S.E. 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    2bn.time |    .0092801     .0089189        .0003612         .000562 
      3.time |   -.0016457    -.0020051        .0003594        .0005617 
   treatment |    .0912332     .0919617       -.0007285        .0011198 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
 
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
 
                  chi2(3) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                          =        0.42 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.9353 
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Hausman Test: Number of hours worked in a day 
 
                 ---- Coefficients ---- 
             |      (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
             |      fe5          re5         Difference          S.E. 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    2bn.time |   -.0972041    -.1000541          .00285        .0233507 
      3.time |   -.0596107    -.0621681        .0025574         .023336 
   treatment |    .0270681     .0322514       -.0051833         .047009 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
 
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
 
                  chi2(3) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                          =        0.03 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.9988 
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Hausman Test: Log(Number of hours worked in a day) 
 
                 ---- Coefficients ---- 
             |      (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
             |      fe6          re6         Difference          S.E. 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    2bn.time |   -.0340088    -.0338384       -.0001704        .0027918 
      3.time |   -.0131472    -.0129437       -.0002035          .00279 
   treatment |    .0046485      .004236        .0004125        .0056228 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
 
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
 
                  chi2(3) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                          =        0.02 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.9992 
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Hausman Test: Returns on Capital(direct income)-in levels 
 
                 ---- Coefficients ---- 
             |      (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
             |      fe7          re7         Difference          S.E. 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
          wc |    .1194085     .1180304        .0013781        .0043031 
    2bn.time |    372.0998     373.9047       -1.804845        6.946309 
      3.time |    391.6826     393.1458       -1.463142        5.930876 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                         b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtivreg 
          B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtivreg 
 
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
 
                  chi2(3) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                          =        0.10 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.9915 
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Hausman Test: Returns on Capital(direct income)-in Logs 
 
                 ---- Coefficients ---- 
             |      (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
             |      fe8          re8         Difference          S.E. 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       logwc |    .3614108     .3551688         .006242        .0150133 
    2bn.time |    .0458559     .0461877       -.0003317        .0009966 
      3.time |    .0485264     .0487971       -.0002707        .0008665 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                         b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtivreg 
          B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtivreg 
 
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
 
                  chi2(3) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                          =        0.17 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.9818 
 
  
 Returns to Capital 113 
 
 
 
 
Hausman Test: Returns on Capital(indirect income)-in Levels 
 
                 ---- Coefficients ---- 
             |      (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
             |      fe11         re11        Difference          S.E. 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
          wc |    .0859265     .0876799       -.0017534        .0248137 
      3.time |    406.5915       404.73        1.861531        25.66966 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                         b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtivreg 
          B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtivreg 
 
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
 
                  chi2(2) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                          =        0.00 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.9975 
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite) 
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Hausman Test: Returns on Capital(indirect income)-in Logs 
 
                 ---- Coefficients ---- 
             |      (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
             |      fe12         re12        Difference          S.E. 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       logwc |    .2841655     .2733628        .0108026        .0829151 
      3.time |    .0537732     .0542417       -.0004685        .0037785 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                         b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtivreg 
          B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtivreg 
 
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
 
                  chi2(2) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                          =        0.02 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.9915 
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6  Gender-based Differences in Business Returns 
 
6.1 Introduction 
In his book, David Roodman tells us two contrasting stories about 
Grameen Bank and asks an intriguing question whether microcredit is a 
‘savior or a snare’ (Roodman 2012)58. The first story is about Murshida, a 
poor Bangladeshi woman, who faced repeated physical violence from her 
husband. One day her husband sold the roof top of their hut to pay for 
his gambling debt. That night, Murshida and her three children spent the 
night in a thunderstorm without any shelter. The next day, she con-
fronted her husband and during this altercation, the husband divorced 
Murshida on the spot and threw her and her three children out of house. 
She took shelter in her brother’s house and bought a goat with $30 mi-
croloan from Grameen Bank. With larger loans she started a sewing 
business and eventually employed 25 women. The second story is about 
Razia who, unlike Murshida, paid a heavy price for her microloan. She 
borrowed from Grameen Bank hoping to give her daughter education. 
Instead, she sold her cows, jewellery and house to pay off her debt.  
None of these stories necessarily represent an average female bor-
rower; however, some of the negative stories do raise an important ques-
tion about the effectiveness of microfinance as a development interven-
tion (Roodman 2012). Females all over the world and especially in 
developing countries are generally believed to be more credit constrained 
than their male counterparts (e.g. Khandker 1998). For this reason, when 
Grameen bank pioneered the idea of group lending, their main target 
was poor women. If the theory of ‘women being more credit con-
strained’ is valid then access to credit maybe expected to have a greater 
impact on female microentrepreneurs as opposed to male (De Mel et al. 
2008). Contrary to this expectation, recent impact studies do not tend to 
support this idea.  
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In a randomized experiment, De Mel et al. (2008) gave a positive 
shock to the capital stock of randomly selective microenterprises in Sri 
Lanka. The shock was given in the form of cash and in-kind grants. The 
study found 5-6% monthly returns to capital which were very high com-
pared to market interest rates. The paper finds significant gender-based 
heterogeneity in treatment effects.  For men, treatment in the form of 
additional capital led to a significant increase in business profits. Female 
microentrepreneurs, on the contrary, did not report any impact of addi-
tional capital on their business returns. Karlan & Zinman (2010) also do 
not find any treatment effects for female owned microenterprises in Phil-
ippines. Based on these findings, De Mel et al. (2009) raise the question 
as to whether capital alone is enough for growth of female owned micro-
enterprises. 
This paper adds further evidence to the debate by exploring gender-
based heterogeneity in business returns. For this study we partnered with 
Akhuwat Microfinance which provides interest free loans to credit con-
strained microentrepreneurs in Pakistan. Borrowers apply for Akhuwat 
loan through a self-selection process. From a pool of eligible applicants, 
we randomly assigned 243 microentrepreneurs to treatment and 245 to 
control group. The treatment was given in the form of Rs. 10,000 inter-
est free loans. We followed these microentrepreneurs for the next 10 
months and created a panel dataset comprising of three waves. At the 
first level of our analyses, we investigate gender-based heterogeneity in 
the baseline characteristics. We found that in the baseline, female micro-
entrepreneurs earn 20% less than their male counterparts. They also op-
erate at lower levels of capital. The gender-based differences in monthly 
returns significantly decreased once we controlled for differences in capi-
tal stock and purdah (veil). Our second level of analyses uses panel data-
set and explores gender-based heterogeneity in treatment effects. Consis-
tent with De Mel et al.(2008), we found significant heterogeneity of 
treatment effects on business returns. In response to treatment, male 
owned microenterprises showed large and statistically significant in-
creases in business returns. Female owned enterprises, however, showed 
smaller albeit still statistically significant increases in business returns.   
Rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 provides brief 
literature review on gender-based differences in returns; Section 6.3 de-
scribes the experiment; Section 6.4 relates to data collection; Section 6.5 
investigates sample attrition; Section 6.6 outlines our empirical strategy 
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for estimation of treatment effects and heterogeneity; Section 6.7  dis-
cuses results and at the end, section 6.8 provides concluding remarks. 
 
6.2 Literature Review 
Research on gender-based differences in entrepreneurship has generally 
focused on two important aspects i.e. participation and performance. 
The first strand of literature shows that compared to men, women’s rates 
of participation in entrepreneurship is significantly low59 (Estrin and 
Mickiewicz 2009; Bosma and Harding 2007). The second strand of litera-
ture, which is of interest to us in this paper, documents gender-based 
differences in firm performance. Bardasi et al. (2011) review literature 
which provides evidence that women entrepreneurs underperform com-
pared to men60. An intriguing question is what factors explain gender-
based heterogeneity in business returns?  
Neoclassical economists attribute heterogeneity in business returns to 
differences in productivity. They believe that markets pay similar reward 
to equally capable male and female entrepreneurs regardless of their gen-
der. In other words, there is no gender discrimination in the market and 
that gender-based performance differences are mainly explained by pro-
ductivity gaps rather than by the gender itself. In line with this argument, 
social feminists posit that nature endowed both genders with different 
bundles of productivities. They argue that these intrinsic productivity 
differences mainly drive the performance gaps (Fischer et al. 1993). Be-
sides productivity, male and female entrepreneurs exhibit different risk 
appetite. Female entrepreneurs are known to have higher risk aversion 
compared to male entrepreneurs (Borghans et al. 2009, Hartog et al. 
2002). As a result, female entrepreneurs chose less risky professions 
which imply relatively less returns. Liberal feminists, on the other hand, 
are of the view that differences in productivity alone do not explain gen-
der-based performance gaps adequately and that female’s apparent un-
derperformance is due to discrimination. They argue that these discrimi-
nations are ‘overt’ and structural (Robb and Watson 2012). Whether 
caused by fair market dynamics or discrimination, both schools agree 
that gender-based heterogeneity does exist. The key drivers of gender-
based performance gaps can be mapped into the following categories. 
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6.2.1 Gender-based Differences in Access to Markets 
Gender-based differences may be caused by structural constraints en-
forced through formal and informal institutions. Market imperfections, 
as a formal institution, have various implications for female entrepre-
neurs in terms of their participation and performance in the market 
place. Some studies suggest that credit markets perceive women to be 
high risk clients. The perception of ‘women being high risk clients’ af-
fects women entrepreneurs in two ways. First, it limits women’s access to 
credit markets (Brush 1992, Heidrick and Nicol 2002) and, second, it dic-
tates credit markets to charge higher interest rates. Muravyev et al. (2009) 
found that in Europe, female entrepreneurs are 5.4% less likely to obtain 
bank loans. Furthermore women, on average, pay 0.6% higher interest 
rate than their male counterparts (Muravyev et al. 2009).  The gender 
imbalance in access to finance in developing countries, where the finan-
cial markets are not sufficiently developed, is even more (Bardasi et al. 
2011). With limited access to capital, female entrepreneurs end up oper-
ating with suboptimal levels of capital.  This suboptimality may be a key 
driver of gender-based differences especially in those labor markets 
which have discontinuous returns to capital (Banerjee and Newman 
1993). In the presence of indivisible minimum scale investment and 
credit market imperfections, the production process becomes inefficient 
which results in heterogeneous returns depending on whether an entre-
preneur is above or below the minimum investment threshold.  
Gender-based differences may also be caused by structural constraints 
in labor markets. Labor markets for women, in developing countries es-
pecially in countries like Pakistan, are largely missing due to social and 
cultural norms (Emran et al. 2011). These norms act as barriers and ren-
der part of the women’s labor endowment ‘non-tradable’. As a result, 
female entrepreneurs grow their business to the extent which makes their 
non-traded labor productive. In Pakistan, one of the cultural barriers for 
women is the institution of purdah (veil) (Roomi 2013)61. Purdah does 
not necessarily mean covering of face; it rather defines spatial boundaries 
for women which results in their systematic segregation and seclusion 
(Papanek 1971). Purdah discourages mixing with the opposite gender 
and also restricts women’s spatial mobility.  Consequently, purdah, as a 
structural constraint, limits women’s potential for profitable network 
formation and restricts their access to various opportunities. Lack of 
networking hampers their business growth and deprives them of useful 
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resources (Powell et al. 1999). These resources can be in the form of 
money, suppliers’ credits or guarantees in case of any need for formal 
and informal credit. These factors combined may cause substantial gen-
der-based differences in business returns. 
 
6.2.2 Differences in Human Capital and Personality Traits 
Human capital is one of the most important inputs in any production 
function. The theory of human capital formation, which was first formal-
ized by Schultz (1902-1998) and Becker (1930-2014) in early 1960s, states 
that human capital can be built through education, life experiences and 
both on-the-job and off-the-job trainings. Numerous studies have estab-
lished the importance of human capital in explaining various positive 
outcomes both at individual and firm levels.  For example, in the US, 
formal training increased firm productivity by 6 percent (Bartel 1992). A 
10% increase in education is associated with 8.5-12.7% increase in pro-
ductivity (Lynch and Black 1995).  
Another explanation for variation in returns comes from the field of 
psychology. According to the literature in psychology, besides cognitive 
skills, non-cognitive abilities e.g personality traits, motivation, beauty, 
social networking etc. have the power to predict different socioeconomic 
outcomes. Heckman et al. (2006) provide evidence that non-cognitive 
skills are at least as important as cognitive skills. These findings thus 
challenges the g-theory of human behavior advocated by Herrnstein and 
Murray (1994) which considers cognitive skills as a dominant factor in 
explaining different socioeconomic outcomes. Mueller and Plug (2006) 
term personality as a bundle of productive traits. Individuals trade these 
traits against equilibrium price which is determined by market return on 
each component of the trait vector. Individuals choose professions 
which pay the highest reward to their traits and as a result, in equilib-
rium, labor market observes occupational sorting based on personality 
traits (Tett et al. 1991).  
Using five factor model, Mueller and Plug (2006) analyzed the effects 
of personality on earnings. They find that extroversion, agreeableness, 
conscientiousness, neuroticism and openness to experience are re-
warded/ penalized significantly and differently across genders. Among 
these factors, agreeableness is the most important factor in explaining 
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earning differentials between male and female. The paper also finds evi-
dence of significant gender differences in personality traits. Mueller and 
Plug (2006) acknowledge that the main limitation of their empirical work 
is endogeneity of personality measures. The data on personality measures 
and earnings were gathered simultaneously and therefore, the causal rela-
tionship is not very clear. That is, we do not know for sure whether per-
sonality is driving earnings or vice verse. One possible solution to correct 
this problem is to gather data on personality before the outcomes.  
Since personality is related with various outcomes e.g. educational at-
tainment, job performance etc., therefore, intuitively, any systematic 
gender-based differences in personality traits has the ability to explain 
gender-based performance gaps.  
6.3 Data 
For this study, we conducted an experiment and collected a three-period 
panel dataset from 488 applicants who were eligible for Akhuwat’s en-
terprise loans. Section 5.4 in Chapter 5 provides a detailed description of 
this experiment. 24% of our sample consists of female borrowers 
(N=115). After conducting baseline survey 243 firms were randomly as-
signed to treatment group and remaining 245 were assigned to control. 
The gender-based distribution of treatment and control groups is pre-
sented in Table 6.3-1.   
Table 6.3-1: Gender-based Distribution of Treatment and Control Groups 
 
Treatment  Control  Total 
Male 178  195  373 
Female 65  50  115 
Total 243  245  488 
 
Table 5.5-1 in chapter 5 shows that overall randomization created a 
valid control group. We also investigated the validity of randomization 
for both male and female subsamples. Table 6.8-1 shows that for male 
microentrepreneurs, the treatment group has significantly higher educa-
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tion than that of control group. Similarly, the treatment group reported 
significantly higher scores on agreeableness domain. For Female micro-
entrepreneurs, the treatment group has a significantly lower score on 
agreeableness domain (see Table 6.8-2). These small differences are not 
likely to bias our estimates. McKenzie and Woodruff(2008) argue that 
because of randomization, any possible differences in both treatment 
and control groups are due to ‘pure chance’ and thus are not expected to 
create any bias. Further, the use of fixed effects model will remove the 
effects of time invariant characteristics. 
In the baseline, both male and female microentrepreneurs reported 
significant differences in key business characteristics. Table 6.6-1 shows 
that female microentrepreneurs operate a relatively smaller business with 
significantly lower levels of capital stock and monthly income. They also 
generate significantly lower revenues and commit fewer hours to the 
business. In our sample, microentrepreneurs generally operate very small 
businesses. Considering the size of businesses, the treatment of Rs. 
10,000 is substantial. For female microentrepreneurs, this treatment is 
equivalent to 143% of their median monthly income.  For men, it is 
116% of their median income. Similarly, the treatment of Rs. 10,000 
represents 45% and 41% of the median capital stock for female and male 
owned microenterprises respectively. 52.63% of female and 26.95% of 
males in our sample run their businesses from homes. Table 6.3-2 reveals 
that the joint distribution of the microentrepreneurs across different sec-
tors do not show any significant differences across genders (p=0.33).  
Table 6.3-2: Gender-based Distribution by Sectors 
 
Female  Male  Total 
Retail 34  127  161 
Manufacturing 18  53  71 
Services 37  137  174 
Agriculture 1  1  2 
Others 25  55  80 
Total 115  373  488 
Pearson Chi-square(4)=4.5714 
P=0.33 
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To better understand the businesses operated by men and women, in 
the following paragraphs, we talk about two cases. For the sake of confi-
dentiality, we conceal the identities of microentrepreneurs by using ficti-
tious names.  
Rabia is one of Akhuwat’s current borrowers. Her life is full of hard-
ships and struggles. Almost two years after marriage, her husband aban-
doned Rabia and her four months old son. Rabia went back to her par-
ent’s house where she lived with her mother and three brothers. When 
her son turned 18, he was shot dead. By the time, she also lost her 
mother. After her mother’s demise, Rabia decided not to be financially 
dependent on her brothers. She heard about Akhuwat’s interest free 
loans and one day borrowed Rs.10,000 with an intention to start her own 
business. With that money, she bought wheat from local farmers and had 
it ground from a nearby flour mill.  She stocked the flour in her house 
and people especially women from the neighbourhood became her cus-
tomers. In an interview with the author, she said that people like her 
stone-ground flour because of its freshness and superior quality. On av-
erage, she buys 15 bags (40 kilograms in each bag) of wheat in a week. 
For each bag, she pays Rs.50 for transportation, Rs.20 for sift cleaning 
and Rs.80 for grounding. After paying all these expenses, she makes 
Rs.150-200 in each bag. Other typical businesses operated by women are 
tailoring, door-to-door selling of clothes and other items, embroidery, 
beauty parlour, making car seat covers and grocery stores etc.  
Hassan is another borrower of Akhuwat who unlike Rabia is a skilled 
worker. He used to work for a furniture manufacturer on daily wages as 
a carpenter. He was not happy with his earnings and therefore decided to 
start his own business. He took Rs. 10,000 interest-free loan from Ak-
huwat and bought tools with that money. He rented a shop and devel-
oped it into a workshop. Hassan started getting contracts from furniture 
manufacturers which normally included work related to wood moulding, 
grinding and polishing. Two of his main expenditures are utility bills and 
location rent. After paying these expenses, Hassan earns Rs.10,000-
12,000 in a month.  
Besides business level, our sample shows significant gender-based dif-
ferences in some household characteristics (see Table 6.3-3). The average 
male and female education in Pakistan is 6.1 and 3.3 years respectively62. 
Both male and female entrepreneurs in our sample have less than aver-
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age education. Female microentrepreneurs are significantly older and less 
educated compared to male microentrepreneurs. Similarly, their house-
hold’s monthly income and food and non-food expenditure are also sig-
nificantly different.  
Table 6.3-3: Gender-based Differences in Household and Business Character-
istics 
0H : Both Groups have Equal 
Means 
Male  Female  t-test 
t-
statistics Mean S.D  Mean S.D  
Education 5.51 3.97 
 
2.88 3.95 
 
6.21*** 
Age of the borrower 37.4 10.2 
 
42.8 9.39 
 
5.06*** 
Number of Children in the HH 1.25 1.34 
 
0.948 1.18 
 
2.21** 
HH Assets 761,735 862,268 
 
708,303 700,693 
 
0.606 
HH monthly income 12,999 4,577 
 
11,476 5,419 
 
2.98*** 
HH expenditure 13,113 4,554 
 
11,571 5,307 
 
3.05*** 
HH food expenditure 8,668 4,238 
 
7,531 4,899 
 
2.42*** 
Monthly Profits 8,563 1,155 
 
6,892 1,205  13.4*** 
Capital Stock 24,642 4,029 
 
22,125 4,031  5.86*** 
Hours of work in a day 10.1 2.08 
 
9.06 1.86  4.81*** 
Significance levels (*=10%,**=5%, ***=1%) 
 
Table 6.3-4 compares personality traits of both male and female en-
trepreneurs (see also Figure 6.3-1). Our data do not show any significant 
gender-based differences in Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness and 
Agreeableness domains. On the Conscientiousness domain though, fe-
male microentrepreneurs score significantly higher than male microen-
trepreneurs.  
124 CHAPTER 6 
 
Table 6.3-4: Baseline Differences in Personality 
0H : Both Groups 
have Equal Means 
Male  Female  t-test 
t-
statistics Mean S.D  Mean S.D  
Neuroticism 2.48 0.655  2.48 0.643  0.012 
Extraversion 3.51 0.632  3.49 0.701  0.302 
Openness 3.28 0.781  3.25 0.764  0.299 
Agreeableness 3.6 0.676  3.64 0.621  0.626 
Conscientiousness 3.83 0.676  3.94 0.665  1.596* 
Significance levels (*=10%,**=5%, ***=1%) 
Figure 6.3-1: Comparison of Personality: Male vs. Female 
 
 
6.4 Sample Attrition 
Of 488 applicants in the baseline, 454 completed the follow-up survey in 
the third wave representing an attrition rate of 6.97%. The response rate 
is comparable to other similar randomized studies. The attrition is non-
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
Female Male
neuroticism extraversion
openness agreeableness
conscientiousness
Comparison of personality Male vs. Female
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systematic as we did not see any significant differences in the baseline 
characteristics of attrited and unattrited microentrepreneurs (see Table 
5.6-1 and Table 5.6-2). Our analysis also reveals that the attrition was 
non-systematic both for male and female microentrepreneurs (see Table 
6.4-1 and Table 6.4-2).  
Table 6.4-1: Comparison of Means of Attrited and Unattrited Microenter-
prises-Female 
0H : Both Groups have 
Equal Means 
Attrited  Unattrited  t-test 
t-
statistics Mean S.D  Mean S.D  
Monthly Profits 6,496 1,051 
 
6,922 1,215 
 
0.963 
Capital Stock 21,223 2,484 
 
22,192 4,123 
 
0.655 
Number of Hours Worked 8.38 0.916 
 
9.11 1.9 
 
1.08 
Significance levels (*=10%,**=5%, ***=1%) 
Table 6.4-2: Comparison of Means of Attrited and Unattrited Microenter-
prises - Male 
0H : Both Groups have 
Equal Means 
Attrited  Unattrited  t-test 
t-
statistics Mean S.D  Mean S.D  
Monthly Profits 8,633 1,055 
 
8,558 1,163 
 
0.321 
Capital stock 24,843 3,946 
 
24,627 4,040 
 
0.263 
Number of Hours Worked 9.69 2.09 
 
10.1 2.08 
 
1.05 
Significance levels (*=10%,**=5%, ***=1%) 
6.5 Estimation Strategy 
In this paper, we investigate gender-based differences in two stages. In 
the first stage, we use baseline data and investigate gender-based differ-
126 CHAPTER 6 
 
ences in monthly profits. In the second stage, we investigate gender-
based heterogeneity in treatment effects. 
6.5.1 Gender-based Heterogeneity in Monthly Profits-Baseline 
To examine gender-based differences, we start by simply comparing av-
erage monthly profits earned by male and female microentrepreneurs.   
Later on we add covariates for demographic differences, business charac-
teristics, personality traits and purdah. We estimate the following model 
using ordinary least squares. 
 
iipurdah
iPiBiHiMalei
Purdah
PBHHSexbrwrofits



Pr
 6.5-1 
 
 
Variable iofitsPr  represents monthly profits of microenterprise i. 
iSexbrwr  is a dummy variable which takes value of 1 for male entrepre-
neurs and 0 for female entrepreneurs. iHH  and iB represent household 
and business characteristics respectively. iP  relates to five personality 
domains and iPurdah  is a dummy variable showing if a microentrepre-
neur is doing purdah63. We use purdah as a proxy for limited access to 
labor markets through restricted spatial mobility which may help explain 
variation in business returns. i  is a zero mean stochastic error term 
which captures other unobserved factors. 
After establishing gender-based differences in monthly profits, we 
then proceed to examine the factors which contribute to these differ-
ences. For this purpose we follow Oaxaca and Ransom (1994) and de-
compose the gender-based differences into Explained and Unexplained 
components based on common coefficients estimated from pooled re-
gression.  
Suppose MofitsPr and FofitsPr are the monthly profits for male and 
female microentrepreneurs in our sample. The average gender-based 
earning differential ofitsPr  can be shown as; 
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)(Pr)(PrPr FM ofitsEofitsEofits   
 
Assuming linear relationship, ofitsPr can be expressed as; 
 
)()(Pr FFFMMM XEXEofits    
 
Where X is set of covariates in our regression model which explain 
variation in monthly profits. 
 
Since MME  )( , FFE  )( , 0)( ME   and 0)( FE   
 
FFMM XXofits  Pr  6.5-2 
 
Various studies have decomposed equation 6.5-2 into various com-
ponents. Since we will be using estimates from pooled regression, we 
decompose 6.5-2 into the following two components.  
 
])()[()(Pr FPFMPMFMP XXXXofits    6.5-3 
 
The term )( FMP XX   explains the gender-based gap in profits due 
to differences in average characteristics of male and female entrepre-
neurs. The second term ])()[( FPFMPM XX    captures dif-
ferential returns on male-female characteristics in the market. In litera-
ture, this term is referred to as market discrimination (e.g. Oaxaca and 
Ransom 1994, Caliendo et al. 2014, Jann 2008) . Mueller and Plug(2006) 
though refrain to interpret this gap as discrimination because they are of 
the view that, instead of market discrimination, this gap may potentially 
be caused by gender-based differences in preferences.  
 
128 CHAPTER 6 
 
6.5.2 Gender-based Heterogeneity in Treatment Effects-Panel 
Dataset 
In the second stage, we investigate gender-based heterogeneity in treat-
ment effects on different outcomes of interest. We use panel dataset and 
estimate the following model; 
 
itii
t
tMt
iitTM
t
ttitTit
Sexbrwr
SexbrwrTreatmentTreatmentY










*
*
3
2
3
2  6.5-4 
 
It is expected that randomization will purge individual specific effects, 
however, we will also control for time-invariant characteristics by esti-
mating a fixed effects model. itY is the outcome of interest of firm i  in 
period t , itTreatment is a dummy which takes values of 1 for treatment 
and 0 for control; t  captures fixed wave effects; T represents overall 
effect on the treated; and i  are  time invariant fixed effects of microen-
terprises. iSexbrwr  is a gender dummy which takes value of 1 for male 
entrepreneurs and 0 for female. TM and Mt captures the gender inter-
acted treatment and trend effects. The error term it in this model repre-
sents other unobserved factors affecting our outcome variables. The 
randomization of treatment implies that it  is random and uncorrelated 
with other covariates in our model. Since the treatment was randomized 
at the microenterprise level, we cluster the standard errors at microenter-
prise level as well. Using the model above, treatment effect on the 
treated is as follows; 
 
iTMT
it
it Sexbrwr
Treatment
Y
 


 
1iSexbrwr  implies male microentrepreneurs 
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Treatment for male microentrepreneurs = TMT    
Similarly treatment for female microentrepreneurs = T  
To investigate gender-based heterogeneity in treatment effects, we use 
the following tests; 
 
Test1: There are heterogeneous treatment effects if 0TM  
 
Test2: There is no effect for female entrepreneurs if 0T  
 
 
6.6 Results 
6.6.1 Gender-based Heterogeneity in Monthly Profits-Baseline 
Our baseline data suggest large and significant gender-based variations in 
business returns (see Table 6.6-1). On average female microentrepreneurs 
earn 20% less in monthly profits and 21% less in monthly revenues 
compared to their male counterparts. They also operate with 11% less 
capital.  
Table 6.6-1: Baseline differences in Business Characteristics 
0H : Both Groups have Equal 
Means 
Male  Female  t-test 
t-
statistics Mean S.D  Mean S.D  
Revenues 10,361 2,773  8,182 2,559  7.5*** 
Monthly Profits 8,563 1,155  6,892 1,205  13.4*** 
Capital Stock 24,642 4,029  22,125 4,031  5.86*** 
Number of Hours Worked  in 
Day 10.1 2.08 
 
9.06 1.86 
 
4.81*** 
Significance levels (*=10%,**=5%, ***=1%) 
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Before proceeding to multivariate analyses, we conduct chow test on 
Model 5, which is our full model, to see if estimated parameters are sta-
ble across branches. Based on p-value of 0.57 (F-statistic = 0.94), we 
conclude that pooling of data is reasonable. Table 6.6-2 shows that male 
microentrepreneurs earn Rs. 1,671 more than female entrepreneurs in 
the base specification (Model 1). The gap actually increases when we 
control for education and age of the entrepreneurs in Model 2. Higher 
levels of capital are associated with higher profits as suggested by Model 
3. Capital stock seems to be a significant driver of monthly profits which 
is quite intuitive. When we control for the capital stock and entrepre-
neur’s own labor input in Model 3, the average difference in monthly 
profits shrinks to Rs. 1,126 compared to Rs. 1,671 in the base specifica-
tion. In Model 4, we add personality traits to our set of covariates. Per-
sonality traits are intended to partially absorb variation in monthly profits 
and by adding them into our analyses, we are not trying to establish any 
causality. The R-squared only marginally improved (from 0.740 to 0.744) 
which shows that personality traits do not drastically improve the ex-
planatory power of our model. The gender-based differences in monthly 
profits virtually stays at the same level (1,127 compared to 1,126). Model 
5 shows that purdah is associated with lower monthly profits. Once we 
control for purdah, gender-based differences in monthly profits decline, 
however, they still remain large and significant. Male microentrepreneurs 
continue to earn Rs. 992 more in monthly profits than their female coun-
terparts even after controlling for demographic characteristics, capital 
stock, effort, personality traits and purdah. 
To further investigate the gender-based earning differentials, we split 
the difference of Rs. 1,671 into two components by estimating equation 
6.5-4 using twofold decomposition (Jann 2008). Table 6.6-3 provides 
detailed decomposition. Column 2 reports the part of earning gaps which 
results from differences in observed characteristics. Column 3 reports 
the unexplained component of earning gaps which essentially captures 
the effects of differential return on male and female characteristics. Col-
umn 4 and Column 5 further decomposes the unexplained gaps arising 
from differences in male and female coefficients.  
In our sample, there are significant gender-based differences in ob-
served characteristics of male and female microentrepreneurs (see Table 
6.3-3 and Table 6.3-4). In literature, these characteristics are referred to 
as endowments. Differences in endowments explain 41% (Rs.679 out of 
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Rs.1,671) of the gender gap in earnings (see Table 6.6-3). Capital stock 
and purdah are the only two variables which significantly explain earning 
gaps. In our sample, female microentrepreneurs operate their businesses 
with significantly lower levels of capital which also yield in lower busi-
ness profits. Gender-based differences in levels of capital stock explain 
Rs.582 in earning differentials. Similarly, prevalence of purdah reduces 
females’ monthly profits by Rs.133 compared to their male counterparts.  
59% of the earning differentials are not explained by differences in 
observed characteristics. The unexplained earning differential may be 
due to market discrimination or gender-based differences in preferences. 
Table 6.6-3 shows that Extraversion domain of personality trait is the 
only significant predictor of the unexplained component. Extraversion is 
seen as a positive trait for male microentrepreneurs which results in a 
market premium of Rs.491. This premium comes directly from large dif-
ference in slopes. In pooled regression, the return on extraversion )( P  
is -14.95 whereas for male microentrepreneurs )( M  it is 124.73. Coef-
ficient on females’ Extraversion is very large and negative
)53.300( F  which leads to a significant negative return of Rs.997. 
We do not know the precise reasons for this penalty. The personality test 
that we used mentions that a person high in Extraversion is assertive, 
active, talkative, sociable, gregarious and cheerful in disposition. Extra-
vert person enjoys excitement and stimulation. Among other possible 
reasons, extraversion for female entrepreneurs may not be a likable trait 
in Pakistan’s conservative and patriarchal society. 
Column 2 in Table 6.6-3, shows that Extraversion alone creates a dif-
ferential effect of Rs.1,488. Though the context and data are not compa-
rable with ours, Mueller and Plug (2006) reported similar findings. Using 
data from Wisconsin Longitudinal Study, the paper finds that compared 
to that of men, female’s Extraversion is significantly penalized. Our find-
ings reveal that with exception of three personality domains (i.e. Neu-
roticism, Extraversion and Conscientiousness), all other characteristics of 
female microentrepreneurs are rewarded though insignificantly. This 
brings down the gender gap in monthly profits to Rs.992 which is same 
as the coefficient on male dummy in Model 5 of Table 6.6-2. 
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Table 6.6-2: Baseline - Gender-based Differences in Monthly Profits 
Dependent Variable: Monthly 
Profits 
Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 
      
Gender Dummy 
Male=1, Female=0 
1671.291*** 
(127.06) 
1697.783*** 
(132.47) 
1126.204*** 
(79.81) 
1127.249*** 
(81.22) 
991.808*** 
(118.72) 
Education of the entrepreneur  
 
-9.108 
(13.46) 
-0.821 
(7.90) 
-1.404 
(7.91) 
-0.856 
(7.95) 
Age of the Entrepreneur  
 
0.473 
(5.56) 
2.131 
(3.06) 
3.160 
(3.12) 
2.585 
(3.12) 
Capital Stock  
 
 
 
0.232*** 
(0.01) 
0.232*** 
(0.01) 
0.231*** 
(0.01) 
Number of daily hours worked  
 
 
 
-25.026 
(15.81) 
-27.400* 
(15.73) 
-25.636 
(15.85) 
Neuroticism  
 
 
 
 
 
11.103 
(79.05) 
3.712 
(79.12) 
Extraversion  
 
 
 
 
 
-5.538 
(74.91) 
-14.952 
(74.89) 
Openness  
 
 
 
 
 
89.768* 
(45.86) 
90.486** 
(45.83) 
Agreeableness  
 
 
 
 
 
15.918 
(55.63) 
21.723 
(56.00) 
Conscientiousness  
 
 
 
 
 
-59.732 
(46.69) 
-57.210 
(46.23) 
Purdah=1, No-purdah=0  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-250.484* 
(127.57) 
Constant 6892.087*** 
(112.10) 
6898.083*** 
(270.91) 
1890.067*** 
(243.49) 
1744.059*** 
(592.23) 
1928.970*** 
(604.93) 
N 488 488 488 488 488 
R-Squared 0.271 0.271 0.740 0.744 0.745 
Notes: Significance level (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).  Robust standard errors are provided in parenthesis. The baseline data (N=488) was 
gathered in June 2010 . Variable Monthly Profits was measured by asking a direct question from the respondents on their monthly business 
profitability. Working Capital excludes value of land and buildings. 
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Table 6.6-3: Decomposition of Gender-based Differences in Monthly Profits 
Predicted Monthly Profits-Male 8563.38*** 
(59.77) 
Explained Difference 679.48*** 
(130.26) 
Predicted Monthly Profits-Female 6892.09*** 
(112.26) 
Unexplained Difference 991.81*** 
(117.21) 
Difference 1671.29*** 
(127.18) 
   
Variable 
Explained Unexplained Unexplained-Male Unexplained-Female 
)( FMP XX   FPFMPM XX )()(    MPM X)(    FPF X)(    
Education of the entrepreneur -2.25 
(20.65) 
-8.64 
(61.61) 
2.05 
(23.52) 
10.69 
(39.95) 
Age of the Entrepreneur -13.96 
(16.89) 
-268.99 
(321.08) 
-69.87 
(56.03) 
199.13 
(271.60) 
Capital Stock 582.06*** 
(100.73) 
-558.69 
(363.30) 
-67.28 
(89.95) 
491.41* 
(285.13) 
Number of daily hours worked -26.76 
(17.17) 
-430.05 
(325.83) 
-106.98 
(75.67) 
323.06 
(259.94) 
Neuroticism -0.00 
(0.26) 
439.49 
(423.56) 
143.91 
(108.38) 
-295.58 
(329.37) 
Extraversion -0.31 
(1.89) 
1488.23*** 
(503.34) 
490.78*** 
(170.81) 
-997.45*** 
(370.35) 
Openness 2.24 
(7.49) 
142.30 
(306.49) 
43.06 
(65.76) 
-99.24 
(246.21) 
Agreeableness -0.96 
(2.86) 
-119.02 
(490.01) 
-93.07 
(123.28) 
25.95 
(379.42) 
Conscientiousness 6.56 
(6.64) 
9.17 
(399.94) 
-73.41 
(90.87) 
-82.58 
(324.70) 
Purdah=1, No-purdah=0 132.87* 
(67.92) 
-8.24 
(26.21) 
0.00 
(.) 
8.24 
(26.21) 
Constant _ 306.24 
(1330.30) 
722.62** 
(335.77) 
416.38 
(1037.89) 
Total 679.48*** 
(130.26) 
991.81*** 
(117.21) 
991.81*** 
(117.44) 
0.00 
(25.48) 
N 488 488 488 488 
Adjusted R-Squared (pooled) 0.740 0.740 0.740 0.740 
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6.6.2 Gender-based Heterogeneity in Treatment Effects-Panel Dataset 
To explore gender-based heterogeneity in treatment effects, we start our analy-
sis with single-difference estimators (see Table 6.6-4). We simply compare the 
means of treatment and control groups at the end of 5 and 10 months for 
both male and female microentrepreneurs. The monthly profits of treated 
male microentrepreneurs showed a significant increase of Rs. 396 after five 
month of treatment. Capital stock also increased by Rs. 2,842. Their own labor 
input, however, did not show any increase which lends credibility to the argu-
ment that increases in monthly profits and capital stock are due to exogenous 
capital infusion and not because of extra hours of work.  After 10 months of 
treatment, monthly profits and capital stock for male microentrepreneurs were 
Rs. 349 and Rs. 2,636  respectively. Compared to treated male, treated female 
microentrepreneurs did not show any improvement in their monthly profits. 
Their capital stock, however, significantly increased in both periods. Just like 
male microentrepreneurs, treatment did not lead to more effort from female 
microentrepreneurs. 
Table 6.6-4: Single Difference Estimates 
Difference (Treatment - Control) 
At the end of 2nd wave (t=2) 
N=453 
 
Male 
 
Female 
 
Difference 
Standard 
errors 
 
Difference 
Standard 
errors 
Monthly Profits 396*** 133 
 
99 249 
Capital Stock 2,842*** 454 
 
2,187*** 797 
Number of Hours Worked  in Day 0.0768 0.296 
 
0.343 0.53 
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At the end of 3rd wave (t=3) 
N=454 
 
Male 
 
Female 
 
Difference 
Standard 
errors 
 
Difference 
Standard 
errors 
Monthly Profits 349*** 128 
 
163 245 
Capital Stock 2,636*** 437 
 
2,371*** 789 
Number of Hours Worked  in Day 0.0933 0.245 
 
0.0769 0.405 
 
Using 6.5-4, we investigate gender-based heterogeneity in treatment effects. 
The panel data help us remove the time invariant factors by using fixed effects 
model. Table 6.6-5 shows that there is significant gender-based heterogeneity 
in monthly profits. On average, treated male microentrepreneurs earn Rs. 212 
more than treated female microentrepreneurs. Overall, treatment effects for 
male microentrepreneurs is Rs. 306 which is equivalent to 3.6% increase in 
their baseline monthly profits. The treatment, however, had a small and rela-
tively less significant impact on female microentrepreneur’s monthly profits. 
Treated female microentrepreneurs reported a gain of Rs. 93 in their monthly 
profits which was equivalent to 1.3% increase in their baseline monthly in-
come. We did not find any heterogeneous treatment effects on capital stock 
and effort measured in number of hours worked. The annual returns to capital 
for male and female microentrepreneurs are 156.9% and 50.1% respectively 
(see Table 6.8-4). The estimated returns to capital, especially for male microen-
trepreneurs, in our study are very high compared to the average interest rate 
charged by microfinance institutions in Pakistan which is approximately 
33.5%. 
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Table 6.6-5: Treatment Effects - Gender-based Heterogeneity in Various Outcomes 
Variable  Coefficients  Monthly Profits  Capital Stock  Hours Worked in a Day 
Treatment  
T  
 93.226* 
(47.95) 
 2229.716*** 
(263.48) 
 0.263 
(0.26) 
Ref: Baseline (t=1)         
t=2  
2t  
 796.537*** 
(40.34) 
 111.665 
(244.01) 
 -0.323 
(0.25) 
t=3  
3t  
 763.046*** 
(35.92) 
 -99.373 
(230.32) 
 -0.323* 
(0.18) 
Interaction Terms         
Sexbrwr x time2  
2f  
 -504.473*** 
(52.62) 
 132.900 
(280.82) 
 0.285 
(0.28) 
Sexbrwr x time3  
3f  
 -480.381*** 
(46.09) 
 28.709 
(261.29) 
 0.334 
(0.21) 
Sexbrwr x treatment  
TM  
 212.331*** 
(64.94) 
 106.496 
(330.78) 
 -0.297 
(0.29) 
Constant    8171.831*** 
(11.77) 
 24053.045*** 
(54.33) 
 9.893*** 
(0.04) 
N    1361  1361  1361 
R2    0.613  0.425  0.004 
Treatment for male microentrepreneurs = 
TMT    
Treatment for female microentrepreneurs = 
T  
Test1: There will be heterogeneous treatment effects if 0TM  
Test2: Female entrepreneurs will see no effect if 0T  
 
Robust standard errors are provided in parenthesis. Estimates are based on fixed effects model. 
Notes: Significance level (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).  Robust standard errors are clustered at the microenterprise level and reported in parentheses. The 
data was collected in three waves (t=1,2,3). The baseline data (t=1) was gathered in June 2010 and a two follow up surveys were conducted 5 and 10 months 
after the baseline. Variable Monthly Profits was measured by asking a direct question from the respondents on their monthly business profitability. Working 
Capital excludes value of land and buildings. 
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6.7 Conclusions 
In the global development discourse, women are considered relatively more 
credit constrained than their male counterparts. As a result, it is axiomatically 
believed that once women are given access to capital, they are able to generate 
very high returns to capital. Influenced by this belief, microfinance interven-
tions generally target women entrepreneurs. Recent randomized studies in Sri 
Lanka, Philippines and Mexico have puzzled microfinance experts. Contrary to 
popular beliefs, these studies did not find significant impact of access to capital 
on returns of female owned businesses. The evidence so far is mixed. The 
purpose of this essay was to bring further evidence on gender-based heteroge-
neity in business returns from Pakistan.  
For this research we partnered with Akhuwat Microfinance and gave a ran-
dom shock to the capital stock of randomly selected microenterprises. This 
study employed two levels of analyses to investigate gender-based differences 
in business returns. In the first level of analyses, using baseline data, we found 
large and significant gender-based heterogeneity in business returns. Women, 
on average, earned 20% (i.e. Rs. 1,671) less in monthly profits than men did. A 
major part of gender-based differences in business returns were explained by 
variation in capital stock. Compared to men, female microentrepreneurs in our 
sample had significantly lower levels of capital and once we controlled for 
variation in capital stock, the differences in business returns shrunk by 33.67%. 
By adding personality traits to the set of covariates, the average earning gap 
reduced to Rs.992. Using Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition, our full model ex-
plained 41% of earning differentials. In our analyses, capital stock and purdah 
contributed significantly to the endowment effects. A major portion i.e. 59% 
of total earning gap could not be explained with gender-based differences in 
observed characteristics. Personality domains had significant differential ef-
fects on monthly profits for both male and female microentrepreneurs. Fur-
ther examination of the unexplained differences revealed that compared to 
that of men, extraversion domain of female microentrepreneurs was associated 
with significantly lower monthly profits.  
In the second level of analyses, we used panel dataset and estimated gender-
based heterogeneity in treatment effects. We removed the gender specific time 
invariant effects by estimating a fixed effects model. For example, gender-
based differences in entrepreneurial abilities were differenced out in the esti-
mation process. We found large and significant gender-based heterogeneity in 
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treatment effects. In response to exogenous infusion of capital, the monthly 
profits of male microentrepreneurs showed a large and significant increase in 
monthly profits. Female microentrepreneurs, on the other hand, registered a 
rather small and less significant increase. The estimated monthly returns to 
capital for male and female microentrepreneurs were 13.1% and 4.2% respec-
tively which were substantially higher than the market interest rate in Pakistan. 
Overall, we believe that in the presence of structural constraints (or social bar-
riers), capital-alone approach will be of little help for female microentrepre-
neurs. 
 
 
Notes 
58 The story about Murshida is taken from a memoir of Prof. MuhammadYunus, foun-
der of Grameen Bank and the story about Razia was broadcasted in a documentary by 
Dane Tom Heinemann called “The Micro Debt”.   
59 Women’s lower participation in entrepreneurship is a common phenomenon and is 
not restricted to developing countries only. Female self-employment rates are 25% in 
the US and 20% in the UK, Ireland and Sweden.  
60 Some studies (e.g. Cowling et al. 1995; Kalleberg and Leicht 1991) did not any 
gender-based differences in firms’ performance.  
61 The manifestation of purdah though varies depending on geographical regions, socio-
economic conditions of the household and ethnicity(Roomi 2013).   
62 Source: http://hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr_theme/country-notes/PAK.pdf 
[Last accessed: June 22, 2016] 
63 We captured the variable by asking a direct question. ‘Do the female members of the 
household do purdah?’ 
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6.8 Appendices 
Table 6.8-1: Verification of Randomization-Male Microentrepreneurs 
0H : Both Groups have Equal 
Means 
Treatment  Control  t-test 
t-
statistic 
Mean SD  Mean SD  
Total number of the HH 5.49 1.92  5.74 2.14  1.210 
Household monthly income 13,223 4,744  12,794 4,421  0.903 
Household assets 795,309 805,707  731,087 911,831  0.718 
Household monthly expenditure 13,164 4,657  13,067 4,470  0.206 
Number of school going children 1.47 1.55  1.64 1.75  0.983 
Presence of Chronic ill in the 
Household 0.213 0.572  0.169 0.389  -0.880 
Years of education of borrower 5.93 3.6  5.12 4.26  1.960* 
Age 36.9 9.91  37.8 10.4  0.925 
Monthly Profits 8,617 1,159  8,515 1,151  0.849 
Revenues 10,452 2,981  10,278 2,574  0.603 
Monthly sales 26,104 31,583  26,728 33,680  0.184 
Business assets 32,050 56,174  31,921 48,010  0.024 
Hours of work in a day 10.20 2.22  10.00 1.95  0.566 
Capital Stock 24,870 3,751  24,434 4,266  1.040 
Credit requirement 23,118 15,207  24,144 17,838  0.595 
Neuroticism 2.49 0.661  2.48 0.651  0.063 
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Extraversion 3.5 0.626  3.53 0.639  0.397 
Openness 3.32 0.735  3.24 0.821  0.967 
Agreeableness 3.67 0.624  3.53 0.715  1.900* 
Conscientiousness 3.81 0.684  3.85 0.671  0.547 
Notes: Significance levels (*=10%,**=5%, ***=1%). The baseline data was collected in June 2010. Variable 
Monthly Profits was measured by asking a direct question from the respondents on their monthly business 
profitability. Capital stock excludes value of land and buildings. 
 
Table 6.8-2: Verification of randomization-Female Microentrepreneurs 
0H : Both Groups have Equal 
Means 
Treatment  Control  t-test 
t-
statistic 
Mean SD  Mean SD  
Total number of the HH 5.86 2.19  5.48 1.95  0.970 
Household monthly income 11,846 6,046  10,996 4,491  0.832 
Household assets 684,600 694,178  739,116 714,944  0.412 
Household monthly expenditure 11,777 5,988  11,304 4,309  0.473 
Number of school going children 1.55 1.66  1.64 1.74  0.271 
Presence of Chronic ill in the 
Household 0.308 0.61  0.26 0.6  0.419 
Years of education of borrower 2.68 3.58  3.14 4.41  0.621 
Age 42.60 9.62  42.90 9.18  0.174 
Monthly Profits 6,885 1,240  6,901 1,170  0.071 
Revenues 8,142 2,992  8,235 1,881  0.192 
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Monthly sales 21,748 35,439  28,543 27,562  1.120 
Business assets 24,840 23,079  22,174 4,146  0.806 
Hours of work in a day 9.06 1.85  9.06 1.89  0.004 
Capital Stock 22,086 3,973  22,174 4,146  0.115 
Credit requirement 25,662 23,793  20,100 9,119  1.570 
Neuroticism 2.50 0.64  2.46 0.65  0.326 
Extraversion 3.47 0.73  3.52 0.66  0.320 
Openness 3.29 0.793  3.21 0.729  0.597 
Agreeableness 3.52 0.631  3.80 0.573  2.500** 
Conscientiousness 3.98 0.652  3.90 0.685  0.671 
Notes: Significance levels (*=10%,**=5%, ***=1%). The baseline data was collected in June 2010. Variable 
Monthly Profits was measured by asking a direct question from the respondents on their monthly business 
profitability. Capital stock excludes value of land and buildings. 
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Table 6.8-3: Treatment Effects – Difference in Difference Estimates for Male and Female 
  Monthly Profits  Capital Stock  Daily hours of work 
  Male Female  Male Female  Male Female 
Ref: baseline          
Treatment  305.635*** 
(43.92) 
93.226* 
(48.24) 
 2330.595*** 
(200.54) 
2229.716*** 
(265.10) 
 -0.041 
(0.14) 
0.263 
(0.26) 
t=2  292.064*** 
(33.78) 
796.537*** 
(40.58) 
 244.565* 
(138.94) 
111.665 
(245.51) 
 -0.038 
(0.13) 
-0.323 
(0.25) 
t=3  282.665*** 
(28.87) 
763.046*** 
(36.14) 
 -70.665 
(123.35) 
-99.373 
(231.73) 
 0.011 
(0.10) 
-0.323* 
(0.19) 
Constant  8556.675*** 
(14.63) 
6914.671*** 
(15.89) 
 24622.783*** 
(66.39) 
22197.868*** 
(83.79) 
 10.142*** 
(0.05) 
9.088*** 
(0.08) 
N  1042 319  1042 319  1042 319 
R2  0.473 0.867  0.398 0.533  0.001 0.013 
Notes: Significance level (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).  Robust standard errors are clustered at the microenterprise level and reported in 
parentheses. The data was collected in three waves (t=1,2,3). The baseline data (t=1) was gathered in June 2010 and a two follow up surveys were 
conducted 5 and 10 months after the baseline. Variable Monthly Profits was measured by asking a direct question from the respondents on their 
monthly business profitability. Working Capital excludes value of land and buildings. 
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Table 6.8-4: Treatment Effects - Returns to Capital 
Male  Female 
Monthly Profits  Capital 
Stock 
 Returns 
To Capital 
 Monthly 
Profits 
 Capital 
Stock 
 Returns 
To Capital 
305.56  2,336.21  13.1%  93.23  2,229.72  4.2% 
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7  Concluding Remarks 
 
An efficient financial system is vital for pro-poor and inclusive economic 
growth. Based on economic principle of diminishing returns, it is generally be-
lieved that poor entrepreneurs should be able to generate higher marginal re-
turns to capital compared to richer entrepreneurs; and, therefore, in perfect 
markets, the capital should naturally flow to the poor (Armendariz and Mor-
duch 2010). Financial markets, however, are not perfect and as a result, a large 
number of the poor households are systematically excluded.  To ease market 
frictions, microfinance has arguably emerged as an effective development in-
tervention and has so far reached millions of the poor households worldwide. 
Initial impact studies and inspiring stories of microfinance borrowers from 
around the world presented microfinance as a ‘development success’; however, 
recent randomized impact evaluation studies showed mixed results. Microfi-
nance scholars and practitioners are clearly divided on the ‘undisputed success 
narrative’ of microfinance. Armendariz and Morduch (2010) acknowledges the 
importance of microfinance in improving lives of the poor but at the same 
time they consider microfinance to be neither a ‘panacea’ nor a ‘magic bullet’. 
Media reports regarding suicide of microfinance borrowers in India in 2010 
have further put a question mark on the usefulness of microfinance.   
In an effort to bring further evidence on the effectiveness of microfinance, 
in partnership with Akhuwat, we conducted a field experiment in Pakistan. 
Akhuwat Microfinance has been providing interest free loans to the poor since 
2001. In this experiment, we gave exogenous shock to the capital stock of ran-
domly selected microenterprises. The treatment was given in the form of in-
terest free loans. Two follow-up surveys were conducted. The first follow-up 
survey was conducted 5 months after the baseline and the second follow-up 
was conducted 10 months after the baseline.  
Along with estimating the treatment effects, we were also curious to know 
that why some microenterprises, otherwise eligible, do not apply for Akhu-
wat’s interest free microcredit. We presented our research findings in three 
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core essays. The first essay examined the determinants of non-participation in 
Akhuwat’s microcredit program; the second essay estimated the impact of Ak-
huwat’s microcredit on various business outcomes; and the third essay investi-
gated the gender-based heterogeneity in monthly profits and treatment effects.  
The stated aim of most microcredit programs is to target the poor, how-
ever, various research studies have documented that a large number of poor 
households, though eligible for microcredit, do not participate. We do not 
know if such high non-participation is triggered by limited supply or lack of 
demand. The supply side barriers to participation have been adequately re-
searched; nevertheless, we know very little of its demand side which is caused 
by poor’s voluntary or self-exclusion. The purpose of our first essay was to ex-
amine reasons for not participating in the Akhuwat’s microcredit program by 
comparing group of Applicants and Eligible-non-Applicants. In our empirical 
analysis, besides household and business level covariates, we also controlled 
for personality traits of microentrepreneurs, different learning episodes related 
to their credit histories and their perceptions about microfinance institutions’ 
loan recovery methods. For meaning traits, we used Big Five Personality In-
ventory developed by National Institute of Psychology, Pakistan. We concep-
tualized learning at two different levels; that is endogenous learning from ex-
perimentation and exogenous learning from peers.  
Based on probit marginal effects, we found that relatively older microentre-
preneurs are more likely to apply for Akhuwat’s loan. Education in our sample 
had no effect on probability of participation. There are two possible explana-
tions for this effect. The first explanation is sample specific. Microenterprises 
in our sample operate subsistence businesses which generally require lower 
levels of skills. In such businesses, education may not sufficiently explain busi-
ness growth and hence appetite for more credit. The second explanation may 
arise from threshold effects. More often than not, businesses need minimum 
threshold investment to finance their growth cycle. More able entrepreneurs 
may require larger loans to meet that threshold and, therefore, they may not be 
interested in smaller loans. In other words, education does not lead microen-
trepreneurs to apply for smaller loans which may be a possible explanation in 
case of Akhuwat. In our opinion, institutions like Akhuwat should focus more 
on providing flexible products rather than sticking to a rigid product line 
where the loan amounts are predetermined. This step will better cater the di-
verse needs of microentrepreneurs operating at different growth cycles.   
Our analysis revealed that Akhuwat attracted poor households who were 
relatively more vulnerable. The group of applicants reported higher incidence 
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of chronic illness in their household and they also reported to be doing busi-
ness for survival. Survivalists operated smaller businesses with relatively lower 
profitability despite committing more hours to the business. It may be the case 
that part of the Akhuwat’s loan may be spent on household consumption to 
cope with different vulnerabilities. We believe that instead of solely focusing 
on microcredit, microfinance institution should also offer affordable insurance 
products as well consumption loans.  
Akhuwat follows a very innovative credit delivery model. They have part-
nered with a vast network of mosques in Pakistan. Since loans are disbursed 
inside the mosque, we expected that individual with higher mosque attendance 
will have better networks and access to information; and hence they will be 
more likely to apply for Akhuwat’s microcredit. Contrary to our expectations, 
we did not find any effect of mosque attendance on participation.  
Among five personality traits, only conscientiousness was a significant pre-
dictor of participation. Microentrepreneurs who reported a relatively higher 
score on conscientiousness scale were more likely to apply for Akhuwat’s loan. 
A person high in conscientiousness is scrupulous, punctual, consistent, perse-
vering, organized and reliable. We are aware that inclusion of personality traits 
in our model has little practical relevance as personality traits are stable and 
may not be influenced through a policy instrument especially in the shorter 
run. Their inclusion nonetheless improves the explanatory power of our 
model.  
We found that both exogenous and endogenous learnings matter.  We have 
strong evidence that individuals learn from credit histories which influence 
their participation decision in a microcredit program. Besides learning from 
their own experience, individuals have the ability to learn from others. Consis-
tent with our findings, it is not surprising that most MFIs advertise success 
stories of their clients to create more demand for their products. Besides learn-
ing, microentrepreneurs’ perception about contract enforcement is a key de-
terminant of participation. When individuals perceive microfinance institu-
tions’ loan recovery methods to be coercive or high handed, it significantly 
reduces the probability of participation. The problem multiplies when negative 
reports on microfinance emerge in mass media. Suicide of microfinance bor-
rowers in India and other similar stories further add to the pessimism of po-
tential clients. Due to these incidents, potential clients, otherwise creditworthy, 
will shy away from microcredit. We believe that microfinance industry will 
benefit from improving their image with regards to contract enforcement. This 
step will stimulate more demand for microcredit. 
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The second essay estimated returns to capital. The global microfinance 
movement is driven by a fundamental claim that once poor microentrepre-
neurs are given access to capital, they are able to generate high returns. How-
ever, credible evidence on returns to capital is mixed and too limited to sub-
stantiate this claim. This essay reported on the outcomes of an experiment in 
which we gave exogenous shock to the capital stock of randomly selected mi-
croenterprises. The treatment was provided in the form of interest free loans 
which was equivalent to 41% of median capital stock of microenterprises.  
Overall we found that microfinance does help. In our sample, the exoge-
nous infusion of capital significantly increased capital stock and as result the 
monthly profits also increased. Using single difference and difference in differ-
ence estimators, we found that compared to control group, the monthly prof-
its of the treatment group significantly increased in the range of Rs. 241 and 
Rs. 275.  Additional capital did not induce more effort from treated microen-
trepreneurs. In other words, the incremental increase in monthly profits was 
caused by exogenous capital alone. Returns to capital for microenterprises in 
our sample were indeed very high. Using randomized treatment as an instru-
ment for capital stock, the estimated annual returns to capital were 103.2% – 
142.8% which were substantially higher than the market interest rate of 12.5% 
and microfinance annual lending rate of 33.5% in Pakistan. Our results are 
consistent with studies done in Sri Lanka and Mexico (De Mel et al. 2008, 
McKenzie and Woodruff 2008). One of the commonalities that we share with 
these studies is that we conducted this research on small subsistence busi-
nesses. This may be one of the reasons that all these studies including ours 
found very large and significant impact of microcredit on various business 
outcomes. Due to lack of data we could not control for spillover effects. In 
case of any positive spillovers, our results provide the lower bound of true es-
timates. 
In this study, we used Akhuwat’s family enterprise loan as a treatment.  
This product accounts for 91% of Akhuwat’s loan portfolio. We believe that 
our results are at least valid in the context of Akhuwat which caters to the need 
of small microenterprises. In this paper we found that small microenterprises 
are indeed capable of producing very large returns which holds a great promise 
for development of a sustainable microfinance sector in Pakistan. 94% of 
small and medium enterprises in Pakistan have no access to formal credit. The 
market is wide open for microfinance industry in Pakistan to tap this huge po-
tential.  
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In the third essay, we investigated gender-based heterogeneity in monthly 
profits and treatment effects. In developing countries, compared to men, 
women are believed to be more credit constrained and, therefore, they are 
considered to be more capable of generating higher marginal returns to capital. 
For this very reason, microfinance programs predominantly focus on female 
microentrepreneurs with a hope that improved access to capital will result in 
growth of their businesses. Surprisingly enough, recent randomized studies in 
Sri Lanka, Philippines and Mexico do not show any positive impact of access 
to credit on female microentrepreneurs which challenges the popular narrative 
of ‘women being more credit constrained’. To investigate this puzzle further, 
we examined the gender-based heterogeneity in business returns and treatment 
effects in a field experimental. 
In this essay, we explored gender-based heterogeneity at two levels. In the 
first level of analyses, we used baseline data to establish and explain any gen-
der-based differences in various business outcomes. In the second level of 
analyses, we investigated gender-based heterogeneity in treatment effects.  
In the baseline data, we found significant gender-based heterogeneity in 
capital stock and monthly profits of microenterprises. Compared to men, 
women entrepreneurs earned 20% less in monthly profits. A major portion of 
gender-based heterogeneity in profits was explained by women’s lower level of 
capital stock. Once we controlled for purdah, which acts a structural constraint 
in labor markets, the differences significantly shrunk. The residual differences 
were still high and significant. Using Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition, we found 
that gender-based differences in observed characteristics explain 41% of earn-
ing gaps. Among all variables, capital and the prevalence of purdah were the 
only two significant predictors. The remaining 59% of the unexplained gap can 
be either through discrimination against women or gender-based differences in 
preferences. Compared to men, extravert women were significantly penalized. 
Mueller and Plug(2006)also found relatively lower returns on extraversion for 
women in the US. In the context of Pakistan, extraversion may not be a likable 
trait for female entrepreneurs because of it conservative and patriarchal soci-
ety. Purdah –a possible impediment in access to labour markets –limits 
women’s entrepreneurship potential. Our findings suggest that capital alone 
approach is not enough. Policy makers should also focus on addressing 
women-specific structural barriers in the developing world.  
Treatment in our sample had a differential effect on male and female mi-
croentrepreneurs. Using panel dataset, we found that both male and female 
microentrepreneurs benefited from additional capital though they exhibited 
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large and statistically significant heterogeneity in treatment effects. Monthly 
profits of treated men increased by Rs306. Treated women, on the other hand, 
could only see a modest and less significant increase of Rs.93 in their monthly 
profits. The estimated monthly returns to capital were 13.1% and 4.1% for 
men and women respectively. Albeit significantly heterogeneous, these returns 
are considerably higher than the interest rates charged by microfinance indus-
try in Pakistan. Our findings are consistent with recent randomized studies in 
Sri Lanka and Mexico. Overall, male entrepreneurs in our study benefited 
more from access to capital than their female counterparts which is contrary to 
popular belief.  
As concluding remark, I would also like to point out that Akhuwat microfi-
nance in its own right is a unique model. On the one hand, major world devel-
opment organizations and governments rely on grant-based programs for the 
poor and on the other hand they promote microfinance interventions to com-
bat poverty. The underlying assumption behind these policies is that grant-
dependent poor will eventually graduate to the next level and will be able to 
afford rather expensive microcredit. In our opinion, the introduction of Ak-
huwat-style interest-free model between grant-based programs and interest-
bearing microfinance will make the transition smoother for the poor. 
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